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STILL HOURS.

BY

RICHARD ROTHE.

TRANSLATED BY JANE T. STODDART.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY THE
REV. JOHN MACPHERSON, M.A.

London:
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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

THE name of Rothe is not by any means familiar to the English reader, but it may be confidently expected that the translation of the volume which is now presented will most favourably introduce that name to the notice of the cultured and thoughtful, as that of one to whom high rank among his own countrymen as a thinker and scholar has been most deservedly accorded. The sententious utterances which constitute the work before us reveal at once the man of deeply disciplined Christian character, and of profound and thoroughly matured scholarship. In one respect such a collection of sayings on a wide range of subjects forms a fitting introduction to the study of the life-work of one who devoted all his powers to the elucidation of many of those themes to which passing reference is made; but, in another respect, it presupposes a certain acquaintance with the author's intellectual characteristics and theological position, without which many of the summary remarks and terse criticisms could not be fully appreciated.

The principal source for information regarding the life and scientific development of our author is

the biography constructed by Professor Nippold, of Bern, the learned editor of the German original of "Still Hours," almost entirely from Rothe's own extensive and instructive correspondence. This large work of twelve hundred pages sets forth, according to its promise, a most vivid picture of the Christian life of a noble, thoughtful, and profoundly spiritual man; and from its stores we shall freely draw the materials specially required for our present purpose. The life of one who gave himself completely, as Rothe did, to realize the vocation of the scholar, must necessarily be uneventful as concerns the record of the outward life and movement; but as a study of moral and spiritual development, as yielding the story of a quiet life of rich humanity, where, side by side with abstract speculation, we find the most genial and intense display of warm human affections, these letters deserve and amply reward careful consideration. It will be the object of this short sketch to set before the reader what it seems desirable that he should know regarding the author, in order to the better understanding of the point and purpose of his statements and criticisms of previous and contemporary systems and modes of thought.

Richard Rothe was born on the 30th January, 1799, in Posen, a city of Prussian Poland, where his father held a high and responsible appointment under the Government. The residence of the family was soon after changed to Stettin, and a few years later to Breslau in Silesia, with which Rothe's

youthful days are specially associated. His mother belonged to a family which had long occupied distinguished positions in the public services, and was herself a woman of high mental endowment and rich Christian experience. The days in which they lived were unsettled, and a vigorous effort was being made to reduce the administration of the several provinces of the kingdom under one general system. The duty of the elder Rothe in his office at Breslau was to arrange and determine the incidence of taxation for the province, and generally to superintend the assessment and collection of the revenue. His knowledge of principles and details seems to have been very remarkable, and his official fidelity and energy called forth, on several occasions, special recognition and gratifying marks of the approval of distinguished statesmen. Alongside of intellectual capacity of an unusually high order on the part of both parents we find the most attractive and beautiful domestic qualities. In such a home, presided over by those whose virtues commanded at once respect and love, Richard Rothe was from his earliest years surrounded by influences which powerfully contributed to mould that character which, in so remarkable a degree, awakened in all who knew him sentiments of high esteem and warm affection.

Having passed through the usual course at the Reformed Frederick Gymnasium in Breslau, he was ready to enter upon his university course. He was now in the eighteenth year of his age. Religious

and moral, as well as political and social, questions had already occupied much of his attention; conversations in the home on these subjects had been eagerly listened to, and discussions among his companions on themes which occupied their parents thoughts had been heartily and intelligently shared in by young Rothe. Preparation for confirmation led him very seriously to consider his personal attitude toward God and religious truth. He realized very clearly the great truth that religion essentially consists in direct personal fellowship with God. The key-note was thus struck in his early years which sounds through his entire religious life. The tendency to depreciate carefully formulated dogmas, which was so marked a characteristic of his scientific attitude as a theologian, appears in his earliest expressions of religious experience, alongside of an intense realization of the power and comfort of prayer in the name of Jesus, to which, amid all his subsequent subtile theorisings, he held with a tender, childlike faith.

Referring to this period of his life, Rothe has recorded in his journal in a characteristic way the leading features of his spiritual experience. "I had found my Lord and Redeemer," he says, "without the help of any human teacher, and independently of any traditional ascetic method, having been inwardly drawn towards Him, at a very early period, apart from any particular outward influence, under the pressure of a gradually deepening feeling

of a personal, as well as a universal human need. But it never occurred to me that there must be anything of a traditional and statutory, or generally of a conventional character, in the Christian doctrine of faith and in the Christian construction of man's life. In short, my Christianity was of a very modern sort; it fearlessly kept itself open on every side, wherever in all God's wide world it might receive influences in a truly human way."

This liberal or doctrinally lax tendency was greatly fostered by the course of reading from the works of modern German writers, which at this period he diligently prosecuted. Schiller, Goethe, Richter, Schlegel, Tieck, and Fouqué were his favourite poets; and the mystical, pious sayings of Novalis exercised over him, as we might well expect, a wonderful fascination. In later years he cherished this love for the writings of Novalis, and over a hundred of the extracts forming the texts for the remarks which constitute the "Still Hours" are taken from the works of this gentle religious poet and dreamer. The heart of Rothe entwined itself around the verities of the Christian faith, especially around all that is most essential and characteristic in the life of Jesus. This warm, personal piety was always a marked feature in Rothe's life. Christianity was with him something essentially supernatural, and the superficial rationalism of the age could never have any attraction for him.

After a short time spent in travel along with a

school companion, Rothe, now in his eighteenth year, entered the University of Heidelberg. This celebrated seat of learning had recently undergone a thorough reorganization, and though it had not yet quite recovered from the loss of such men as Marheineke, De Wette, and Neander, who had been transferred to the recently founded University of Berlin, there were still among its professors men whose character and learning alike placed them in the first rank as teachers of youth.

The two professors who most powerfully influenced Rothe during his student years, and in such a way as to affect and largely determine his whole subsequent course in life, were Daub and Abegg. The name of the former is still well known to every student of German theology, and though the name of the latter is scarcely remembered at all, we shall find that he, no less than the other, gave a powerful impulse to Rothe's moral and spiritual development. Daub was then at the summit of his illustrious career, and as a speculative theologian, under the influence successively of Schelling's and of Hegel's philosophical theories, he endeavoured to commend Christianity to the cultured and scientific by presenting it under the forms demanded by current systems of philosophy. There was one side of Rothe's nature which demanded that religious truth should have expression given it in strict accordance with the most rigorous requirements of science; and in Daub's speculative presentation of Christian

truth Rothe found his scientific demands most satisfactorily met. Abegg, on the other hand, was a profoundly spiritual man, who devoted all his powers to the building up of the moral and spiritual character of the young men around, and who seemed, in an altogether remarkable manner, to have succeeded in infusing his own moral earnestness and intense spirituality into the noblest of the students, who with rare affection and reverence seated themselves at his feet. Such a teacher early won a ruling influence over Rothe, whose sensitive religious nature and genuine piety craved for that spiritual nourishment which Abegg knew how to impart in so stimulating and winning a way.

"Daub is a man," says Rothe, in a letter to his father, written during his first session, "of whom, not only Heidelberg, but our whole German fatherland should be proud. I have no hesitation in saying that he is the first of all living academical teachers and the first of all men. The enthusiasm with which he is here regarded is universal. . . . I have never heard any one who can say so much in few words." It was Rothe's privilege to be received by this great thinker in familiar social intercourse, and his letters are full of enthusiastic references to the scientific stimulus which he gains from the professor's academical lectures and his conversations with him in his own home.

At this time Daub's great work, "Judas Iscariot," appeared, in which the entire speculative system was

unfolded in the elaborate treatment which it gave to the doctrine of human sin. The attempt made in this work to recommend Christianity to men of science by expressing religious ideas in terms of philosophical ideas did not meet with the approval of his young scholar and enthusiastic admirer. In a letter, written in July, 1818, Rothe maintains that such philosophising does not present the essential element in theology. On the contrary, he holds that theology is concerned with the purely positive and historical development and exposition of dogma, especially of the two fundamental doctrines of Christianity, the divinity or Divine sonship of Jesus Christ, and the redemption of man by Him,—these two doctrines being again reducible to the doctrine of the Trinity. His attitude towards Daub's system was not that of one who gave it anything like an unqualified acceptance. Writing toward the close of that same year, he expresses his dissatisfaction with the over-elaborateness and speculative subtilty of Daub's theology, and yearns, with all the longing of an earnest, religious nature, after the simplicity that is in the doctrine of Christ Jesus. While then there was much in the teaching and influence of the speculative theologian that powerfully and permanently impressed the ardent and inquisitive young student, we find in Rothe no tendency to a onesided satisfaction with that which afforded delightful exercise to his intellectual nature, while it left the emotional and religious side of his being unsupplied and unnourished.

It was the singular good fortune of Rothe to have in another of his revered teachers one who could in the most admirable way both satisfy and stimulate all his religious and spiritual aspirations. Rothe's admiration and affection for the devout and eminently pious Abegg receive unequivocal and unrestrained expression in his letters. "Abegg," he says in a letter of that period, "is a true man according to the truth as it is in Christ, a man in whom Christ is formed, as the Scripture says, who is penetrated through and through with all that is most fundamental in Christianity, who can look on nothing but with Christian eyes. . . . Hence Abegg is a most distinguished and excellent man, who is here revered as almost an angel; and he is a man of extraordinary philological, and especially biblico-philological, acquirements, who above all stands where he stands as a man, and never loses his rank as a true and genuine character." This admirable and venerable man taught chiefly New Testament exegesis, and we find Rothe attending his lectures on Romans, on Philippians, on Corinthians. These lectures were so appreciated, that numbers of theologians, whose course at college had been completed, were accustomed to come into the city as opportunity was afforded, simply that they might be present as listeners to those thoughtful and suggestive expositions of Scripture. Quite as important in the spiritual development of Rothe were the sermons which Abegg delivered regularly in one of

the city churches. He describes these sermons as bearing no trace of art, being simple expositions of short Bible texts. They had no formal divisions, but the truth was unfolded according to a natural sequence; they were full of references to practical Christian experience and of earnest appeal free from all affectation. They were delivered without any manuscript being used, and indeed were never written but carefully thought out. Under two such men, both of them men of undoubted personal piety, but in the one the speculative and systematic, in the other, the practical and expository treatment of religious and scriptural truth, receiving special development, the theological students of Heidelberg of that period must be regarded as having been favoured in no ordinary degree.

Rothe's college course at Heidelberg was fruitful in many ways, at once in the discipline of his mental powers, and in the formation of character. Here he gained an insight into problems that were to occupy his attention all through life, and here he had those truth-loving principles established which contributed so largely to secure for him a distinctive position and to give to all his work such an air of freshness and originality. His residence at Heidelberg was brought to a close about the middle of the year 1819. Before quitting the university, Rothe prepared and delivered his first sermon. The preparation of this discourse seems to have given him much anxious concern. He wrote in full detail to his father in reference to the text

which he had selected and his treatment of it, and also in reference to his experiences on the occasion of its delivery. The text chosen was 2 Peter i. 2–11. After a short introduction he divided his discourse into two parts: he treated, first, of the grace and benefits which God has given us in Christ; and, second, of the fruits which this grace produces in the hearts of the redeemed. He hoped in this way, he tells us, to be able to show what is specifically Christian in the religion of the Christian, so that his first sermon might be an introduction to all sermons that he might afterwards preach.

Very characteristic is the description which Rothe gives of his experiences on this interesting occasion. The place chosen for his first pulpit effort was a small village, called Mauer, a few miles distant from Heidelberg. Here the father of one of his fellow students, with whom he was specially intimate, was pastor, and in company with his friend he walked out on the Saturday evening to the quiet parsonage. The greeting given him on his arrival proved to Rothe's sensitive and loving nature the very best possible preparation for the work of the coming Sabbath. The worthy pastor and his wife received the young student with such hearty frankness and genuine kindliness as immediately won his heart. Their very appearance reminded him of a much-loved uncle and aunt; and the manner in which he was received by them and welcomed to the bosom of their family made him at once feel as if he were

among old and well tried friends. When on Sabbath morning he entered the church, that shyness which was natural to him, and often caused discomfort and uneasiness, had completely vanished, and he advanced without any tremor or agitation to the conspicuous isolation of the pulpit. His position was not made any easier by the presence of seven of his fellow students, who walked out that morning from Heidelberg to hear him preach.

His own personal experience through the service was most delightful. He found no difficulty in making himself heard, and he had the satisfaction of observing that he had completely secured the attention of his audience. This first hour spent by him in the pulpit was one of the pleasantest he had ever known. "I was thoroughly impressed," he says, "with the idea that I was now for the first time in my own proper element, and that I had now found my true life work." He was so fascinated with the solemn services which he was called to conduct, that he declares that it was well for him that he was obliged to hasten away, as otherwise he might have been tempted to give himself so constantly to preaching, that his proper studies would have been utterly neglected. This delight experienced in preaching did not arise, as we may be very sure from the character of the man, from any inordinate, vain conceit of his own qualifications and immediate success as a preacher. He was much dissatisfied with the sermon which he had delivered, but not in such

a way as to regret his delivery of it. He carefully noted its faults, that he might avoid them in future. He saw that only long and careful practice would enable him truly and faithfully to represent in words the life which lives in us, and to this task he resolved seriously and diligently to apply himself.

After a brief but thoroughly enjoyable and profitable holiday, spent in travel in Switzerland and southern Germany, along with a congenial companion, we find Rothe entered as a student for the winter session at the University of Berlin. His proper college course having been finished at Heidelberg, he intended by his residence at Berlin to take advantage, not only of the classes of the university, but also of all opportunities for culture which the learned society of the city at that time so abundantly afforded.

Of the theological professors with whom Rothe came into contact, undoubtedly Schleiermacher and Neander most powerfully and materially influenced his views, and aided in the formation and development of his scientific opinions. He attended faithfully the classes of Neander on Church history and on the history of dogmas. He found him a hard-working professor, who made his students work; and he amusingly complains that his fingers ached with the amount of matter which he was obliged to take down from his lectures, though he heartily admits that he always found the quality to be quite proportionate to the quantity. He speaks with enthusiasm of the noble character of Neander's Christian life, and evi-

dently a deep impression was made by the saintliness and purity of the professor's walk and conversation. Rothe however calls attention to a certain melancholy and dejected air about him that detracted somewhat from the general beauty and attractiveness of his character, and did much to interfere with his success among the youths who gathered around him. The longer he associated with Neander, the more thoroughly he respected him, and came to see in him rich fountains of spiritual life.

Rothe also attended the lectures of Schleiermacher on the life of Jesus. These he found extremely interesting and in many ways suggestive. He complains however that they were critical rather than historical, and that the net positive result from them was not great. As a preacher Schleiermacher had a great reputation and exerted a powerful influence. Accordingly Rothe regularly attended his preaching, not without profit, although all the while keenly alive to certain serious deficiencies both in the matter and in the method of these discourses. He compared them with those of Abegg, from which he had reaped such advantage in Heidelberg. Those of Schleiermacher lacked the spirituality so characteristic of the sermons of the Heidelberg preacher. They were useful and instructive expositions of Scripture passages, approached however rather from without than from within. Upon the whole, his experiences of Berlin society were unfavourable, and during the two sessions spent there he often compared the habits

of life in this city and university very unfavourably with those of Heidelberg.

While resident in Berlin, Rothe met with and was powerfully influenced by some of the more prominent leaders of the Pietist party. There was one side of his nature readily and easily affected by such contemplative and purely devotional modes of thought, and soon repelled by anything that bore an aspect of cold and formal externalism or of rigid and dogmatic ecclesiasticism. In Berlin he frequented the society of the devout, many of whom, impatiently demanding greater earnestness and purity of life than the Church could show, had withdrawn from Church communion, and gathered together in meetings for spiritual edification and devotional reading of Scripture. The unsatisfactory condition of the Lutheran Church of that period—the prevailing worldliness of its members, and the generally low tone of spiritual life within its pale—had driven many of the noblest and saintliest of men to join the separatists, and actively to promote the interests of what was perhaps not a non-sectarian, but at least a non-ecclesiastical form of Christianity.

In the Pietism of that time there was much to attract one of so devout and deeply religious a nature as Rothe. It was as yet a genuinely healthy movement, which was largely felt, and proved mightily influential upon some of the young contemporaries of Rothe, who were destined afterwards to rank among the most distinguished ornaments of the

Church. Tholuck, Thomasius, and Stier may be named as illustrations of the noble fruit of the much-needed protest against the blighting rationalism and cold, dead orthodoxy that had too long borne sway. The name Pietist was applied as a term of reproach, just as Christian was at first, and as Methodist, Puritan, etc., have been applied in later times. Rothe employs the term, as most fitly designating those who had been awakened to a new life of true Christian faith. Writing in the year 1862, he thus uses the name, while repudiating that which had then come to be designated by it. "I know very well," he says, "what Pietism is, for I have been a Pietist myself, and that in good faith, and at a time when Pietists did not stand, as now they do, in honour and favour, as conservative people, but were laughed at, and that —which is a material element in the case—by those whose ridicule could not but painfully affect any tender and feeling heart."

What was genuine and true in Pietism was never abandoned by Rothe, but by-and-by he became estranged from those who were regarded as leaders of the movement, because of their narrowness and their assumption of an exclusive possession of all that was good. Even while among them Rothe felt repelled by their want of charity toward those who did not belong to their party. In the paper from which we have just quoted, Rothe proceeds to say that Pietism is true Christian piety, but not *the* Christian piety; it is a form of Christianity, and indeed such a form

as is, when sincerely and consistently professed, most honourable and estimable, but yet only one form among many others, and not necessarily the highest of all. Rothe found reason to object to Pietism as a system, not only for its objectionable exclusiveness, but also on account of its being occupied altogether with religious and not also with moral interests, and so developing a purely personal or private form of Christianity, and overlooking the social elements and influences in Christianity, which are properly developed in the organization and ordinances of the Christian Church. "Hence," he says, "we cannot conceive of a Pietistic people, though we can conceive of a Christian people." Individualism, in short, was the bane of Pietism.

Perhaps, after all, we shall best describe the religious position of Rothe at this period by saying that he was a man of decided personal piety. The warmth of his religious nature showed itself freely under the genial influences by which he was then more immediately surrounded. A few words from a letter written to his father from Berlin, during the session of 1820, will show in a very pleasing way the simplicity and earnestness of his Christian faith. "How often," he says, "does one find a jewel where least expected! In one of the very smallest and least pretentious of churches there is perhaps the very best preacher in all Berlin, Pastor Löffler, with whom I was first made acquainted by Neander, and from whom I shall to-morrow, along with Schrötter,

Thielau, and Heege, receive the holy communion. In view of this I have been wishing that I could, along with you both, my dear parents, examine myself, and for sins and errors, for which the gracious God has promised me forgiveness, also obtain forgiveness from you. I fall upon your necks, and know indeed that you are not inexorable, and on my hearty sorrow and repentance from the heart forgive. Pray for me, that to me this bread of everlasting life may be more blessed than all earthly nourishment. How willingly would I behold this mortal body constantly wasting away into dust and ashes, if only the immortal soul in its eternal and unchangeable nature be saved with an everlasting salvation!"

After two years spent in Berlin, Rothe passed into the theological seminary of Wittenberg. Here he entered upon a course of thorough practical training for the work of the Christian ministry. At the university theology had been studied as a science, but in these seminaries the work is wholly of a homiletical and pastoral character, engaged upon in a purely practical way, in order to equip candidates for the pastoral office in regard to all the details of their future parochial duties—as preachers, catechists, and visitors in the homes of their people. Bible study is earnestly and largely prosecuted, sermon plans are sketched and criticised, discourses are preached to rustic audiences from pulpits in the surrounding districts, listened to by professors and fellow students, both manner and matter being subsequently made

subject of discussion. Here Rothe was surrounded by society of the most delightful description, and the warm spiritual atmosphere of the place, and the earnest religious lives of teachers and fellow students, proved stimulating in no ordinary degree. Among the teachers in the seminary, the one who most powerfully influenced Rothe was Heubner, a man of rare force of character, and an earnest and devoted worker in the Lord's vineyard.

Rothe continued, during his stay at the seminary, to work faithfully in departments to which his attention had been specially turned in the later years of his university course. He gave attention to the scientific exegesis of the text of the Old and New Testaments, and laid the foundation of subsequent literary work in this department; but he devoted his time and strength most ungrudgingly to historical investigations, and already had given himself to elaborate studies in the original sources of our knowledge of the beginnings of Christianity—a department which he was destined yet to make so peculiarly his own. All the while however Rothe was most conscientiously diligent in his prosecution of the practical studies and his discharge of probationary duties, which constituted the special functions of the seminary. He enthusiastically engaged upon the work of preaching and catechising, taking part, wherever opportunities were presented, in all the different forms and various departments of pastoral work.

His stay at Wittenberg marks a very important stage in his spiritual development, in which the serious impressions made during his residence in Berlin were greatly deepened, and became productive of rich fruit. Hitherto it could only be said that Rothe was pietistically inclined, but now he threw himself heart and soul into the movement. His fellowship with Stier in the seminary was mainly instrumental in leading Rothe to give in his adhesion without reserve to that party, which still continued to be everywhere spoken against. Rothe and Stier, who were exactly of an age, were powerfully attracted to one another, although in many respects their dissimilarities rather than their resemblances would first arrest attention. They were both ardently attached to the same evangelical faith, and yearned after thorough emancipation from the chilling influence of that dreary ecclesiasticism of orthodox propositions and verbal formularies, into which no living spirit was any longer infused. It is with no ordinary enthusiasm that Rothe described his friend and enlarged upon their common sympathies. "Stier," he says, "is a Christian of the old order; a noble mixture, or rather thorough blending, of the fine scriptural faith of the sixteenth century and of the deep spiritual piety of the Spener school." With such a companion he felt in the presence of a true believer who had strong personal conviction and assurance of the truth.

His letters written during this period are such as

would satisfy the most ardent and extreme revivalist. He tells of meetings held, of spiritual blessings bestowed; he quotes fragments of hymns, and bewails the deadness and formality which he beheld generally prevalent around. It would have been well for the movement, and well too for Rothe, had the leaders of this most desirable and hopeful religious tendency, with its much-needed protest against pure intellectualism and heartless formalism, been more equally balanced in the proportion of their intellectual and emotional faculties. It soon however became only too evident that there were among them few men, if any, of Rothe's type; that while they were undoubtedly good, they were also, for the most part, as undoubtedly narrow; that they had no comprehension of or patience with the profounder thought of the great thinker who was among them; that the tendency was developing within the party to regard intelligent reflection as profane, and unreflecting piety as the most satisfactory proof of the presence of simple religious faith. Very gradually this divergence between Rothe and the members of the Pietist party developed, until at last their virtual separation from one another was mutually recognised. This estrangement was really most injurious both to Rothe and to his earlier friends. There is no reason why piety should assume such forms as to alienate the intellectual and the rationally inquisitive. For pious men with intellectual tendencies and capacities like those of Rothe's Pietism ought, not grudgingly,

but heartily, to afford the freest scope. Such investigations, conducted by a man of personal piety, conscious of possessing the confidence of his brethren, would broaden, in such a way as to strengthen, the foundations upon which all true religion rests. The loss to Pietism, in respect of influence on those around, and of moral and religious power within its own circle, from the secession of Rothe was very serious. To himself also this alienation was most disastrous. Largely sympathetic with their religious tendencies, yet conscious of being regarded by them with coldness and suspicion, his scientific investigations were henceforth pursued without the presence of those guards and securities which the surroundings of the warm spiritual life of the religious community would have afforded. Earnest personal piety always continued a notable feature in Rothe's character; but more and more, as years rolled on, he found scientific fellowship among those whose sympathies had never gone in that direction. This accounts for the strange and sudden transitions in his writings from fearless, even ruthless, statements of intellectual conclusions to warm, hearty breathings of a pure devotional spirit.

During a residence in Breslau of about six months as a licentiate, Rothe associated with several Christian men in their endeavours to promote the interests of true religion. Here he enjoyed much profitable intercourse with Steffens and Scheibel. Together with other likeminded men, they were wont to meet

for prayer and devotional reading and exposition of Scripture. But, while finding rich nourishment for his spiritual nature in such pious exercises, Rothe was actively engaged in historical studies upon the original sources of early Church history, and in laborious researches into the development of Paulicianism, Manichæism, and Priscillianism he was laying the foundations for his great work on the "Beginnings of the Christian Church." Already he was drawing off from some with whom he had been brought in contact in the revival gatherings which he frequented. He tells of one, for example, "who, in his zeal against the natural man, and especially against the reason, goes so far as to affirm that the natural man is worse than a beast, and who reaches the conclusion that the regenerate cannot sin." Rothe characterizes these positions as dangerous, and as having a tendency like the doctrine of Gichtel, an enthusiast and separatist of the school of Böhme, but much more violent and extreme than his master. But while repudiating all such views, Rothe very characteristically concludes by a lamentation over his own sinfulness.

In the beginning of August, 1823, Rothe received and accepted from Government the appointment of preacher to the German embassy at Rome, and on October 12th he was ordained in Berlin. During the following month he married a young lady in Wittenberg, whose sisters were married to Heubner and August Hahn. By this union Rothe was

brought into close, lifelong connexion with those two able and influential theologians, to whom he was largely indebted for much wise counsel and brotherly help. Entering upon his work in Rome in the beginning of 1824, he found himself surrounded by a congenial society, and in the discharge of his spiritual duties he had great comfort and joy. By young men his arrival was hailed with peculiar delight, and his eminently suggestive discourses proved thoroughly suitable to the audience which gathered around him there. Of all whom Rothe met in Rome, Bunsen, who had been secretary to Niebuhr, the Prussian ambassador, and who was now called to fill the post vacated by his patron's removal, was the one most powerfully attracted toward the young chaplain. Bunsen and Rothe at once became, and all through life continued, most attached and loving friends. Not only in the pulpit, but otherwise did Rothe seek to fulfil his functions as pastor to his fellow-countrymen in the foreign city. He organized a service for Tuesday and Friday evenings, which was attended on an average by fifteen or sixteen young German artists. After devotional exercises, consisting in singing, prayer, reading of Scripture, and short exposition, he gave a lecture on Church history, dealing specially with phases of Church life and the origin and growth of Church organization and institutions.

Toward the end of the year 1827, after Rothe had laboured for four years in Rome, he had his first serious illness, which, in connexion with the removal

from the city of Bunsen and others of his best friends, left Rothe in a somewhat unhappy and dissatisfied condition, inclined to take a rather melancholy view of his position and prospects of further usefulness in that sphere. Just then through Bunsen came the offer of an appointment to a professorship in the theological seminary of Wittenberg. This invitation was most welcome to Rothe, who had always retained the most tender regard for all friends in the seminary, and the prospect of a return to Wittenberg was all the more delightful from the fact that his beloved and valued brother-in-law, Heubner, was already resident there.

The appointment now given to Rothe was that of the fourth professorship in the seminary; and his colleagues there would be Nitzsch and Schleusner, both old men, over seventy years of age, while the third professor was his own brother-in-law. Rothe's special work here would be in the department of Church history. He would be required to give lectures on the Church life, and this was understood by Rothe as a history of Christianity as distinguished from a history of the Christian Church. The subject was to him thoroughly congenial, and his previous preparations rendered him well qualified for the task.

Here Rothe made a beginning of his academical labours, in October, 1828. He was now in his thirtieth year, entering upon what was to be his special life work, with a ripe and varied experience of men and things, which, along with his thoroughly

competent scholarship and conscientious methods of study, formed an admirable preparation for his collegiate labours. In the seminary he at once began a course of lectures, on which he laboured for several years, on the constitution and life of the early Church. Besides lecturing in his chair, he preached very frequently, and continued the abundant hospitality which he had begun to practise in Rome, receiving the students to his house in the evenings, and engaging them there in profitable conversation on scientific, artistic, and spiritual themes. The time too was one of an altogether peculiar kind. There were students there affected by the most diverse intellectual and religious influences: some from the believing schools of Neander and Schleiermacher, or under the influence of Tholuck and Hengstenberg: others from the philosophical school of Hegel and the rationalistic school of Wegscheider. To all these Rothe proved most useful as a moderating power, though perhaps he seemed quite satisfactory to none. He had at least sufficient sympathy with both tendencies to secure the attention and win more or less the confidence of rationalists and evangelicals.

His labours in Wittenberg continued till 1837, in which year his first publications were issued. Rothe, never rash or hasty, was already in his thirty-ninth year when his first work appeared. This was an elaborate exegetical monograph on the passage Romans v. 12–21. He had commenced it in 1828,

on the appearance of Tholuck's "Commentary on Romans," to whose interpretation of this section he was strongly opposed. In his preface he lays down sound hermeneutical principles, and reprobates chiefly the endeavours made by many to prop up a preconceived dogmatic theory by the exposition of Scripture texts, repudiating the rationalising exegesis of Rückert as heartily as the orthodox exegesis of Tholuck. He insists upon warm Christian feeling and personal religion in the exegete, but at the same time demands perfect freedom from dogmatic prejudice. He also insists that difficulties be boldly faced, that a thorough solution be at least attempted, and no half answers accepted and palmed off as though they were complete.

In this same year he published his great epoch-making work on the "Beginnings of the Christian Church and its Constitution." He explains his object in writing this work to be to sketch the course of man's historical development as affected and determined by Christianity. Of this great undertaking he only published the first part. In the volume issued we have three books. The first book treats of the relation of the Church to Christianity. The second describes the origin of the Christian Church, sketching first of all the rise of the Christian communities and the formation of a Church constitution, and then the forming and consolidating of the Christian Church properly so called. In the third book we have the development of the

Christian Church during the first age. No proper explanation has ever been given of the non-appearance of the second volume, the materials of which, Rothe says in his preface to the first, were then ready and requiring only slight revision prior to publication. Professor Nippold, the editor of Rothe's "Life and Letters," suggests that when subsequently the great treatise on Christian ethics was commenced, Rothe felt that there was no longer need for the continuation of his earlier work, and that the historical matter was wrought up into the ethical work. This historical treatise at once secured wide fame and high scientific reputation for Rothe, although its attitude satisfied very few. While, on the one hand, there is an apparent churchliness in his idea that traces of the episcopate may be found in apostolic times, there is, on the other hand, a very evident anti-ecclesiastical tendency, which was afterwards largely developed in Rothe, in the view that he takes of the modern Christian state, as that in which, rather than in the Church, the great mission of Christianity must be fulfilled.

In 1837 a new seminary was founded at Heidelberg, and Rothe was appointed director of this institution. On a review of his Wittenberg experience, Rothe felt it his duty to make a new departure in Heidelberg, and from this time onward he gave much more attention to the development of the speculative side, in order to find a satisfactory and permanent basis for the practical. This resolve he

carried out with special care and elaborateness in his studies in the department of ethics. He gave himself unremittingly to study, refusing to take any part in writing ephemeral articles to theological magazines, even when one was started under the management of his brother-in-law Hahn. He regarded the work of the theologian as a peculiarly responsible one, and insisted that only well considered and thoroughly digested work should be presented before the public. Meanwhile Rothe was zealously working for and upon his great work on Christian ethics. In 1845 the first two volumes were published. In presenting these to the scientific public, he said that he laid before them his theological confession. In this work he traverses the whole range of moral theology, developing speculatively the entire system of Christianity. Christian dogmatics he regards as an historical science, in which the Church doctrine, as laid down in ecclesiastical symbols based upon Scripture, is set forth. In ethics again we have the speculative treatment of the truths dealt with positively and historically in dogmatics.

Just about the time when the last volume of his great work was published, in 1847, Rothe received calls from Bonn and Breslau. There was an attraction in Breslau, as the residence of Hahn, and as having been the home of his dearly loved parents; but meanwhile the attractions of his work at Heidelberg forbade him listening to any suggestion of a change. In 1849 however a call was addressed him

again from Bonn, which he saw it to be his duty to accept. During his five years' stay in Bonn Rothe threw himself heartily into the ecclesiastical movements of the time; and of this period he was wont to say afterwards that it was not without fruit to him, but what, from painful experience, he there specially learnt was what he was not suited and had not been intended for.

All through those years he entertained a lingering love for Heidelberg, and in 1854 he availed himself of an invitation to return to that city, where he continued throughout the remainder of his life. This was a period of great activity, but his work was carried on amid manifold family sorrows and cares. After a long and depressing illness, his wife, with whom he had lived most happily for thirty-eight years, was removed by death. This stroke was very keenly felt by him, and his letters, in answer to his many friends who had written consolatory epistles, show at once the tenderness and affectionateness of his nature, and the strong faith and warm Christian piety by which he was sustained. Already Heubner was gone, and in the years that immediately followed one dear friend after another was taken away. He felt himself now very much alone, for his theological position was such as could be rightly understood and sympathised with only by those who had known him in the various stages of his spiritual development. There is a peculiar sadness in his later correspondence, as he acknowledges the isolated character of

his position. The Tübingen school failed to appreciate his intense spirituality and deep, earnest piety, and regarded him as a dreamy mystic and theosophist; while the evangelical party regarded him as one of the most dangerous of their opponents whose influence against the truth was all the greater because of the devoutness and fervour that lingered in his life and utterances.

For some time Rothe had been engaged upon the revision of his great work, "The Theological Ethics." It was on January 31st, 1867, that he wrote the preface for the first volume of the second and revised edition. His time was now almost entirely given to his regular class work and the revision of this treatise. His health was manifestly breaking down but he struggled bravely to perform his daily duties. By August 6th his illness became so severe that he could not go to his class-room, and he now lay down upon the bed from which he was never to rise. And on the 20th of this month, the day on which, as he reminded those around, his father died twenty-three years before, he quietly passed away. "Tell them all," he said a few days before his death to one of his ministerial brethren, "tell all my friends, all who take an interest in me, that I die in the faith in which I have lived, and that nothing has ever shaken or diminished this faith in me, but that it has been always growing stronger and more inward." When it was said that perhaps it would yet please God to raise him up, he said, "If so, then

I shall be still at His service; but I trust that I may now be allowed to go home."

Rothe had been an eager and discriminating reader. For many years it had been his habit to record in his notebooks passages which had specially impressed him, together with his own reflections, sometimes expressed in a few pregnant words, sometimes running on into considerable details of original thinking. This record of his varied reading had been revised by the author, as if intended for publication or to be used as material in some other work. Many passages were struck out, and some were rewritten. There was however no method observed in the order of the quotations and remarks, these having been simply noted in succession from time to time whatever the subject of his reading might happen to be.

In 1872, five years after Rothe's death, Professor Nippold, of Bern, one of his admiring and affectionate students, published the carefully arranged edition of this posthumous work of his master, which is here presented to the English-speaking public in an English dress. The work of the editor was done in a neat, conscientious, and painstaking manner. The remarks of Rothe were separated from the passages which had suggested his reflections, and were carefully arranged according to the subjects of which they treated under convenient and appropriate heads. In no one work of Rothe do the characteristics set forth in the preceding sketch find so complete an illustration. We see him here as the theologian of wide culture and

broad sympathies, the thinker of philosophic grasp and scientific accuracy, the daring speculator and unwearied investigator; while at the same time we recognise in him the man of warm and deep personal piety, of pure and simple heart, in whom no trace of self-consciousness is found and no taint of personal ambition. To many this collection of choice reflections by so profound and earnest a thinker as Richard Rothe will prove a rich mine of intellectual and religious suggestion, helpful and stimulating in no ordinary degree. So varied too are the themes discussed, that all classes of readers may find something to interest and to instruct, something fitted to throw new light on oft-discussed and long-studied themes, or to lead to new departures in thinking not ventured on before.

PERSONAL.

I. PERSONAL.

LIFE EXPERIENCES.

To endure, throughout a whole life-time, the presence of a psychological enigma, most intimately affecting one's own personal concerns, without daring even to attempt its solution, and to feel compelled simply to cling with heart and soul to the belief that it shall one day be solved just as love requires that it should, —this is hard, very hard.

*

Oh, how bitter and unspeakably hard to bear, when one by his circumstances is obliged to spend upon the consideration of his own condition an amount of time and strength which could with propriety be devoted only to an objective life-work, and would willingly be given to such an object only!

*

Altogether stupid I am scarcely likely to become, but rather languid and weary.

*

Although I must indeed confess that very often,

even through my bodily sensibilities, God has already made my life uncommonly hard, I must also at once acknowledge that He has, on the other hand, been near me with quite uncommon aids of grace, so that I have been able to get through so many decades of this painful life already. Here then, surely, there is room only for humble and adoring thankfulness.

*

A retrospect of my whole life, from the earliest period of my recollection down to the present hour, leaves with me this impression, that I have been, and am being, guided by a gracious and a mighty Hand, which has made, and is making, that possible to me which otherwise to me had been impossible. Oh that I had at all times unhesitatingly trusted and yielded myself to its guidance!

*

On reviewing my long life, I perceive with shame and confusion how, in my professional labours, the excellence of the subject with which I wrought always raised the insignificant worker to a position of respectability.

SELF-CRITICISM.

It is to me a painful observation, that there are many heads still worse than my own.

*

It is my misfortune that I am so sharp-eyed in detecting "slovenly work" in the world, even in things which pass among others with high approval.

*

My satisfaction with life depends on my having lived to some purpose, not on a mere peradventure that I may do so.

*

The height of my ambition would be attained in a life as active as possible, but yielding substantial results, and at the same time as uniform as possible, and free from distraction.

*

I am losing, to a shocking degree, my appreciation of the charms of the "interesting."

*

As God has constituted me, I am fit for nothing else in the world than to be a simple, but perhaps, in the end, not altogether inefficient, professor of theology.

*

That so small a measure of talent has fallen to my lot gives me really no pain; all the more however that I have been placed in an office where really first-rate talents are required.

*

If I had been as fully conscious in my younger years, as I am now in my old age, of my incredible intellectual poverty, I could not have endured the prospect of my life as a university professor.

My idiosyncrasies are an aversion to cockchafers and to letter-writing.

*

One of the beauties of heaven will be that we shall have no letter-writing there.

*

Letter-writing is an expression of sociality. It is an indispensable adjunct to friendship.

*

Why have I such a dislike to preaching? For the very same reason that I detest visiting and letter-writing.

*

I am a considerable centre, with an immeasurably small circumference.[1]

*

The natural respect of a weak head for a strong one (which however need not by an means have a more intense, or qualitatively better, knowledge than the other) is with me, I am thankful to say, a perfectly familiar feeling.

*

Of myself, I can only say that I am an unprofitable servant; but I serve a good Master, who loves me with unwearied faithfulness.

*

A being so peculiarly constituted as I am ought every moment to be filled with gratitude for the

[1] The middle point has an intensive and variable size.

boundless indulgence which he requires and receives from those who have to do with him.

*

He who has such a dearth of talents as I have must pride himself (I speak foolishly) on his honourable character.

*

I should like to realize—were it only for a single day—how a really gifted man must feel.

*

I shall never be perfectly happy, until I have reached my own fitting place in the lowest room, as *homo gregarius*—which will certainly be given me, at least in the world to come.

*

I have an insatiable longing for a condition in which, surrounded by realities, I should myself be real.

*

Oh, what blessedness will it be for a man, when he has reached his destination and rest, when he has become a being perfectly balanced, completely in harmony with himself and with the external circumstances of his existence!

*

I am heartily fond of public life, but public swaggering and noise I detest. At the same time I know very well that the one is not to be had without the other, and so I let the empty clatter

pass harmlessly by, seeing only that I have no share in making it.

*

I long, not for rest, but for quiet.

*

Whenever the monotonous quiet of my individual life is interrupted, a weary longing for its return takes possession of me. The *vita monastica* is for me the only one of real intrinsic vitality. With such a temperament, one has serious difficulty in struggling through life, and in keeping his head above water while swimming against the steady current of the stream.

*

My intellectual conceptions must be brought forth with pain. This is a thought to me profoundly humbling.

*

I rank myself always on the side on which one need have no fear.

*

I am really ashamed on so many points to have to correct the unanimous opinion of contemporaries by my own convictions, and so to seem keener-sighted than they.

*

One of the things which I find it most difficult to comprehend is how it comes about that there are men—yes, a considerable proportion of men—who have a smaller measure of insight than I have myself.

My one strong point is, that I know exactly where my weak points are.

*

The power of distinguishing between great and small, real and unreal, has from childhood onward been present with me in no ordinary degree.

*

My critical tendency inclines me, in the domain of science, to criticise my own thoughts rather than the thoughts of others.

*

A very common form of narrow-mindedness is that shown by the originator of a system of thought, when he imagines that, because it satisfies him as an individual, it must be in itself satisfactory. From this form of narrowness at least I know that I am free.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEOLOGY AND THE CHURCH.

I have cause to thank God that He has given me the power of at once discerning, in the historical phenomena of the present, amid the whirling clouds of chaff, the good grains of corn which have shaken themselves free from that chaff.

It is noteworthy, as a thoroughly logical consequence, that our theologians have to write "moral-religious," while I write "religious-moral."

*

I always find among the Christians around me only the believing confidence that God *will* conduct victoriously the cause of His kingdom in Christ, through the course of history, *perhaps even in our own day;* whereas on my part, aided by my conception of the kingdom of God in Christ, I perceive quite distinctly that God *is* conducting victoriously the affairs of His kingdom through the course of history, and even at this present hour.

*

In one point I am certainly a step in advance of most contemporary theologians. I am on terms of agreement with the moralist or ethical Christians of the day, without being guilty of any indifference toward religion and positive Christianity.

*

I have no objection to any one setting his powers to work in whatever direction he can most successfully employ them, although that direction may not be particularly pleasing to me. This only I insist upon, that such a rule shall be held to apply to myself as well as to others.

*

I am well aware that in theology I play only upon

one single instrument; that instrument however forms an essential part of the orchestra. I do not pretend to be in any sense the orchestra itself. It is my vocation and my only ambition that I should learn to play my own instrument as well as possible. No one can become a well-furnished theologian by studying under me alone, regarding it even from a merely human point of view. He who simply plays, as I do, his own instrument *alone* in the orchestra, must give to his playing another sort of attention than he who, along with many others, performs upon some particular instrument, or even perhaps not upon any one in particular.

*

That my whole conception of life is untenable and worthless can be proved only when, in its final development, it has been wrought into a regular system. In the pure interest of objective truth, I can therefore do nothing more useful than continue most resolutely the elaboration of my own speculative system.

*

For this one gift I may, without seeming boastful, give thanks to God, in acknowledging that He has endued me with the power of seeing when there is nothing beneath the surface, nothing but empty forms and words, without power or substance, though set forth with great pretension.

*

A place in an ecclesiastical board of control and similar institutions seems to me undesirable even for this reason, that there can be no great honour in merely issuing orders in regard to matters of which the whole art lies simply in their execution.

*

It would be wrong on the part of any one to abandon his own individual way of working; but whoever considers his own way of doing a thing absolutely the best must either be very vain or very narrow-minded. Of this absurdity at least I am certainly innocent. If only I knew how, I should gladly do my work better than in my own way it is done.

*

I get on very well with my theological opponents, and do not need to fatigue myself in wrestling with them, simply because I make no claim to be right, or to have established my own conviction, whether in theology or in any other science, but only propose to carry stones to the building. It is for the builders themselves to decide what they are to do with them. That is no affair of mine. Should they be able even to roll them completely away from the spot, for my own part I have no objection even to that. The work assigned to me has been done; its results I leave with Him by whom the work was given.

*

What distinguishes my attitude from that of my

colleagues is that they are self-conscious, while I am free from any such feeling.

*

A discovery which has caused me no small surprise is, that the characteristic distinction between myself and most others consists in this, that while to me personally the fundamental propositions of religion, and especially of the Christian religion, are thoroughly self-evident, and form quite spontaneously and immediately the universal and permanent presupposition in all my considerations, others invariably busy themselves first of all with making sure of these fundamental propositions by the aid of reflection. Thank God! I know by heart the multiplication table of my Christian-religious mode of thought, and do not need to be always reckoning it up anew.

*

I am thankful to say that I have never been obliged to employ artificial, or indeed any express or special contrivance, in order to secure the presence of religious ideas, and to work myself into a religious frame. Such contrivances, therefore, even the commonest and most approved, seem to me of little value.

*

Never, never by any means, shall a good cause, on account of the worthlessness of its supporters, be to me a subject of aversion and scorn.

*

In so far as I speak only of matters which in these

times must engage the attention of such as labour in theology, I shall patiently endure all the displeasure of my contemporaries, which the one-sided and disproportionate representation of these things calls forth. Enough that I have said exactly what I had to say. I sing my own part in the music, poorly as it may sound when sung by itself alone.

*

My theology belongs to quite another era from that of the Reformers. That era is not mine as an individual, but that of modern times in general.

*

I cannot understand those people, who would have the great moral revivals and revolutions that have taken place in the world, without the improprieties and disadvantages which are inseparable from such movements in their early stages.

POSITION IN REFERENCE TO THE PRESENT.

It is quite possible for a man, from an objective point of view, to rejoice sincerely and honestly in the changes of modern times, and yet, for his own part, to wish himself back in the past.

*

We can work for the future only at the cost of suffering discredit in the present. He who desires his work to be really effective must seek no reward for himself from his doings.

Even in the deepest poverty of the present, our wealth consists in this, that whatever we have experienced in the past is not lost, but has remained our own.

*

Because the evils of the world in every age are always new and different evils, not those of the past, which, because men have grown accustomed to them, they scarcely count as evils at all, therefore each new age seems worse than the last.

*

A sure method for accurately testing the average worth of our contemporaries is to take, as a fundamental maxim, that theirs is, at any rate, a much higher worth than our own.

*

One reason why I should not care to begin the world again is, that life grows more wearisome from generation to generation.

*

We must not seek to be wiser than our time, but only to have a perfect understanding of it — to recognise distinctly what its aims and tendencies are.

*

Men excellent in themselves may become perfectly useless (in State, Church, etc.) by disdaining constantly to learn new lessons from their time. This learning does not in any sense mean doing homage to the spirit of the age ; but it means the development

of one's self alongside of that spirit by continually learning to understand it better.

*

Are not these the true interpreters of history, these men, so wondrously wise in their own opinion, who seek the characteristic marks of their age amidst its dust and rubbish?

*

It is only too common for a man to complain that his times are bad, because he does not find in himself the strength requisite for undergoing the heavy toil which they lay upon him. In old age especially this is naturally an oft repeated complaint.

*

A new thing that appears in history, miserable as it may seem in its early childhood, and slowly as it may advance to the perfection of ripened manhood, means yet incomparably more than some completely outgrown product of antiquity, gray-haired and venerable though it be.

*

Our time is specially sensitive in all that concerns principles.

*

The fault of our age, as regards religion, is not so much that it is on the wrong track, as that it does not know it is on the right one.

*

He who desires to accomplish a work for the

present must have something of the future dwelling in him.

*

Every one, who is called to be in any measure productive in the world, needs indispensably some discernment (literally, faculty of scenting) the future.

*

In order to be in a position to judge of the general direction taken by the road on which we are travelling, we must be able to see a good way on in front.

*

It is characteristic of modern times, that in them intellect *as such* ranks high.

*

Thank God! I am fully convinced that, even in the province of the intellect, progress is made with the same inconceivable slowness, of which in material nature we have something analogous in the world of the infinitely little. Even that measure of time according to which a thousand years are as one day, is here utterly inadequate.

RELATION TO THE PARTIES OF THE DAY.

For every man whom I see visibly bringing forth fruit gladly do I praise God, the Creator, without caring to inquire whether, by growing up in some different way, he might have presented even a more stately appearance and borne fruit that would have had a yet sweeter taste.

*

The surest way to ruin a good cause is to turn it

into a party affair; for then its supporters cannot, in every separate case, keep strictly to truth and justice, and they must, besides, seek to make it work directly on the masses, which is impossible without an admixture of impure ingredients.

*

The unfailing sign of a partisan is that he fights his enemies *unconditionally*, and for that very reason criticises their actions with prejudice, suspicion, and injustice.

*

Wherever I see anything stupendous in its own way, there I do reverence, though the way itself may not please me at all.

*

When, for the attainment of his own ends, a man does not scruple to exercise constraint upon the moral convictions of another (even though it may be in a very mild way), that is partisanship. Because I happen to desire a certain thing, that is no reason why I should wish any one else to agree with me, otherwise than of his own accord.

*

One characteristic of the present generation is its frank and unscrupulous boldness in exercising constraint upon the moral convictions of others—for good purposes.

*

Semper solus esse volui nihilque pejus odi quam juratos et factiosos (*Erasmus*).

The chief reason why I find it so easy to keep on friendly relations with others is, that most men's individualities present so sharp a contrast to my own. I rejoice to think that others are different from myself, and that the world is wide and full of variety.

*

Not even for the best cause could I ever be persuaded to agitate. Not that I mean to pronounce decidedly against all agitations; for they are inseparable from the party life, which, under certain circumstances, is indispensable in a community. There will never be any want of those, who are *bonâ fide* capable of agitating; but for that very reason, those who could only do it *mala fide* ought to be released from the duty of doing it at all. To this latter class I belong.

*

It is an occasion of grief and shame that, in judging of the great religious movements of the world, men should (as so often happens), because of the worthlessness and imperfections of those who seem to be their visible supporters, mistake the significance of the movements themselves, and disparage them with a haughty superiority, whose narrow-mindedness brings its own certain punishment. God keep me from all manner of assumption of superiority!

Not only would I refuse to belong to another's party, but I would not on any account make or uphold a party rallying round what was simply my own personal conviction.

*

He who cannot be important without having a row of ciphers attached to him, and who at the same time wishes to be important, must of course form a party.

*

On whatever point the quarrel may turn, I am not, and never will be, able to persuade myself that I alone am right and my opponent entirely wrong.

*

It is quite possible for two men to be striving after the same end, and yet to have altogether different designs, and to be animated by quite diverse sentiments.

*

Esprit de corps may be very easily created with the help of pride.

*

To my mind it is a psychological mystery that any one should desire to see the world (whatever world it may be, even the smallest) governed entirely according to his own opinions. For the cultured man it is a point of honour to avoid every appearance of cherishing such a desire.

*

It is sad, but none the less a fact, that the

Redeemer, in order to carry on the struggle for His kingdom, had to divide His forces into two rival camps, which are now on fighting terms with each other. Only by using both alike for the furtherance of His kingdom can He attain the result He desires. It is like a review, in which different *corps* of the same army operate against each other. Nevertheless, the final victory will rest with *one* of the parties. which will then, although after many errors, be acknowledged as the true one. Well for him who, while boldly attacking his opponents, yet recognises in them his friends, and is joyfully conscious that both alike have much in common.

*

The opponents of an evil cause need only leave it room enough ; in time it will destroy itself.

*

Christians fight "as though they fought not."

*

Beware of speaking contemptuously of those who are not of *your* opinion. Beware of arrogance and self-sufficiency, whoever you may be !

*

The clearness of a conviction is the best preservative against its over-passionate enforcement.

*

A man is never in a worse case than when he shares his principles with narrow-minded people, who make a foolish use of them.

Against fanaticism (especially party fanaticism) even a noble man is not secure.

*

I certainly appear to be in advance of many others in being able, with tolerable ease, to imagine myself in the situation of those whose individuality and individual position in life are quite different from my own.

*

In order to see our way clearly in history, especially in that of the present, we must apprehend its various tendencies with the same precise and logical keenness which belonged to their *à priori* conception, but which, in their empirical manifestation, never comes clearly to the light. Such a mode of apprehension is indispensable to myself, and this is what people call my finical or hypercritical tendency. Without this definite sharpness of conception, we have before us merely vague, vanishing historical factors, and we must grope about continually amid uncertainties and imperfections.

*

As regards difference of opinion, no one is personally a more estimable man because his dwelling happens to be more favourably situated than the dwellings of others, as the standpoint for a free, open, and picturesque view of the landscape.

*

I so often find, to my very great surprise, that people candidly object to some course of action

which, in itself (objectively considered) is perfectly correct, simply because many or most of those who uphold it are acting from bad or impure motives, or because it is practised by those who are (no doubt with perfect reason) personally objectionable to themselves.

*

True agitation confines itself to waking up the drowsy.

*

The real power in some men's characters is looked upon indulgently by others as a charming and innocent childishness. With such a judgment they may well be content.

*

To most people it is a psychological impossibility to hold a conviction for themselves alone.

*

Although I have attached myself to a party (every one who holds a genuine conviction must do so now-a-days), yet I am unsuited for a true partisan; because it is so easy and natural for me to look at matters from my opponent's point of view, and to recognise and cheerfully acknowledge how far his views are right.

TOLERANCE AND CRITICISM.

Every one must undoubtedly judge of things as he sees them. On this point therefore we have no right to reproach another, vexatious as his wrong opinions may often be to us. Nothing more certainly

secures tolerance towards others than our realization of the need of systematic thinking, and our remembrance of the close dependence, in all our conceptions, of one idea upon another.

*

Is impartiality a thing that may be acquired? A view on all sides can be had only from the top of the mountain; but we may climb up and gain it.

*

It is of course quite natural that every man should consider his own profession the most important, only he must not forget that others have exactly the same opinion of theirs.

*

A man may, with perfect consistency, be inwardly certain of his own conviction, and yet cherish no thought of obliging others to assent to it; indeed, the one is an excellent test of the other.

*

We shall never convince another that he is wrong unless we begin by frankly acknowledging how far he is right.

*

There are very few people who can understand that, in any given case, it is another's duty to act quite differently from themselves.

*

The keenest-sighted man will become blind to wide provinces of experimental knowledge if he habitually avoids turning his gaze in their direction.

It is lost trouble to attempt to make another understand what for him has no existence.

*

There is a large-hearted Christian tolerance, which is much more effectual in keeping within bounds all wandering from the path of Christianity than the polemical zeal of eager controversialists.

*

It is not love, but egotism, which makes us demand that the world shall take its course according to our own ideas, and leads us to discuss its actual history with scorn and discontent.

*

Can he be said to see truly who, in examining the sun-spots, misses the sun?

*

Insight into the necessity of one common faith for the Church (??).—Dorner, "Gesch. der prot. Theol." p. 892.

*

It seems to me that any one who takes pleasure in mocking at the little things in human life does so because of his inability to recognise what is great in things little. Only in polemics would I admit the legitimacy of satire, and even there it must be a satire of a not ungenial kind.

*

To make what I regard as a piece of mere stupidity a subject of serious controversy is entirely

contrary to my inclination. For this reason I can never have anything to do with what is called the "average culture."

*

He is a mere pothouse politician who founds upon the gossip of the day his calculations in regard to the future of history, whether it be with reference to things great or things small.

*

A man who lacks scientific culture has few ideas, and even these are necessarily of an indefinite and confused description; whereas the numerous ideas of the man of scientific culture are, by a similar necessity, clear and definite.

*

One sure mark of an uncultivated and ignorant man is that he naïvely assumes that human knowledge began with just the same elementary ideas which are with us traditional commonplaces, never dreaming what infinitely laborious and complicated processes of thought are presupposed, even in such conceptions as seem now to us crude and imperfect.

*

Many a traditional idea which circulates amongst us seems credible only because we have never seriously examined it.

*

He whose thoughts rise even a little above the trivial must not be astonished if most people entirely misunderstand him.

Narrow horizons, circumscribed points of view, have a demoralizing influence.

*

Paradoxical people are generally arrogant. The singularity of their nature, however, should make them the most modest in the world.

*

God keep my doctrine from this disgrace, that ever a pedlar in science, travelling about with his wares, should make boastful assertions on its behalf!

*

I have not found myself as comfortable as most people in the turbid waters of the current popular science and the philosophy of the day.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SPECULATION.

II. THE PRINCIPLES OF SPECULATION.

THE TASK OF SPECULATION.

It is significant that one and the same word (*θεωρία*) was originally used to express both speculation and mystic contemplation. The earliest appearance of speculation was in the form of pure religious contemplation; just as indeed knowledge of every kind always comes into being hidden away in the depths of the individual soul, and must by degrees work itself free of its covering. This is especially true of the speculation and the mysticism of the middle ages and of the theosophy of Jacob Böhme.

*

Dialectics is essentially a non-speculative operation, although in it speculation possesses an indispensable assistant.

*

It forms a part of culture, that we should be deeply and seriously persuaded, that the knowledge of those truths which are in themselves the simplest has been

for mankind a slow and exceedingly toilsome and complicated process.

*

The saying, that "to him that hath shall be given," is strikingly verified as regards the apprehension of truth.

*

Correctly to understand the speculation of others is a very difficult matter; all the more important therefore is it that every one should at least have a thorough understanding of his own.

*

Each speculative system will receive credit exactly in proportion as it explains realities.

*

Those ideas which do not in themselves compel assent, without any direct interference of their originator, are not worthy of having even a word said to recommend them.

*

To occupy oneself with speculation, without possessing the faculty for it, leads to sophistry.

*

One essential point in the discovery of a scientific system is, that we should be conscious of the subordinate importance of the matter, and not imagine it an historical event.

*

The parallel to speculation on the side of activity is *ideal* willing (*cf.* Schelling, "Works," I. 3, p. 558 *seq.*)

—free willing and doing; i.e. *à priori* ideas of purpose projected by our own minds.

*

Because on some special scientific path I can proceed no farther than to this particular point, does that imply that the road ends there?

*

Those who maintain that speculation is an impossibility, and that therefore any attempt in that direction is mere idle sport, yet make constant use in the ordinary scientific course of results attained by it, and without this help from speculation they could not advance a step farther on their way.

*

There are many, especially among those who occupy themselves with thought, who, having thoroughly illogical minds, cannot be persuaded to pause and reflect upon their own ideas.

*

We may measure the intensity and value of a conviction by seeing whether it holds itself in control, and can exercise a restraint upon its own power; or whether, like a mere natural force, it must pour itself out in words and attempted performance of actions.

*

It cannot be boasted of, as though it indicated any special wisdom, that one is unable to philosophise without empirical objects of thought.

Speculation reaches the nature of things from the inside, not from the outside.

*

There is no more modest science than that of theological speculation. The speculative theologian acknowledges the merely approximate correctness of his propositions; and this he does all the more readily because he knows that, in consequence of that logical process, which he has accepted for his science as the principle of its procedure, he has not been able to avoid those errors which must flow from the mistakes that will infallibly be slipping in among his fundamental operations. The mere reasoner, on the other hand, cleanses himself from such errors at every step. The speculative theologian knows that he has thought on regardless of consequences; whereas the mere reasoner is conscious of having advanced with all proper caution, and so considers his results as well assured and perfectly reliable.

*

Logic, not less than æsthetics, forms a part of ethics.

*

That man has reason, means simply that man can think. But this thinking power has very different degrees, and must be learned gradually and with heavy toil.

*

When a man decides to speculate, he lays himself open to the scorn of all those who think only in

fragments and aphorisms, and who self-complacently look upon this, their intellectual incapacity, as wisdom.

*

Does speculation force itself upon any one? Does it not expressly declare that it is not a matter for everybody? Why then do those who, being unfitted to speculate, are at perfect liberty to leave it alone, cherish so violent a dislike to it?

*

In my own speculation I have always been led on by an inward compulsion, which I might compare to the mechanical instinct of animals. In the case of others, speculation may arise from strength of intellect; in my own it arises from weakness.

*

In the very nature of things, the only really practical method is the speculative.

*

There is no better and surer test of the human perceptive faculty, than the attempt to establish a thoroughly comprehensive system that will yield a satisfactory theory of the world.

*

In the criticism of the human perceptive faculty, there is often no distinction drawn between the limited powers of that faculty while yet in growth, and its wide capacities when, by means of the special development of human life, it has become all that it was originally only designed to be. Originally in-

deed, our self-consciousness is not reason (speculative capacity), but by means of the moral development of our nature, it may become reason.

*

The act of thinking is not otherwise possible than by means of the category of cause and effect, the original and fundamental category of logic. This is the principle of the sufficient reason.

*

Perception, *i.e.* thought on some given subject, is the opposite of pure thought. The latter is really speculation, the former, reflexion.

*

That a conscious being should also be conscious of his own conception, and take it as the norm for his self-determination (as his moral law), does not seem in any way surprising.

*

All speculation is of course an experiment. If the speculator cannot attain a result corresponding to the empirical fact, it naturally follows that he is incapable of speculating,—a discovery at which only a self-conceited fool would be surprised.

*

A keen thinker may have very confused ideas on special points, simply because he has never expressly made them the task and subject of his thought.

*

Deliberately to throw doubts on the pure objectivity of our own ideas, means nothing less than

to renounce absolutely the possibility of knowing objective truth.

*

It was a curious misconception (especially of Julius Müller) to suppose that speculation, because entirely ruled by the law of the immanent necessity of thought, had its way cut off for reconciling true freedom (whether of God or of the creature) with necessity. Behind this idea there is always the thought that there can be no actual freedom without some mixture of arbitrariness.

*

Without speculation the sciences cannot live.

*

Not by any union of empirical knowledge and speculation (which would only lead to the mixing up and ruin of both) will the interests of Christianity, as opposed to philosophy, be established. This can be done only by the strictest keeping asunder of speculation and empirical knowledge, and at the same time the upholding of the unlimited authority of all real facts as opposed to speculation.

*

There is a distinction between the difficulty of comprehension which arises from the startling clearness and vividness of ideas, and that which is caused by their confusion.

*

Poor empty-minded, every-day people, who have no idea what it means to have a new idea struggling to life in the soul!

Our conception ceases at the point where the thread of analogy with our experience breaks off; but it would be sad indeed if our thinking also ended there.

*

He is certainly in a sad case who can only think what others have thought before him.

*

The doctrine that we can know nothing which we do not learn on the path of experience has naturally a seductive charm for all weak, and especially for all unproductive, minds.

*

Speculation, while otherwise mindful of the debt it owes to logic, may claim the title of an exact science with as much right as natural philosophy, which rests on mathematics; for in speculation we calculate with ideas, and logic is certainly not less exact than mathematics.

*

Mathematics occupy the same position towards material nature that logic does towards thought (?). The same kind of evidence applies to both.[1]

*

Profundity of thought is nothing else than the clearness and distinctness of one's thinking.

*

If those good people who cry out against specula-

[1] For other remarks on mathematics, see under "Space and Time."

tion would only not imagine that we think even a tenth part as much of our speculative thought as they do of their little aphoristic thinking exercises! Assuredly they have no cause to reproach us with pride of intellect.

*

The main thing in speculation is to be strictly conscientious, and not to allow oneself to be imposed upon by anything.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SPECULATION.

A being can be truly real and perfect only when it absolutely corresponds to its original conception.

*

Existence (the real) cannot idealize itself, or change itself into a thought; but thought (the ideal) may very well realize itself, namely, by the act of thinking.

*

Existence, according to the most abstract definition of it, is a thing (therefore something); thought, according to the most abstract definition of it, is the universal. According to its most concrete definition, existence is freedom, thought is reason. The former is self-established existence; the latter, self-established thought.

*

Whatever exists, or has being, for our consciousness really does exist.

When the result of our thought is a necessary logical inference, then that result must *eo ipso* be accepted as existing, as real. He who denies this must consequently altogether deny the possibility of understanding anything by means of thought.

*

As regards thinking, one of its primary and most important steps is the acknowledgment that all things, in proportion as they are material, are unreal.

*

The exclusion of any reasonable possibility from the bounds of reality must always rest on some imperfection of thought.

*

What a vast conception is that of a being existing of itself alone! Such an idea we can clearly entertain of none but the absolutely perfect, and even then only when we do not imagine it as existing at once in all its full perfection.

*

Since we are obliged to think sometimes, whether we will or not, surely the most sensible plan is to take pains to think correctly and with the utmost possible perfection.

*

Most people imagine that what satisfies their individual thought must be objectively satisfactory.

*

What a difference we find between thought and thought! How wide a distinction between the com-

monplace thoughts of the average individual and those of the gifted philosopher! How much wider between our human thinking as a whole and that of the creating God!

*

Ruling ideas are certainly indispensable in the treatment of all scientific matters, but they must be fruitful.

*

The fact that the object eventually reaches and reflects itself upon the consciousness of the subject is made perfectly clear to philosophy by its conception of the powers with which the object is endowed. *How* it thus reflects itself is not a question for the philosopher, but for the physiologist.

*

When we say that anything *exists*, we mean that its being is no mere idea or abstraction.

*

Existence = the actual establishment of some idea (otherwise impossible), the reality of the object of thought. Only some definite object of thought can be said really to exist.

*

A pure ideal cannot be material, because it must be truly and absolutely ideal, whereas it belongs to the nature of the material to be, at least relatively, non-ideal, as well as non-real.

*

Only the ideal can be real. Only *something* can

be posited as an actual existence. What the material lacks in ideality, it also of necessity lacks in reality. Whatever has not existed first in thought has only an apparent existence.

*

The more visible and tangible anything is, the more unreal it is *eo ipso*.

*

The general conception of being (as distinguished both from imaginary and from real existence[1]) is that of the pure logical subject.

*

A hopeless confusion arises when we understand the ideal as "thinking" (while it is rather thought), which can only be regarded as the function of a thinker, therefore of one who is, at the same time, real. The opposite of thinking is not existence, but the positing of our ideas; just as the opposite of existence is not thinking, but its product the thought. But thinking and being are in no way co-ordinate ideas, and cannot therefore form a contrast.

SPECULATIVE SYSTEM.

I do not require that my system shall be accepted as correct, but I do require that no one shall dispute my right to find my personal satisfaction only in a

[1] Or as distinguished both from possible and from actual being.

method of thought which proceeds on strictly speculative lines.

*

We must seek the evidence and guarantee for the truth of a system, not in its beginning, but in its end; not in its foundation, but in its keystone.

*

Half truths find many more adherents than whole and perfect truths. The latter cost too much exertion of head and heart.

*

It seems incomprehensible that we should require so much time to draw with any completeness the necessary results of some new proposition, clearly as we may understand it in our own minds.

*

Most people seem to me to seek the fulcrum of their individual existence in themselves, in their own personality. I cannot understand how this is psychologically possible.

*

Wonderful wisdom of my Creator! Along with the indescribable difficulty which mental work occasions me, He has at the same time given me, in order to counterbalance my deep-seated sluggishness, an intense dislike to all superficial, half-hearted, and slovenly modes of intellectual production and their results.

There are people who quietly leave alone whatever they find difficult, and work eagerly and with much satisfaction at whatever comes easy to them. It is not so with me; my way of working is exactly the reverse.

*

The building of my thought is of such a nature, that I consider it a duty to employ my small scientific gifts in beautifying and laying it out.

*

I am glad that those who would only have misunderstood me have not taken the trouble to understand me at all.

*

He to whom my thoughts are confused and indistinct, simply because *for him* they are too clear and too distinct, is not in a position to criticise them, and therefore also he is not in a position to reject them.

*

It seems to me a far less important point in ethics to decide *how* we should act rightly, than to discover what *materialiter* happens and results *when* we act rightly, and indeed when we act at all. I am chiefly interested, not in understanding the law of action, but in finding out what action really is and signifies, in what its being consists. This interest seems almost unknown to my contemporaries, but it has been alive in me from my earliest days. To my mind ethics is not *principaliter* a guide to the action demanded by the moral law, but an index to dis-

cover what that really is which we, *sensu medio*, call morality.

*

My system of ethics prepossesses others in its favour by its great capacity for formation and development.

*

My system of ethics did not originate in this way, that I found such a science already existing, and only wished to add my share to its building; but because my thoughts resulted in such a conception of man, that all science concerning him spontaneously assumed the form of ethics.

*

My own system of ethics appears to me like a book, which has a right to be what it is, quite independently of what may be thought of the task of theological ethics in general. What place it will finally receive is to me a matter of indifference.

ON GOD.

III. ON GOD.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

SINCE the fall, all true knowledge of God, and successful speculation about Him, in fact, every kind of successful speculation, can proceed only from a religious point of view.

*

We owe sincere thanks to the modern atheistic philosophy, because through its means we have first realized what an incomparably great thing it is to maintain the existence of God.

*

The word "God" is very great. He who realizes and acknowledges this will be mild and fair in his judgment of those who frankly confess they have not the courage to say they believe in God.

*

Although many people sincerely believe that human existence is *tolerable* without the certain knowledge that God is, this opinion rests only on thoughtlessness.

*

To maintain the existence of God certainly seems our only sensible course; but however much is im-

plied among us by *real* good sense, to how few can it be truly ascribed!

*

Man is capable of understanding what God is, only in proportion as he is morally developed.

*

In those ages when the will of God was the only known source of good, and when by the "good" itself was understood merely the direct relation of man to Him, the minds of Christians must have had a very different conception of God from our own.

*

Can the true idea of man (the true moral idea) exist where the true idea of God is wanting? Undoubtedly it is possible that when the true idea of God exists and rules in a whole community, the true idea of man may exist and rule in individual cases, even when the true conception of God, or perhaps any conception of Him whatever, is altogether wanting. But this can happen in no other instance.

*

When the true moral idea is actively present in any man's mind, he may, though of course unconsciously, have workings of Divine grace in his soul, even though he has no true conception of God; for the *material* condition of such influences is then present, and the formal is by no means unconditioned.

*

The more elementary the development of human life is (as for example, in the times of the patriarchs),

the more vast does the idea of God appear to the consciousness of man. At the same time, it reveals itself with more splendid lustre in proportion as man's life attains to a richer and fuller development.

*

God and man are for us alternative conceptions. As we cannot truly understand the idea of man without possessing the true idea of God, so the converse is also true.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

God can love only the moral, *i.e.* something that owes its position to some inherent power of its own: not therefore a so called second Person of the Trinity, who for God could be in no way another.

*

That three Persons should be one Person is not in itself contradictory, for the unity of several Persons (by means of their existence in one another) is, when they are regarded as spiritual, in itself a perfectly tenable idea. But the unity of several Persons necessarily implies a distinction along with the unity, and how three Divine and infinite Persons should be really distinct from each other is for us quite inconceivable So that the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, lies, not in maintaining the unity, but in maintaining the real tripersonality. In order to be distinct Persons, the Divine Beings must undoubtedly be individual

and as such they would not correspond to the idea of absoluteness, which is inseparable from our conception of God. For that very reason, if we consider the three Persons as alike Divine, it is impossible, in the Church's doctrine of the Trinity, to avoid tritheism.

*

If the unity of God is not a numerical unity, then it is not in any sense what we mean in asserting monotheism.

*

The opponent of the doctrine of the Trinity does not deny that three Persons can be one (*conf.* Ebrard, "Dogmatik," i., p. 193); but he does deny (1) that there can be three absolute Persons; (2) that between absolute Persons any real distinction can exist; (3) that three Divine Persons in their unity can be God, *i.e.* an absolute spirit existing essentially as a Person. The conception of theism is, that God is a Person; that of monotheism therefore, that He is one Person, not a plurality of Persons, which would necessarily imply a plurality of Gods, or copies of God. To this we may add (4), that in the case of Persons who are differently constituted, we shall expect to find some purpose and motive for their coalescing in a unity, but not in the case of Persons who are constituted exactly alike, as absolute Persons must necessarily be. (Precisely the reverse, as we see, of Ebrard's idea.) Such Persons can have no mutual love, because their mutual love would really be self-love, and that of course would be a *contradictio in adjecto*.

An exclusive unity of God and a man (such as the Church's doctrine requires) is impossible, for this reason, that the man is always an individual. Even the universal individual is an individual still.

*

As a dogma (*conf.* Schelling, S. W. ii. 2, p. 46), the assertion of the unity of God occurs only as a proposition in the doctrine of the Trinity.

THE ABSOLUTENESS OF GOD.

It belongs undoubtedly to the conception of the absolute, that it is *transcendental*, and lies beyond the range of all experimental knowledge. It can therefore be discovered only by speculative means, because it is in its primary conception entirely spiritual, and therefore entirely immaterial.

*

In the fact that the Divine objectivity and the Divine subjectivity mutually presuppose and result in each other lies the necessity for considering the process of the Divine self-actualization as absolute and irrespective altogether of the course of time.

*

In the sense of absolutely pure being, could we say that in creation chaos is the corresponding idea to God? In that case, chaos must lie behind even matter.

*

It is strange that we find it so much more difficult

to believe in the original existence of the perfect (that is, of God) than in that of the imperfect (such as primeval mud, matter, etc.); for the perfect clearly corresponds much more nearly than the imperfect to the idea of self-existence (of creation not by another). This is the real kernel of the *argumentum ontologicum*.

*

The saying, "Ex nihilo nihil fit," may perfectly well be applied to the self-existence of God.

*

In the conception of the absolute, both possibility and reality must be supposed as existing together in one, without in any way excluding each other. The absolute is therefore entirely self-necessitated being.

*

The absolute perfection of a being conceived of as personal consists in its capacity for forming a conception of the highest possible end, and for absolutely positing its own idea.

*

The Good is that which corresponds to its conception, the True. In the creature this conception is more nearly teleological. God is the absolute Being and the absolute Good, because as the absolute Being He perfectly corresponds to the conception of the absolute; *i.e.* He is determined in an absolute way, which also implies that He is thus determined entirely of His own will.

The Good is that being which entirely corresponds to its conception; but it belongs to the conception of true being, that it is self-posited (existing not merely *of*, but also *for*, itself).

*

The Good in God is not *moral* good. Even in the perfected individual creature this is no longer the case. Moral good is becoming, and is destined to become, real good; but it has not yet attained perfection.

*

The absolute "union of necessity and freedom" is directly implied in the conception of God, for it necessarily belongs to the idea of the absolute, that it is purely self-posited, and for this very purpose, purely self-positing being. (For if being self-posited were for the absolute a principle given it, then it would be determined by this, and would thus be dependent on another.)

*

We contradict ourselves when we refuse to that absolute Being, who, according to our conception, is not only determined, but also determined in full perfection, the very highest of all the determining attributes of being (whether known to us by experience or in themselves imaginable), *viz.* personality.

*

Whenever philosophy renounces the idea of a personal God (which really means to renounce *every* idea of God), it necessarily degenerates into mythological personifications.

While determining Himself as the absolute *Person*, God must again from that point determine Himself as the absolute Being; for thus only does He really exist entirely by His own self-determination.

*

The idea of absoluteness certainly involves that of perfection, for the absolute simply means that which in every respect is absolutely perfect; but we cannot reverse the idea (? ?).

*

Undoubtedly God alone is absolute being; but at the same time every fully developed (personal) created being is in its own degree absolute (it is what it is in an absolute way). This latter is the so called *relative* absoluteness.

THE INFINITUDE OF GOD.

Absoluteness and infinitude are in no way identical conceptions. Infinitude is merely eternity with the idea of self-negation added. It cannot therefore in any sense be predicated of God.

*

There is no worse, no poorer definition of the absolute, than the word "infinite."

*

God in His immanent being is to be considered as entirely outside space and time, and therefore just as little infinite as finite.

Infinitude, when predicated of God, means simply this, that His being does not, through the existence of the finite (created by Himself) and through His relations with it, become less purely infinite; that it does not come under the same category as the finite, owing to His connection with it. Because the being of God is a being outside space and time, it cannot enter into their relations, and cannot therefore come into collision with them. He who exists entirely outside space and time cannot have His own being limited because another occupies only a fixed portion of space and time. Because the being of God does not come under the category of space and time, being quite independent of both, therefore, when He does enter space and time, it is not as being Himself controlled by them, neither does He in any way come under the influence of either.

*

How little the idea of the infinite can be used as synonymous with the idea of God becomes evident from the fact that space and time are themselves infinite (?).

*

The words "temporal" and "eternal" do not in any way exclude each other. The opposite of the temporal is the timeless, and therefore originless; the opposite of the eternal is the non-self-existent.

*

One of the many superstitions which, in our science, are practised with the idea of the infinite

(often with the mere word itself), owing to its importance being very much over-estimated, is the notion that the infinitude of God makes any adequate idea (not merely an approximate conception) of Him impossible. But is it not a matter of indifference to the mathematician, in his idea of the line, whether the length of that line is limited, or whether it stretches on into the infinite?

*

The infinite is for us simply inconceivable. [We cannot make a mental representation of it.]

*

Why should people always imagine that we lose something of great importance in our knowledge of God, because infinitude is to our minds quite inconceivable? [We cannot picture it to ourselves. It is *unvorstellbar*.] The importance lies in the *quality* of the being to be known; its *quantity* is of quite subordinate consequence.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD.

The immutability of God does not imply that He is unaffected by the condition of the world, although it does imply that His being thus affected does not result in a change of condition in Himself. The reason of this is, that His being is really untemporal, and can therefore know nothing of vicissitude. God is undoubtedly affected by all conditions of the world

at every moment of its being (of the whole, as well as of the individual creature); but since for Him no separate moment of the world exists as separate, but always in union with all separate moments of the world's being, therefore, while being affected by one particular moment, He has ever present to Him at the same time the affections caused by all other separate moments. He has constantly present to Him the entire totality of all the affections which have come to Him from the world, only determined under the potency (under the louder sounding) of the special and separate affection of each passing moment; and this must be always similar and homogeneous. His immutability rests therefore on the fact that He never beholds the separate as merely separate, but always in conjunction with the absolute completeness of the whole.

*

Self-sufficiency certainly belongs to the conception of absoluteness, and must therefore undoubtedly be ascribed to God; but God really suffices to Himself only in so far as He really unites in Himself the possibility and necessity of the world.

*

It would be an actual imperfection in God (a mental dulness or indolence) if He were not affected by the condition of the world. His absoluteness demands only that His being thus affected by the world shall in no way involve a disturbance (change or limitation) in His own being.

God is immutable, because His being, in all its changes and modifications, remains constantly true to its own conception. Change of condition never makes His own being less or greater, but at every moment, and in all variations of the changing relations between Himself and the world, He remains in His entirety as the absolute Being. For this reason His condition is one of absolute and perpetual happiness and glory, or, if we unite the two, of absolute and perpetual vitality. Of the agency of God *ad extra* immutability cannot be predicated, because we do not consider it as absolute. Seeing that God, at all times and in all His relations with the world, perfectly corresponds to His own idea, He is at all times like Himself,[1] and consequently immutable.

SEPARATE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

That determining quality of God, which causes Him, while actualising His absolute potentiality (constituting Himself as *actu* existing in an absolute way), yet at the same time not to relinquish this potentiality, but rather to preserve it, is His self-existence. Without the thought of this self-existence the idea of God is not really an idea of God. It is

[1] Just as, in strict analogy with what has been said above, an approximately perfect character, amid all the varying conditions of life, preserves approximately likeness to himself—his personal identity.

not an attribute of the Divine Being, but rather an attribute of the very conception of such a Being.

*

The real purport of the idea of eternity is that of self-existence, both of which ideas perfectly coincide. Considered as timelessness, eternity has an entirely negative meaning; if we seek to express the idea positively, the thought results that God is *causa sui*. It is for this very reason that the eternity of God is so sharply accentuated in the religious consciousness. God is also *causa sui* because of His immanent trinitarian process.

*

Just because eternity is a predicate of the Divine being (of the hidden God), we cannot possibly conceive its idea in a positive form.

*

We must exclude from the idea of God all those attributes and functions of personality, which have their principle in the inherent individuality of the person, *e.g.* all impulse and sensation, all appropriation and enjoyment, all anticipation and contemplation, all pleasure and displeasure, and along with this all blessedness (notwithstanding 1 Timothy vi. 15). (Therefore there was need of a High Priest who should be both God and Man; such a High Priest as we find described in Hebrews ii. 17, 18; iv. 15.) Yet this exclusion is merely an exclusion of limitation. (See the general scheme of the Divine attributes.)

Since God possesses no individuality, we cannot ascribe to Him any definite individual self-consciousness, any feeling (as distinguished from thought), whether of pleasure or displeasure. In the strict psychological sense, He can have no affections; for in Him affection is self-consciousness, which, through the mediation of feeling, on the one hand, and inclination, on the other, passes over into self-activity. But in spite of this, we must suppose that there is in God a transition from His absolute self-consciousness into His absolute self-activity, only, as we must exclude all individual mediation, the transition must be brought about immediately by Himself. We may therefore suppose that there are in God qualities analogous to affections; on the one side, anger, and on the other, satisfaction or love (as an affection), more particularly as mercy (in all its various modifications as pity, patience, long-suffering, etc.). Those attributes however which belong to feeling as such must be expressly left out of sight; not merely those of displeasure, pain, and suffering, but just as decidedly those of pleasure. The happiness of God must therefore be conceived as without the attribute of merely individual pleasure, and in this way it is characteristically distinguished from the happiness of all created beings.

*

The life of God, as of man, depends on His having a natural organism (animated body) in closest union with His personality.

We cannot gain a clear idea of the Divine omnipresence unless we draw a distinction between God's inworking and His indwelling.

*

In perfected personal creatures the Divine omnipresence is real indwelling.

*

God is good and holy, but He is also incomparably great [*genial gross* = lit. supremely gifted].

*

The expression, "foreknowledge of God," may be very easily misunderstood and perverted. The only sense in which there can be a foreknowledge of God is that of forethought (of *à priori* conception), and consequently of fore-ordination.

*

How obstinately we all cling to the heathen custom of supposing that the chief characteristic in the idea of God is His absolute *power!*

*

To call God an "ethical" being, and to speak of the "ethical" in Him, is most confusing. He is a *personal* being; we can stretch the analogy no further than this. (?)

*

It is a narrow-minded delusion which leads us to imagine that God is so very lofty that we must deny to Him all that makes up the special charm of humanity. Our own lofty ones fancy that they should renounce this also to a large extent.

Can we know that God is, without at the same time knowing *what* He is?

*

O my God, well do I feel my rashness in trying to let my own thoughts follow Thine, and the feeling of deepest humility never possesses me more powerfully than then; and yet, if it is right that my thoughts *should* follow Thine, is there then any other way on which I might walk less rashly?

*

To call God (with Schelling) a Being unique in His *kind* is quite impracticable; for it belongs to the conception of the unique, not only that the being concerned is a self-contained being (a "thing definitely marked off on all sides"), but also that it is *one* in a plurality of beings of the same *species*.

*

We should not treat the good God as unreasonable; therefore not as an arbitrary God.

*

We cannot indeed speak of God as individual, but He does not in this way lose any affirmative attribute. He possesses no individuality, only because He includes in Himself the *totality* of those qualities, which, taken separately, constitute individualities.

*

To make God amenable to the rules of logic is senselessness itself.

We can form no mental representation (*vorstellung*) of the being of God, because it is timeless, and our mental representations can be constructed only under the categories of space and time. This however does not necessarily imply that we can form no idea of such a Being. For this reason then, because the thinking of the creature necessarily comes under the categories of space and time, our thinking is mainly in the form of mental representations, and the mental representation forms a part of the actually complete idea.

*

It seems to us a simple and purely elementary truth that God is holy love, but how could we have known anything about it without Christ and the revelation made by Him? Nature and history show us clearly the wise and mighty God, but where do they show Him as holy and loving?

*

It is easy enough to repeat that God is love; but who, looking merely upon the natural course of earthly existence, would himself have fallen upon the idea?

*

In Old Testament times men knew that God was good (*cf. e.g.* Gen. l. 19), but they did not yet know that it belongs to the very conception of man himself to be good.

PANTHEISM AND MATERIALISM.

In pantheistic mysticism God is really everything; in ordinary pantheism everything is God.

*

The pantheism of the middle ages was a movement of moral contemplation in opposition to the purely religious. We find in it a dawning consciousness of the really Divine nature of ordinary created existence.

*

Materialism, and especially materialistic pantheism, seem highly plausible to all who feel their own empty-mindedness and uselessness, without being, in consequence thereof, disgusted with themselves.

*

He who thinks of God as in Himself an entirely *simple* being (as *e.g.* Schleiermacher) must be strongly tempted to form a pantheistic conception of Him as particularising Himself in the world.

*

Superficial systems (as *e.g.* materialism, and many forms of pantheism) readily commend themselves to the approbation of all mediocre and easy-going minds. They supply a summary solution of difficulties, and, at the same time, one which can be definitely formulated and easily repeated.

*

Materialism is a tendency, not a system; it cannot therefore be conquered by setting up any system in

opposition to it, no matter how excellent that system in itself may be.

*

What people call the materialism of our time is the more or less clear consciousness, which men are beginning to have now-a-days, of the human value of material things for truly human purposes.

GOD AND THE WORLD.

IV. GOD AND THE WORLD.

CREATION OF THE WORLD.

TRUE natural science, as a construction of the nature of our earth, must never forget that the creation of our planet most probably presupposes the existence and active agency of other spheres, to which the peculiar concrete forms in which the special grades of created beings have appeared must be causally referred. The *prima materia* of our planet was probably not in itself the pure and entirely abstract *prima materia*, but only relatively a primeval matter, in which were present the unconsumed remains of earlier cosmic spheres, the development of which had been fully completed.

*

Supposing that the sun were a fully developed, therefore a really spiritual, sphere, then light (which includes heat) would be elementary spirit streaming forth from it, not as pure spirit, but in union with the material elementary substances of our earthly atmosphere. What our senses apprehend of light would in that case be its non-spiritual element. The

sun itself would be perceptible only in its reflexion in our material atmosphere.

*

Heaven, the dwelling-place of God, is in all places of creation (or space) where God has given to Himself a real being, where He therefore has being (though without limitation) in the midst of space. Heaven must therefore be apprehended as in infinite growth, and consequently as being itself infinite.

*

It is noteworthy, that in creation each higher step always arises from the dissolution of the one below, so that the lower, by means of the creative influence, always forms the substratum for the generation of the higher. (This cannot be otherwise if the creature is to be developed from itself.) From the decomposition of elements arises the mineral, from decayed matter the plant, from the putrifying plant the animal. So from the material human being, as he sinks back into the elements, arises spirit, the spiritual creature.

*

Creation is creation only in so far as we find in it no sudden bound, but in all its links a real development from the preceding links of the chain.

*

Like the creation of nature, that of man has not yet come to a close. Both processes run parallel to each other.

The Scriptures distinguish two creations (κτίσεις), a material (χειροποίητος) and an immaterial (Heb. ix. 11 ; *cf. vv.* 14, διὰ Πνεύματος αἰωνίου, and 24).

*

It is equally true that God dwells in the perfected (*i.e.* purely spiritual) creature, and that the creature (even the imperfect) dwells in God. Our duty is to see that God does dwell in the creature which dwells in Him. Then, notwithstanding His work of creation, God dwells again entirely by Himself.

*

The distinction between creation and preservation in the ordinary sense entirely disappears, when creation is considered (as it must be) as continuously progressive.

*

Creation as a Divine act is eternal ; but creation as a Divine work, as the creature, cannot be eternal, because, in accordance with its very idea, it is placed without exception under the law of finitude.

*

So far indeed the creature is certainly not eternal, because the creative influence of God, according to its very conception, enters directly into space and time, and thus becomes directly affected by both. Although in itself eternal, it is everywhere present only as temporal.

*

The finitude which belongs essentially to all created being necessarily implies that it (as being made up of

separate parts) exists in all its forms (grades, kinds, species), in a multiplicity of separate beings. As each of these many separate beings has its own peculiar and various conditions of origin and existence, therefore the many are at the same time dissimilar.

*

Even after the creature, in its perfected spirituality, has attained to infinite being, it yet remains finite because of its temporal origin, even setting aside the fact that, according to its own conception, it can never cease to be a divided and alterable being.

*

Creation is not a miracle. A miracle is essentially an *absolute* act of God, which essentially creation is not. And because the miracle is an absolute act of God, it vanishes immediately within the circle of created things, and does not form a new and continuous chain of events in the world.[1]

*

It is no proof of God's omnipotence that He creates pure matter; the proof rather consists in His doing away with matter merely as such.

*

While God creates time, His creation is itself a creation in time, a temporal creation. The same is true of space. But His being is also *eo ipso* a creating of space and time. If the whole antithesis of past, and future had no existence for God (Ebrard, i., p.

[1] For further aphorisms on the subject of miracles, see under "Supernaturalism."

225), then He would be unable rightly to understand temporal things, and would not therefore be the all-wise and omniscient God.

*

If I were not to proceed on the assumption of a teleology in the world, such as is alone consistent with the idea of a creation by God, it must remain to my mind a most problematical question whether my knowledge, that derived from the senses and that derived from the understanding, really comprehends anything of facts as they truly are.

*

The being that is perfect and exists absolutely must be conceived as the original, as the cause of the being that is imperfect and exists only relatively.

*

That there must be something which was not originated by another, no thinker can dispute. But if this uncreated being exists, it must be itself its own originator; it can exist *thus* only of itself. Such a being alone can be without origin, which suffices to its own existence, and which is, at the same time, the causality of all originated things.

*

The solidarity of interests in the universe.

*

Natural forces are undoubtedly "elastic" (as even experience shows us), for they are capable of being infinitely modified by each other's influence.

In creation (alike in nature and in history) there is everywhere a wealth of variations upon those themes which rest on absolute necessity. The variations themselves do not rest upon logical and immanent necessity, but on the free artistic play of the creative and relatively co-creative intellect.

*

In the creation of the material world God is not only an architect, constructing all things after His own design, but also a perfect artist; *i.e.* in creating the visible world, He constantly considers the æsthetic impression that it will make on the feelings of its personal inhabitants, in order that they too may understand Himself, His consciousness. He is the first and greatest landscape-painter.

*

Every flower is beautiful when it blooms.

*

Man, in his productions, has many separate ideas: God, in His creative work, has but one, but that comprises all in all.

*

It is well in physics to go back to atomism; but if in all nature we see nothing more than an aggregate of atoms, if we forget that the Maker of these atoms has, by His creative power, produced from them incomparably higher things, this is, to use the mildest expression, a culpable thoughtlessness.

*

Unless we look at the matter from the standpoint

of theism, we cannot imagine that the really finite world originated otherwise than by means of those limitations, which were laid upon an originally positive being by some negative principle. From the theistic standpoint, the case is, of course, reversed.

*

It is not correct to say that "in the last and highest instance willing is the only being" (so that all real life has freedom as its foundation); the true expression is rather that in the last and highest instance only a *being who wills* is the fundamental principle of all.

*

Is the idea of a God creating all things after His own design so very absurd that we must, without saying anything about it, set aside this, the most natural of all explanations of the world?

*

He who attempts to understand the world without possessing the idea of God, can only guess; he who makes the attempt, possessing this idea, is able to explain it.

*

If God could not raise the creature to something better than its present condition, He would not have begun to create it at all.

*

God cannot share what He is and has with another, but He can impart it to another.

The creation of God is equally characterised by wise economy and by generous lavishness; by the former in its plan, by the latter in its execution.

*

It is pure thoughtlessness to maintain that God created the world from love, and yet to deny that He created it from necessity, from an inward compulsion.

*

He whose highest ideas in theology and cosmology are "barren" is undoubtedly on the wrong track. Theological and cosmological ideas can be made use of only when they are really fruitful, in comparison with those which lie lower, and may be discovered on the path of experience.

*

The creature can possess value for God only when, purely by its own self-development, it becomes what it ought to be; that is to say, when it ceases to put itself in opposition to God. But only by means of its relation to God can this self-development be achieved.

*

The world does not give itself being in God (to whom space is unknown); but God gives Himself being in the world, His own eternity nevertheless remaining unimpaired.

*

From the standpoint of belief in God, therefore from the presumption that the world, ourselves included, is His creature, it naturally follows that we

may venture confidently to trust our means of knowledge (our senses in their widest acceptation); *i.e.* we may trust that they are real means of knowledge (true senses). From any other standpoint we would have much difficulty in gaining any certain knowledge on the subject.

*

The true real is not the real in itself, but the real in its indissoluble union with the ideal.

*

That an element of the creature is indispensable as an intermediate step towards the attainment of the definite creature, owing to the law of development of the creature from itself; and that this is indispensable as an organic element in the creature or material nature, in order to its life or temporary existence;—these are two different sides of one and the same question, of one and the same teleology of separate created things.

*

It is a perfectly natural consequence that those who believe that our earth left the Creator's hand in an already perfect state should, as we always find, look upon tradition (*cabala*) as the only source of knowledge.

*

The creature can have value in God's eyes, and be an object of delight to Him, only in so far as it has become what it is entirely by its own self-development.

If the creature which God wills to create is to be the same as God, and yet another than God, distinct from Him, then He must make the creaturely being that is like Him out of a being which is entirely unlike Him,—which is, in fact, the opposite of what He is. He must therefore first of all produce a being contrary to Himself.

*

Matter can be said to be in any sense positive only because it is not merely (negatively) *not* what God is, but rather because it is precisely (positively) the *contrarium* of what God is. Matter is indeed a nullity, but it is a positive nullity.

*

If spirit and matter do not form a perfect contrast, let us have done with all our logic.

*

Pure matter is not yet world (κόσμος).

*

How can an emanation proceed from that which has no parts?

*

What a *naïve* idea it is to imagine that all nature is merely an adornment, placed round man for the purpose of beautifying him!

*

All that exists, the being of every actual thing, indispensably presupposes its previous existence in thought. This is also true of the world as a whole, as *cosmos*.

There are but few people so constituted as to be able to keep their eye and their attention at once both on God and the world.

*

What strange beings men are, that to them God should become small in proportion as the world becomes great!

*

All true inventions are only discoveries.

PRESERVATION OF THE WORLD.

The Divine preservation of the world is not a continuous creation. The creation of the world is no doubt infinitely progressive (John v. 17), but the preservation of the already created being does not require a new creative influence on the part of God. The already created being is preserved, in so far as it is in itself perishable,—therefore *only thus far*. The creature that is already really spiritual is not an object of the Divine preserving power. With the completion of creative activity in the earthly sphere, the preserving influence of God comes there to an end;[1] therefore those who belong to this sphere, but have not become spiritually perfect (the lost), are *eo ipso* placed outside the reach of the preserving influence of God. The Divine preservation of the world is thus always a preservation of the *natural*

[1] When God Himself really exists in the creature, the latter can have no further need of preservation (*cf.* Rev. xxi. 23).

side of the creature. (Many serious difficulties are thus overcome.) But for this reason preservation is the peculiar function of the Divine nature.

*

The Divine preservation, purely as such, does not act *directly* on the separate created being, but directly only on the totality of special created spheres—or, more correctly, on the totality of *all* special created spheres. Wherever the preserving power of God acts on a separate created being (or on a special circle of such), there a miracle takes place. There are many more such miracles than we ever dream of.

*

The conception of the Divine preservation of the world is, that the true, continuous existence of all not yet really spiritual creatures, because it may at any moment be annihilated by the Divine omnipotence, rests therefore on a function of God, which does not nullify, but rather confirms it, and must be referred to Him as its cause. This may be said of every separate being which has not yet become truly spiritual, for no separate being is an indispensable potency in God's plan of the world ; but this cannot be said of the world as a whole. The Divine preservation acts therefore on the former, not in any sense on the latter. Until they become spiritually perfect, separate beings are therefore, as regards the continuation of their existence, in a state of entire dependence upon God ; and this dependent relation, but no more than this, is required also by the pious

consciousness. The continuous existence of separate material creatures is undoubtedly assured by the laws of nature; but these are so elastic, that God could at any moment put an end to the existence of every material being by means of these very laws.

*

The Church's doctrine of the Divine preservation of the world rests on the same delusion as our bureaucracy; namely, on the assumption, that if others are to be dependent upon one person, that one must himself do everything for them,—while in this way he has *really nothing* dependent on him, merely a number of empty ciphers.

*

God can really (*i.e.* purely) love only those creatures *for* whom He had first to give Himself, with all that He is,—sacrificing Himself in order to qualify them as objects of His love,—before He could give Himself *to* them by means of mutual communion. The act of self-surrender to another must be, even for God, an act of self-sacrifice, owing to the toil and trouble which it costs Him to bring it to its completion.

*

The pain of sympathy is the only pain which God can know.

*

God cannot suffer, but He can sympathise.

*

In what a different attitude does adoring admira-

tion stand in presence of the enigma of the world, from suspicious scepticism, proud of its own irony!

*

If man, on the path of morality, exercising his understanding and advancing his culture, has appropriated to his own personality the whole of outward earthly nature, and thus by assimilation has spiritualised it, he will, at the same time, have appropriated to himself all the real ideas of God, which constitute the Divine nature, as far as these can reveal themselves in the *earthly* creation.

ANGELS AND DEVILS.

God's working *through* the angels is the natural consequence of His being *in* the angels.

*

It is no mere accident that the Scriptures describe the angels as so often taking an active part in the history of the Redeemer, especially at the time of His entrance upon His life on earth.

*

As regards the doctrine of angels, most of our contemporaries seem almost to suppose that the spiritual perfection of a creature involves its imprisonment in heaven. (How differently does Christ Himself look upon the matter!—Matt. xxviii. 18, 20; xviii. 20.) The same is true of demonology.

*

As regards the higher spiritual world, we learn

from the Scriptures that in it real angels and devils are actively present. We know from Scripture that there are such beings, what their nature is, and how they act; but whence they come, and whither they go, the Scriptures do not tell us.

*

The devil is in God's world an illegitimate power and unacknowledged by God; but, at the same time, he is an *actual* power, which God cannot ignore.

THE SUPERSENSUAL WORLD.

Is it less adventurous to assume that matter will perish, than to believe it will be spiritualized? What are we then to think of the "supersensual world"?

*

He who wishes to look into the supersensual world must prepare himself to find things in it which will appear to him most wonderful.

*

The invisible spiritual world is not merely invisible for us, but is altogether imperceptible by means of the senses.

*

In material nature the most real, because the most intense and energetic, forces are the imponderable, those which are least tangible and altogether least perceptible by the senses. From this we may draw an inference as to the reality of invisible and spiritual things.

If, in facing the question as to whether there is a supersensual world, as the result of the sensual, I contemplate the visible world, then this thought takes powerful possession of my mind, that it is impossible for the most artistic work to be at the same time the most worthless and without design.

*

He only can, as a natural consequence, be disposed to avoid all thoughts of the supersensual world, who does not consider it as the product of the sensual.

SPACE AND TIME.

As far as God is considered as standing in relation to the world, thus far, but no further, must He be considered as making space and time the sphere of His activity.

*

According to Herbart space and time are only "still forms of our conception."

*

Existence as the existence of nothing, of nought, of nullity = space; existence as non-existent, as null, as negative = time.

*

The original dimensions of space are those of the original figure, the sphere.

*

Space and time are the framework, the warp, into which God weaves his κόσμος.

Κόσμος = the *universitas rerum* considered as the product of design.

*

The saying, that whatever begins must end, is untrue.

*

The idea of time does not in itself by any means belong to the conception of growth. Growth is being which exists under the form of causal relation. This relation naturally involves the idea of design; and more nearly, on the one hand, the *idea* of some object of design, and, on the other, the realization of this idea. The being which is self-developed, which is *causa sui*, must inevitably be considered as existing under the form of growth.

*

Matter is not equivalent to mass, which is already a *concretum*. The two are invariably confounded when one gives to space and time an existence prior to matter.[1]

*

The conception common to both space and time is that of divided being. In space, the divisions of time are considered as co-existent, existing along with each other; in time, as successive, existing after one another. Divided being = finite being. Existence in space is non-self-existent as regards its idea, as

[1] Or when matter is defined as "space-filling substance, which has as its essential characteristics weight and antitypy" (Weisse: "Philos. Dogmatik," ii., § 129).

regards what it is; existence in time is non-self-existent as regards its actual existence, the reality of what it is.

*

In the conception of matter as the simply non-existent, *i.e.* the simply finite or divided being, lies its infinite divisibility, because of its being divided; and thus we reach the idea of the infinite divisibility of space and time.

*

The finitude, which belongs essentially to all created being, necessarily implies that it (as being made up of separate parts) exists in all its forms (grades, kinds, species) in a multiplicity of separate beings. As each of these separate beings has its own peculiar and various conditions of origin and existence, the many are at the same time dissimilar.

*

Even after the creature, in its perfected spirituality, has attained to infinite being, it yet remains finite because of its *temporal* origin, even setting aside the fact that, according to its own conception, it can never cease to be a divided and alterable being.

*

That which is filled with divisible being (atoms) is not empty space (Fichte: "Anthropologie," pp. 204–206), but extended and animated space, or æther.

*

We are able indirectly to contemplate space by contemplating those things which fill it, for every

microscope shows the relativity and subjectivity of the laws of size in space; but we cannot do this with time. For although certain things do fill time, yet it cannot be thus contemplated; for in filling a certain point of time they do not exclude each other, as things in space, relatively at least, always do. Time must therefore be contemplated in its duration.

*

A beginning of time can be conceived of only in space, therefore only on the assumption of the priority of space to time. But time and space are, in their fundamental principle, entirely co-existent; so that the one cannot be supposed to exist without the other. The same is true of the assumption of a beginning of space.

*

Number (by means of motion) stands in the same relation to time as measure, figure, or size (by means of extension) stands to time.

*

Space : locality = figure. Time : measure = number. Figure is the original and most abstract form of the idea : number the original and most abstract form of existence. The idea is the *quale;* existence is the *quantum.* Space can be defined only by figures (the most simple is the point); time only by numbers (the most simple is the zero).

*

The origin of a being can take place only in time. If time does not exist, then there can be no existence

of that which has a beginning ; so that whatever part of the world exists before time must be without commencement. Only after time has come to have an existence in the world are there creatures which have a beginning.

*

Space divides the various forms of existence ; time divides existence itself.

*

Because space and time exist *for* God, therefore they do not exist *in* Him, nor He in them.

*

Only for the spirit space is no more a separating barrier. Only as spirits can persons really dwell in one another.

*

Mathematics are an essential part of the system of philosophy.

*

Mathematics pre-suppose logic, but not *vice versa.*

*

Mathematics are a part of physics.

*

What logic is in the ideal, mathematics are in the real. The laws of nature are laws of logic.

*

Categories are those presuppositions of our consciousness, by means of which the act of thinking as such, apart from any given object of thought, is rendered possible.

SPIRIT.

Spirit exists only for spirit.

*

Spirit is not by any means, in its fundamental conception, a personal, *i.e.* a self-conscious and self-active being; but *without* personality, *i.e.* self-consciousness and self-activity, spirit cannot be imagined.

*

The most striking proof of the reality of spirit is the universal talk on the subject, while, at the same time, hardly any one ever connects a real idea with the word "spirit."

*

In the perfected spiritual world there are personal potencies of dimensions, of which we, within the range of our present experience, have no conception whatever.

*

Even pure spirits in the purely immaterial world must have an outward, in contrast to an inward, being, just as surely as the being of each several one, in spite of its pure spirituality, is finite, or limited by space.

*

Once for all, spirit cannot possibly be made.

*

In visible nature, if we advance from its lower to its higher stages, we find that, on the one hand, the ideal factor, spirit, is always increasing, while, on the

other hand, the real factor is continually decreasing. At the summit we come to a purely ideal being, to the *ego* as we may imagine it previous to moral development.

*

There is no other created spirit except the moral (morally determined).

*

Ought not the perfected spiritual mind, which has become free from the sensual, to comprehend the sensual, and, indeed, to comprehend it as it truly is?

*

While the spirit is at once both conceived being and absolutely existent being, its very principle excludes the possibility of its being *potentia*, *i.e.* conceived (possible) but not purely existent being.

*

Even material nature is essentially self-developed and constantly self-developing; but spirit is developed both from without itself and from within itself.

*

Is spirit in its fundamental idea simple? Certainly it is indivisible, an *ἀκατάλυτον*.

*

Real spirit cannot become more than it is.

*

Spirit can originate only by self-conception and self-realization.

Real spirit cannot be sensually affected, cannot therefore be affected by anything sensual; *e.g.* it is impossible to alter or to spoil it.

*

In a tenable conception of spirit how can there be any question of a "possible troubling and darkening of the spiritual life, by means of the organic feelings and sensations, impulses and desires"? (Schenkel: "Dogm.," ii., p. 340. *Cf.* Schenkel himself on this very point, pp. 341, 342.)

*

Spirit and matter are alternative conceptions, so that we cannot have a clear and distinct idea of the one without the other.

*

Spirit is the only being which possesses value in itself, because it alone is self-developed.

*

The word "spiritual," as distinguished from the immaterial, means spirit considered as not morally developed—a kind of spirit which certainly does not exist in the creature.

*

Spirit in its fundamental principle is absolutely penetrable, manifest to others, self-communicable; *i.e.* it is light. As an absolutely existing idea, spirit is clearly conceivable by others.

CREATION OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT.

The ruling conception of the human spirit in our theology, although our dogmatists do not appear to be conscious of it, is unquestionably emanative, purely created, and not as they pretend, creative. We may easily conceive to what serious consequences such a confusion of ideas may lead.

*

He who considers that the human spirit was *directly* created must necessarily consider it as mere nature; for, so considered, it is of course merely a conceived and posited being.

*

If matter, the contrary of God, has yet, in the personal creature, come to be in some sense analogous to God, then the personal creature itself becomes thus the contrary of matter, and the contrary of nature so far as nature is material.

*

Even the creation of nature, in each of its several kingdoms, passed through stages of deformity. Why then should it be thought unworthy of God to suppose that the like took place in the creation of man?

*

If it belongs to the very conception of creation to be a development of matter, itself primarily created by God, then we do not cast the slightest aspersion on the Creator by saying that He made man *at first*

merely natural (1 Cor. xv. 47), and, in this the first stage of his development, necessarily sinful; for this stage of the creature's development could not be overleaped any more than another, if true development was to subsist. Only, we must remember that it was merely temporary, and destined to be abolished in the further progress of creative work.

*

Nothing which is imperfect, which is not absolutely good, can be original or *causa sui;* but must, in some respect, at least, have been originated by another.

*

Dispositions and determinations of the will cannot be inborn.

*

Created spirit can be conceived of only as an ideal and yet real being, whose reality is the proper act of its ideality; only in such a being can its being so, that is, its having spiritual existence, have any value. Only when the spiritual being has been developed, not by the mere thought and action of another, but by its own personal thought and action, can it be not merely spiritual nature, but also a spiritual *ego*, therefore a spiritual person or personal spirit. Even the natural *ego* is not the result of the direct thought and action of another, but is developed by its own thought and action, building on the foundation of its natural disposition, which is undoubtedly the creation of another. Hence a natural *ego*, strictly so called,

does not exist; but as far as it is *actu* present, it is also spiritual, developed by its own thought and its own action.

*

How impossible it is to conceive the created spirit as developed by a direct and therefore pure decree of God, is clearly shown in the everywhere apparent tendency of our theologians to consider it as proceeding from *God's own being*, therefore as emanative.

*

Wherever and under whatever circumstances any good can be developed from the personal creature, there, by means of His own holiness, must God develop it.

*

If God could have created man in a state of direct moral goodness, then He could have restored sinful man *directly*, *i.e.* by magic, to the same state of moral excellence. The pity is, that in both instances the *moral* quality would be wanting to the man who had thus become good!

*

If we wish with full assurance to recognise the highest good in man, then we must at the same time acknowledge that it grows up in him out of the low and the sensual, to the honour of the Creator's wisdom.

*

If man, *by a direct creative action of God*, has

become in reality "a being akin to Him" (Schenkel: "Dogmatik," ii., i., pp. 153–159), then he can claim no real kinship to God at all; for such a being only can be akin to God which has *itself* become what it is; what is *actu* akin to God must be self-developed.

*

Can it be seriously demanded (Schenkel: "Dogmatik," ii., i., pp. 154, 156) that the human individual shall be a creature of God in a different sense from the individual of any other species of organic creatures?

*

If we are to grant that an *adequacy* of the creature for God may exist, on account of which He can love it, then, since God exists of Himself alone, the creature which exists, not of itself, but entirely of God, must become developed by its own means. Therefore the merely natural creature always remains foreign to God, who can dwell in none but the personal creature.

*

If God had wished to make of the creature merely an impersonal plaything, not an object of His love, then undoubtedly it need not have passed through the discipline of evil.

*

The only true power of self-determination is that which has determined *itself* to be so. But in that case the creature, to whom it belongs, cannot have been endowed at its creation with this self-determin-

ing power. Only such a being can determine itself to be a power of self-determination.

*

The difficulties which surround the assumption that sin was appointed by God in His scheme of the world may be very easily explained when the circumstances are correctly represented. God traces out in *à priori* thought the necessary course of creation, and because, according to its conception, the personal, spiritual world, which is its aim and object, cannot be otherwise realized than through stages of sinful personal creatures, with material organisms and animal propensities, therefore He expressly gives a place to these stages in His plan of the world; but, like all mere means to an end (which, as being only means, are conceived as not definitive), they are just as expressly meant to be abolished.

*

A real unity of idea and existence, *i.e.* spirit, cannot be achieved otherwise than by means *of these themselves*. It cannot be accomplished by the intervention of any third influence exercised outside of them, for in that case the unity would be merely outward, not truly inward. Consequently, (*a*) the idea must place existence in absolute unity with itself; or (*b*) existence must place the idea in absolute unity with itself; or (*c*) each must place the other in absolute unity with itself. Of these, however, *b* is clearly inconceivable, because existence as such cannot create an idea, cannot therefore place it in unity

with itself; and for the same reason, *c* becomes also impossible. *A*, on the contrary, is quite conceivable, if the idea is supposed to be, on the one hand, self-conceiving, and on the other, self-realizing. Spirit can originate in a being only by means of its own conception and its own realization. Only the elements of the creature's spirit can thus be divinely created; the spirit itself must be produced from these elements by the creature itself alone. For only by the creature itself can these elements be truly woven into one another, because this can be done only by its personal thought and action (not by those of another).

*

Self-consciousness does not mean that we are of ourselves conscious of the matter in question, but that we are conscious of that matter, whatever it may be, *through* ourselves, in an active, not a passive, acceptation. From *this* self-consciousness alone it follows that the conscious being can also be conscious *of itself; i.e.* can distinguish itself from its consciousness. The same is true of self-activity, and this indeed is in keeping with our common mode of speech. Only as far as the active being is active through itself, can it direct its activity *towards* itself. Because the soul (the soul's life) is self-conscious and self-active, therefore it is also self-determined: it is *ego*, *i.e.* it is personal; personality belongs to it. This *ego*, although it is essentially the union of self-consciousness and self-activity (it results from these two factors), is yet essentially distinct from both, and

indeed is so by virtue of these themselves, because as self-consciousness it acts upon itself as self-activity, and *vice versâ*.

*

Perception = thinking directed towards a given object; moral formation or culture = volition directed towards a given object. Pure thinking is thinking which originates the thought out of itself; pure volition is volition which originates the deed out of itself. The former produces from itself the world of its thoughts; the latter, in the same way, the world of its actions. The one is speculative thinking; the other autonomic volition. The speculative thinker, when placed in a world, understands it of himself, as it ought to be understood; the autonomic willer forms it to himself, as it ought to be formed. The first is the man of reason; the second the free man. The pure ideas of the former find everywhere objects which correspond to them, and the same is true of the pure acts of volition of the latter. So far we may say of the true speculator and autonomist, *i.e.* of the true man of reason and the true free man, that he himself, thinking and realizing, creates his own outer world, both ideal and real. On this point rests the possibility of an active agency without the intervention of material senses and powers. The true speculator and autonomist is therefore adapted to every sphere of activity; he understands (perceives) them all correctly, and he deals with them or morally forms them all rightly.

That the spirit of the creature was not created *directly*, but can be produced by the Creator only as self-posited being, therefore only by the intervention of the creature itself, only by the non-spiritual creature positing itself as spiritual—all this necessarily belongs to the conception of spirit as the true, *i.e.* absolute, union of idea and existence. A true, not merely relative, union, as distinguished from mere connection, between any idea and existence can be brought about only by this idea giving itself existence; namely, by a rational realization. Only from within, *i.e.* only of itself, by its own rational self-realization, can existence be given to an idea in such a way that a real union of both shall result; it can never come from without, therefore never by the thought and action of another. Such another could indeed produce a connection between idea and existence, as, on the one hand, the Creator Himself does in material nature, and as, on the other, the personal creature does in his arts and manufactures. But we could never have in this way a truly inward, *i.e.* absolutely pure, connection which would be a real unity.

God can therefore create the spiritual creature only indirectly, by creating a material creature, which is specifically so organized that it is able to transubstantiate itself from materiality into spirituality; or, in other words, to spiritualize itself. To this idea the personal creature corresponds.

LIFE (LIGHT).

Light is the concrete form in which life exists in God. Light is existence and idea in absolute identity. Therefore light is the concrete form of spirit as such, as impersonal. Matter as such is therefore, as the opposite of spirit, death, and *in concreto*, darkness. Light is the principle which generates life, especially in created nature. (*Cf.* Luke ii. 36.)

*

Spirit as such, as impersonal, is light and life. Personality is absolutely centralized life and light.

*

Spirit is *in concreto* life and light. It embraces the two in absolute identity. It is living light and luminous life. It belongs to the conception of light to be also life.

*

That which in its form is life is in its matter light; *i.e.* spirit is formally life, materially light.

*

The concrete identity of light and life shows itself in the fact, that the outward expression of both, while yet material, is heat.



ON MAN.

V. ON MAN.

MAN AND MANKIND.

THE thought of being a man is indescribably solemn, and fitted to produce a feeling of awe.

*

What a curious creature is man, a being who must rack his brains in order to discover what he himself is!

*

Man is the only creature which, as created, does not correspond to its own conception, and which is therefore self-contradictory. This self-contradiction is necessary, because it lies in the principle of man's being to become conformable to his conception only by his own personal action.

*

Man is the earthly microcosm only in his having spread himself fully out over the entire globe, so that the totality of all his peculiar attributes, and all his latent ideas and forces, are reflected and actualized in the whole human race.

*

The being of man is no mere "mode of existence,"

but a specifically determined being, to which a "mode of existence," of one kind or another, belongs.

*

It is undoubtedly a pressing necessity for the theology of the present day, unless it is to degenerate into silly prattle about piety, to acknowledge that it distinctly assumes that man is a product of nature, that he is creatively produced.

*

Our "scriptural" theologians expressly acknowledge that "man did not originally occupy the higher stage of development, which has for its distinctive mark a conscious separation between good and evil, but had to attain this stage by means of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil." Yet, in spite of this, they also maintain that God held with our first parents in Paradise "a continuous spiritual and corporeal intercourse, and that they were conscious of their undisturbed communion with God"; that "their will rested in the will of God, and was in perfect harmony with it, not merely unconsciously and instinctively, but consciously and knowingly," that "their primary condition was not childlike, in the sense that their communion with God had first to be entered into, but that they were rather in conscious unity with their Creator God." They even go as far as to add distinctly, "But we must not forget, that the first human beings did not enter this condition by any inward development, but found themselves already

existing in it, just as they had left the Creator's hand!"

*

Humanity in its sum total is itself a mere individual as compared with the personal creature as such. It is the personal creature in its specific determination as an earthly creature.

*

As regards the question, as to whether the human race descends from one pair or from several, we must not overlook the fact that the latter idea may be understood in very different senses, according as we consider the several pairs as of one and the same kind, or of different kinds. The latter would then be considered as indicating the different stages by means of which the idea of a creation of man has been gradually realized.

*

The unity of the human race is founded, quite independently of the unity of our first parents, in the unity of the conception of man.

*

If in the created universe the earlier generations were not considered as always lower in the scale of being than those which follow, then its happiness could not be infinitely increasing.

*

The more intimately I come to know a man, the more honourable does he usually appear to me.

There is no doubt that God must first have a real *man*, before He can make him a child of God.

MAN AND ANIMAL.

Even the animal exercises a moulding influence upon nature, but only in an individual manner. It can only assimilate it to itself, but has no power to make or produce anything from it. The same is true of its understanding.

*

Very instructive, as regards the relation of the personality to the soul, is the fact that the animal, in the gratification of its desires, never transgresses the proper bounds, which man often does. Man, being an *ego*, can excite his own impulse at will, while the animal is only excited by its impulse, and the exciting impulse naturally disappears as soon as the impulse is gratified.

*

It is a very common error to confound the *ego* with the soul, an error which (*e.g.* in Lotze's works) has a most confusing result. But how comes a confusion like this to be possible in presence of the little fact that there is such a thing as an animal-soul?

*

In the animal sphere there exists as yet no definite contrast between the soul, which rises above matter, and the nature, which is in direct union with it. For this reason the soul of the animal is entirely

under the power of its nature; but this is, at the same time, the sustaining power, which preserves to the nature its own proper character—the power which we call instinct.

*

In spring the toads, frogs, and reptiles come out; even this is a sign that a new spirit of life is at work in nature.

*

In dreams we are conscious *passively* and actively; our experiences in dreams may perhaps become an important key to the knowledge of the soul-life of animals.

*

In sleep the animal sinks back into the plant, into the process of vegetation; the personal therefore falls back into the material or impersonal, in order to gather thence new powers of existence (which by its special animal process are being constantly exhausted).[1] The particular being sinks back into the general process of nature, there to acquire new nourishment, because of itself, as a particular being, it has, as yet, no principle of existence, seeing that it is not yet real spirit. Sleep, therefore, like nourishment, is a condition of the existence of every individual, of every animal which has not yet become real spirit. The plant sleeps continually, as the

[1] It is here evident that the course of animal existence is a continuous sublimation of matter into the animal, a transformation of matter, of the real into the ideal. Only in man does the true idealization take place.

animal does before, and in the first period after, its birth.

*

In the animal the real self-comprehensiveness of the individual is first achieved, but only as self-exclusion and self-reserve, for the animal cannot love.

*

The expression of the animal in death is different from that of man.

*

So far as man is concerned, the animal belongs to material nature as it lies unaffected by human influences. It has itself a claim on nature only as far as nature is morally raw material, not on nature as cultivated by man.

SOUL AND BODY.

Life is the harmonious unity of contrasts. Its condition is therefore the oneness of soul and body, for the body is for the soul the condition of the diastole and systole of being, on which life depends.

*

According to Mor. Wilh. Drobisch ("Empirische Psychologie nach naturwissenschaftlicher Methode," p. 16: Leipzig, 1842), it is a "frequently noted fact that we find the full use of the mental powers existing up to the end of life, along with an almost entirely ruined brain."

That which in the moral process we understand by the process of spiritualization is the so-called organism of the inner nature; *i.e.* the psychical, the directly causal *substratum* of the *ego*. The soul [*seele*] becomes the organism of a spiritual nature—a spiritual, animated [*beseelt*] body.

*

The mass of spirit-elements, which is the result of the moral process of the individual, is styled a spiritual body, only on account of its absolute organization, *i.e.* its absolutely unique construction. But the possibility of this presupposes the really perfected personality of the constructing individual, for only in this case would it be in itself an absolute unity. That which here opposes the organic unity is *in concreto* the fact that, along with the good and therefore essentially real spirit, is blended spirit which is not yet good, and therefore not yet essentially real. There must therefore be a separation of the latter, *i.e.* a regeneration, which purifies it from all material elements, and changes it into good, and therefore also into essentially real, spirit.

*

The soul, or more nearly the personality, is to all eternity only the result of the vivifying functions of man's nature, or more particularly of his body. This is true of the spiritual man, just as implicitly as of the natural. That the soul is essentially the same as its body is quite as true a saying as the reverse, like soul, like body.

A soul and a body (an animated [*beseelt*] body) must be necessary to the natural organism which corresponds to the *ego*, because the soul in itself is only inwardly the instrument of its activity ; in order to outward activity the body is required.

*

The probable reason why our common mode of speech (in almost every language) refers the moral life of man, individually considered, to the heart, is that this organ is the centre of the action of the blood, the original basis of the material animal life.

*

As long as we have a conception of the spirit which excludes nature from it, it must be quite impossible for us to imagine a purely spiritual being and life of man, and consequently to imagine a living and personal God as purely spiritual. For even the most spiritual functions of the *ego*, its absolute thinking and absolute willing, are themselves limited by the possession of an organism which does not itself think and will, which is therefore essentially a nature.

*

In an organism (structure of members) "everything exists for the sake of one, and each separate member for the sake of all" (Kant: "Kritik des reinen Vern." Vorr. zur 2 Aufl.). Each constituent part of the organism has "a life for itself, only because it exists in the whole" (Vetter: "Lehre von chr. Cultus," p. 192).

The process of appropriation is specifically the process of life preservation. For material nature is said to come into possession of itself as an individual, as the organism of its own personality, even to bring out its own life, which actually consists in the personality finding itself in possession of an organism.

*

For the personal creature in its particular sphere, outward nature must finally cease; it must be entirely appropriated as the creature's own organism. In the same way no outward nature exists for God within the circle of His immanent being. The doctrine of the final destruction of our earthly nature is therefore perfectly unassailable. A spiritual nature cannot be conceived of as outward, for a real idea, or an ideal existence, is conceivable only in a thinking or, speaking generally, only in a personal being.

*

The peculiar organ for self-activity is the system of ganglia; for self-consciousness, the central system. Both these systems are organically united, and exist, although in different degrees, in each other.

*

Physiologically, the brain is the principle of the universal side of man's nature; the heart, that of the individual. Self-consciousness and self-activity proceed equally from both these organs. (?)

*

In the course of the physical process of life, the head, or brain, gradually appropriates to itself all the

life-spirit left over by the other organs (nervous fluid, etc., as it is not unfitly called). (?) Just as the God-Man appropriates to Himself all the qualities proper to humanity.

*

In the front of the brain our knowledge is wrought into shape; in the rear, it is kept in store.

*

Our sensual organs—even the finest—are instruments for the production of the spiritual man, and nothing more. Of the product itself, of spiritual human nature (which is itself a complex of organs, but, be it observed, of spiritual organs), nothing whatever is transmitted to them.

*

Not matter, not substance in any sense, is the essential point in the body, but form, the perfected organization of matter.

*

Spirit, according to its very conception, cannot degenerate into matter ("become extinct," "sleep," and so forth); but matter may very well be elevated into spirit.

*

"The soul of man gives evidence of its natural being by existing[1] before it is conscious of itself, and before it wills" (Gess.: "Die Lehre von der Person Christi," p. 189).

[1] But can this be said of the soul as personal?

The most striking proof that there can be no life for the *ego* without a natural organism is found in *sleep*. It rests on the fact that our sensual natural organism withdraws itself for a time from our *ego*, and lives for itself alone, a plant-life, in which the plastic process carries on its work.[1]

*

"All that slumbers in man is never awake at once" (Schaller: "Psychol.," i., p. 320).

*

"Man is at every moment infinitely more than he knows" (Ebrard: "Dogmatik," ii., p. 319; *cf.* p. 353).

*

The *ego* occurs only as "I am conscious," or "I will" (I am active).

*

All human functions, which may be replaced by machinery, are only sensual functions.

*

In the organism matter is completely determined as a norm (*Cf.* Schelling, i. 5, p. 337). In it form is one with matter and has passed over into it.

*

The "direct object" of our subject is our own natural organism, our own animated body (Schopenhauer). This is equally true both of the conscious and the active object.

[1] *Cf.* Schaller, "Psychologie," i., pp. 292, 296, 300, 301, 321, *seq.*

As regards the dispute between G. E. Rahl and his opponents as to whether, in organic generation and nourishment, the real active agent is the "soul" or the "vital force" (Fichte: "Anthropologie," pp. 275–277), we need simply notice the fact that the "soul" and the "vital force" are not different things, but that the soul is merely the specifically animal vital force. (*Cf.* Fichte, pp. 439, etc., 480.)

*

Every part of an organism is at once means and end.

*

That is a strange thoughtlessness which supposes that the word "sensuality" can have reference only to functions of the body, not also to functions of the soul.

*

What Baader calls the kindling of the wheel of Ixion in the creature's life, is the awaking of the autonomy of the material life of the creature. (*Cf.* ii., p. 101, etc.)

*

Vitality in general depends on the union of the individuality with a natural organism.

*

Hands are worth more than wings.

*

It is a thoroughly human idea not to allow one's beard to grow, for the beard evidently lessens the space left free for involuntary mimicry, for the

direct representation to one's self of the individual life of the soul.

*

A man may well wonder when he considers how even the individual organization of his body stands in definite teleological relation to the individual spiritual development and task in life assigned him by the Creator.

PERSONALITY.

Personality is the first example of true individuality, —totality in itself, existence of the universal in the non-universal, of the absolute in the relative, of the infinite in the finite. Therefore it first is true self-determination, self-dependence, independence as regards the complex of relative or finite existence, immortality.

*

In the personal individual as a totality the universe is individually reflected. In this consists its self-dependence, and its power of making itself relatively the central point of the universe.

*

In the origin of the human individual there is no doubt that the blended individualities of the two individuals which generate it are the factors of its formation. But the conjunction of these factors is the result of the expressly determining influence of the creative function of God, so that the peculiar formation of their product is the work of God. On

this depends the essential truth of creationism, which does not however necessarily exclude the idea of traducianism.[1]

*

As the absolute centrality, *i.e.* as being the ideal point, the personality remains everywhere similar to itself. Just as all mathematical points are absolutely similar.

*

Man is the only animal creature who has power to set before him, not merely separate momentary aims, but an aim in life, and, as this itself implies, to keep that aim before him as his *one* aim, and to realize it entirely of himself. This is important as touching the question of man's immortality.

*

The person alone, as distinguished from the thing, is an end to itself, because it alone is able to refer itself to itself as an end.

*

Human individuals are not Helots of the universal moral end; their individual moral end has the same rights as the universal.

*

The possibility of free self-determination rests on the distinct separation between the personality and its organism, by means of which it receives on both sides impressions from without, and the distinct

[1] *Cf.* on this point the matchless representation of Herder in his "Christl. Reden und Homilien," *th.* ii., p. 69.

opposition of the former to the latter. But in an organism, we have to think, not merely of its outward and material, but also of its inward parts, considered as in process of spiritualization.

*

Life is the growth of a being by means of itself. Therefore in it growth is indissolubly united with being.

*

According to Schelling, (in his "Treatise on the Nature of Human Freedom,") personality rests on the union of a self-dependent being with a basis which is independent of him, the union being effected in such a way that the elements interpenetrate each other, and thus form only one being.

*

We ought not to say, The *ego* cannot perfect itself otherwise than on the assumption of an opposing *non-ego;* but rather, The *ego* cannot be perfected without placing a *non-ego* in opposition to itself.

*

The *ego* is the resumption into a unity of what is in itself a multiplicity; a being which, as multiplicity, stands opposed to itself as unity. The multiplicity which we presuppose in the *ego* must therefore be purely *organic.* The condition, we may call it the absolutely universal condition, of the *ego* (true of the absolute being as well as of the finite) is therefore the existence of an organism and a centre of life in the being, the separation of soul and body. The body is that other, in contrast to which alone the

ego, the personality, especially as self-consciousness, can complete itself. The *ego* is therefore essentially a self-opposition; it is identical with that which is opposed to it.

*

The person is the concrete unity of personality and nature.

*

Not the *soul*, which exists even in the animal, but the *person*, is immortal.

*

The separate events of a man's life make an impression exactly according to the colour of its general background.

*

A properly made man ought to have one or two good moles on his person, so that an unmistakable description may be furnished for his detection.

*

The personal creature, as it exists by nature, has been developed *from* itself; but its moral development must be brought about *by* itself.

*

An absolute unity of idea and existence can be produced only by the idea, through its own thought and action, giving *itself* existence. No third influence can create this unity. True unity is unity which is self-produced.

*

In self-consciousness, when understood as consciousness *of ourselves*, we are not conscious of our-

selves otherwise than we are of all surrounding objects. We are conscious of ourselves, not because our consciousness is of a different nature from that of those beings who are never conscious of themselves (although this is undoubtedly the case), but because there exists in us a self, an *ego*, which our consciousness perceives as its object.

*

Man, because he is an *ego*, can turn his soul against itself.

*

The self is named *ego* = *ego*, a reflexion of the being on itself and in itself; and these two forms of reflexion are the presuppositions of distinctions in the being.

*

How strange and confused, as well as confusing, is the opposition between the "reason" and the "heart"!

*

In reason understanding and emotion are united.

*

Even the natural *ego* is not merely created by the direct thought and action of another, but it becomes an *ego* only by means of its own thought and action, working on the foundation of its natural disposition, which is undoubtedly the creation of another. A strictly so called natural *ego* does not therefore exist, but as far as it is *actu* present, it is also spiritual, under process of development by its own thought and action.

AFFECTION AND TEMPERAMENT.

Affection, in the widest sense of the word, is always a heightened vivacity of the individually determined self-consciousness, or sensation, exercised in such a way that the universally determined self-consciousness, or reason, cannot for the moment preserve its true equilibrium, and therefore, for the moment, falls back powerless, unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon it. It is therefore joy (pleasure) or pain (displeasure) which has escaped, for the moment, from the companionship of reason, the occasion being the unexpected strength of the outward impression. But if the affection is of noble nature, there lies, even in this overpowering emotion, a principle which contributes strength to the function of reason; the repression of it would therefore be only the occasion of its more powerful solicitation. Where this noble character is not present, affection is really passion.

*

Affection in its natural crudeness, while not yet rendered ethical, is a condition in which the individual has lost control of himself. Affection becomes ethical when, on the one hand, the sensation which in it passes over into impulse, and, on the other hand, the impulse into which the sensation passes over, are both rendered distinctly ethical; *i.e.* when the former is definitely posited as emotion, the latter as desire.

Since the fall, men have always existed in a state of relative affection. The sensual impression is always disproportionately strong for the feeble energy of our self-consciousness. Hypochondria is the natural disease of fallen man.

*

Affectibility (excitability) and receptibility are not identical. The latter is a more particular determination of the former.

*

Emotion is always self-emotion; but at the same time there is no *pure* self-emotion.

*

Sensation is always comprised within the boundaries either of pleasure or of pain. The same is true of moral sensation, *i.e.* emotion. Emotion, when determined as pleasure, is joy; determined as pain, it is sadness. The animal, and the child in its earliest days, know neither joy nor sadness.

*

It is noteworthy that emotions, even when they are true elevations of spirit, find vent in tears, thus expressing themselves by an obstruction of our sensual life.

*

Of the four temperaments, the phlegmatic and choleric belong to the side of self-activity, the melancholic and the sanguine to that of self-consciousness. On the other hand, the phlegmatic and melancholic temperaments have their root in a specific depres-

sion; the choleric and the sanguine in a specific irritability, characterizing the person to whom they belong. Directly, of course, temperaments are attached only to the natural side of the individual, therefore only to its individual attributes. To state the matter more precisely, the choleric and phlegmatic are attached to impulse, the melancholic and the sanguine to sensation. The more powerfully mind and strength, the universal side of the personality, are in the ascendant, the more does the influence of temperament recede into the background. In opposition to temperament, we find a special need for the exercise of self-control. (*Cf.* Wirth: "Spec. Ethik," ii., p. 24, etc.) Affections are specifically related to the temperaments, for temperament is the natural foundation of affection. For the specific preponderance of one separate factor of the natural personality predisposes the disturbance of the equilibrium among the functions of that personality.

*

Excessively depressed receptivity (with self-consciousness) is stupidity; excessively excited receptivity is levity or distraction: excessively depressed spontaneity (with self-activity) is languor or laziness; excessively excited spontaneity is hastiness or violence. Therefore stupidity belongs to the melancholic temperament, frivolity to the sanguine, laziness to the phlegmatic, and hastiness or violence to the choleric.

If self-consciousness is so depressed that it cannot appeal to self-activity, then there arises fear; but if it is so irritated or excited that the activity which it then appeals to with immoderate force cannot be made use of as *self*-activity, then the result is rage.

*

As in the phlegmatic temperament there already exists a natural depression of the self-activity, it is specially predisposed to fear, and as in the choleric temperament there already exists a natural irritation or excitement of the self-activity, it is specially predisposed to rage. On the other hand, we may say that, as in the sanguine man there already exists a natural irritation or excitement of the self-consciousness, this cannot easily be so deeply depressed as to hinder the work of self-activity, and he is therefore decidedly predisposed to fearlessness ("sanguine hope"); and as in the phlegmatic man there already exists a natural depression of the self-activity, this cannot easily be so excessively irritated or excited as to prevent its finding expression for itself in real self-activity, and in this way the man of a phlegmatic temperament is decidedly indisposed to anger (the "lazy, peaceful, patient phlegm").

*

Fear and anger are affections of temperament. When regarded as moral, the former is timidity or meekness, the latter indignation (the so-called noble anger). Even timidity or meekness and indignation are certainly only sensual affections; but the sensual

feeling and the sensual impulse are in their case under the power of the personality, or more exactly, of the mind (in the form of the understanding), and under the power of volition. They are not blind and beyond their own control, like fear and fury.

*

As in a state of high irritability of the self-activity, even the self-consciousness may be easily brought into an excessively irritated or excited condition, and *vice versâ;* so in the choleric temperament there is, as a rule, a considerable admixture of the sanguine, and *vice versâ.* And as in a state of deep depression of the self-activity, even the self-consciousness easily falls into a state of languor; so there is, as a rule, in the phlegmatic temperament a considerable admixture of the melancholic, and *vice versâ.*

MEMORY.

Memory and habit appear to be parallel to each other; the former is, as regards self-consciousness, what the latter is as regards self-activity. Memory is the extension of self-consciousness, its compass, its capacity, in order to its possessing simultaneously a multiplicity of contents.

*

Habit is the beginning of freedom, memory the beginning of reason; education must therefore begin by cultivating both. They are both at first merely sensual, mechanical appropriations of nature to the personality. They belong to the formation of the

physical organism, therefore to the side of individuality.

*

As regards imagination (*bilden*) and perception, the former is the positing of the conceived image, the latter the conception or observation of the posited image, the former distinction, the latter resumption of the image. All perception is remembrance of the outward, all imagination an expression of the inward.

*

Imagination is a reception of consciousness into existence; perception, a reception of existence into consciousness.

*

Memory in its perfection is reason; habit in its perfection is freedom. All thinking is recollection, reflection; every act of freedom bears the stamp of involuntariness, of having become a second nature.

*

A scientific mind with a bad memory is a prince without land and people.

*

Good powers of thought with a poor memory are like a great prince on the throne of a duodecimo province.

*

A good memory forgets nothing, but gathers up all kinds of knowledge, even trumpery and rubbish; the most crude ideas are as firmly fixed in it as the essence of the purest conceptions.



Originality and sterling worth of thought may be limited by the possession of a "bad head."

*

A man of poor memory must of necessity turn his mind in upon itself.

*

He whose memory is bad remains, in spite of all his knowledge, an ignoramus and bungler to the end of his days.

*

Good capacity for thought with a hopelessly bad memory is a labour of Sisyphus.

*

A man with a bad memory is literally a *poor* man.

*

The possessor of a bad memory enjoys this advantage, that he is not inclined to let his thoughts linger much in the past,—an idle occupation for a man *who sincerely condemns himself*,—but is always disposed, like Paul, to forget the things that are behind, and to reach forth to those that are before.

*

The memory is most closely connected with the senses, for in it they all store up the observations they have made.

*

A bad memory in its physical aspect corresponds

GIFTS OF MIND.

A man may have a very large head, and at the same time a very small mind.

*

A "bad" head is not necessarily a narrow-minded one.

*

It is no great trial to be poorly endowed with abilities, unless we are placed in an office in which better talents are required.

*

Can the narrow-minded man really not see beyond his barriers? He certainly cannot *pass* beyond them, but he may very well look beyond them, *i.e.* acknowledge that they *are* his barriers.

*

He to whom gifts for some great work have been denied ought to try to use the gifts he has to the best possible advantage, though he may work only in the narrowest circle.

*

The correlative to the idea is the "original." It is a product of a universal formative faculty, for it may be copied, and is intended to be copied; but it is, at the same time, in its specific origin and perfection, entirely peculiar to its originator, and belongs distinctly to him, and is thus a product of an individual formative faculty. It is also undoubtedly transferable.

Genius consists in this, that a man does not require to gain his ideas, either his objective or his motive ideas, by observing them first in nature, in the sphere of reality.

*

Cleverness goes readily hand in hand with shallowness and confusion of thought, because the richly supplied *quantum* of ideas and knowledge is apt to be regarded as a make up for their *quale*, even when that is of little value. A mind which is unfruitful in *quanto* must seek its safety in the *quale* of its knowledge.

*

Not high talents, but great talents, bring heavy temptations in their train.

*

The poorly gifted man enjoys this advantage, that he easily learns to see how innumerable things which lie far beyond his own capacity, perhaps even beyond his powers of conception, are yet by no means impossible.

*

A man may be personally an excellent worker, although he possess the very poorest tools.

*

The insufficiency of his own powers seems to the poorly gifted man like insufficiency of the time at his command.

*

There are people who are endowed only with the

most central organs, and with the more peripheric only at their utmost need. The work of life must be hard indeed for such.

GREAT AND SMALL.

We become aware how merely relative are all our conceptions of great and small, not only when we compare what is called great amongst us with the infinitely greater, but even more strikingly when we come to perceive how great that always is in itself, which to our conception seems infinitely little.

*

That man is in a peculiarly difficult position in whose character great and small exist together. With his poor means he cannot attain the great desire that floats before his mind, and yet, by virtue of his greatness, he sees with pain how small are the attainments which these poor means can achieve.

*

A right feeling man cannot bear to hear the small called great, any more than he can bear to hear the great called small, especially as regards himself.

*

A man who can distinguish between great and small will never put on airs of consequence in his course through life.

*

However much of a pessimist you may be, at least never relinquish this belief: that in all circumstances,

a man who, with pure and honest heart, devotes his life to some good object, can accomplish great things.

*

Considered as an attribute of the finite, greatness is a limitation, just as much as littleness. All quantity is limitation, as a negative attribute of existence; while quality, as an affirmative attribute of the ideal, is the opposite of limitation.

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS.

The organs of the mind are at the same time organs of strength.

*

Vices of strength find ready indulgence, but not so those of weakness.

*

Every one speaks according to his understanding, and understands according to his experience.

*

It is strange that men should marvel and be excessively astonished, when anything transcends their *thought.* They must surely mean their powers of mental representation.

*

Every one knows that depressing surroundings in our outward lives bring in their train deformities of at least the outward side of the character. In our judgment of others we must therefore remember that here on earth we are all in depressed circumstances.

Lifted out of these and placed in a larger air, men's characters will expand differently, and their real nature will then appear, for the first time, in its true light, to the great advantage of very many.

*

There are people, who live only on what others leave them over of life.

*

In the interest of the weak themselves, it is enjoined that the strong should not treat them with *undue* consideration. Where this is done, they make no progress; on the contrary, they fall behind. The ground on which they stand inevitably breaks away beneath them, and there is then no new ground, on which they can plant their feet in safety.

CONSCIENCE.

If we seek to establish in an unarbitrary way the common usage of the word "conscience," we must reserve the expression for denoting those facts which cannot be included under any of the terms which are synonymously employed.

*

There is something very great and blessed, as well as inevitable, in the fact that our mind is in agreement and harmony with the eternal and inviolable laws of the world and its Creator. The bringing about of this harmony in himself is one of the chief duties in the self-training of the individual.

The "conscience" is the peculiarly human instinct, *i.e.* the moral instinct, and as such it is essentially religious.

*

The conscience is the unity of the subjective moral consciousness of the individual with objective moral requirements. No one is able to judge with certainty how it stands as regards this point in the case of any other individual. (*Cf.* Schenkel: "Wesen d. Prot.," pp. 148, etc., 50.)

*

Conscience is the directly active moral instance in the individual; namely, as an instance for him as a *particular* individual. It is both legislative (requiring and binding) and also sentencing. It is both emotion and impulse.

*

The conscience = the self-actualization of the essentially moral nature of man.

THE WILL.

Willing, as distinguished from mere impulse, which is certainly blind, always presupposes thought; for we cannot will anything without a purpose, *i.e.* a thought which originates and determines it.

*

Thinking and willing rest equally upon self-determination; and it is self-determination, not willing, which makes morality.

*

In looking upon the will as the final principle, we

are so far right; because it alone gives value to the being of the creature (in fact, to any kind of being) in the sight of God.

*

Positing (*das setzen*) is (*a*) an ideal positing of some end, *i.e.* willing; and (*b*) a real positing of this end, a giving of being to the motive idea, *i.e.* doing.

*

The strong or powerful will is not stiff and obstinate, but elastic.

*

In maintaining that the "will is the original form of the spiritual life of the person," we really mean, not the will, but self-determination.

*

On the threshold of man's development, his *ego*, his thought and will themselves, are merely an idea, which possesses only a shadowy reality in the corresponding materially physical functions of life, and which must achieve for itself a true reality.

*

That the will and the power of self-determination are not precisely identical becomes evident from the fact that we can *will* to will. (*Cf.* Schleiermacher: "Psychologie," p. 468; Baader, xiv., p. 386.) I can determine myself to will, just as I can determine myself to think. I distinguish myself (my *ego*) from my will and my understanding; and thus I can speak of *my* will and *my* understanding, and hold both will and understanding in my own power, which for the present indeed is merely relative.

Self-determination is determining one's self to will, or "willing to will."

*

The will itself does not will, but the *ego* by means of the will. In the same way, it is not our consciousness which thinks or feels, but the *ego* by means of our consciousness. Consciousness and will are not themselves the *ego*, but they are powers, which in their union result in the *ego*, or the personality.

FREEDOM.

Can the true and formal self-determination, the true *liberum arbitrium*, be inborn? or must it be attained through the special development of the personal creature? This is the great question, on the answer to which depends the nature of our conceptions as to the original condition of the first human being. The question may be stated more precisely thus: Can a [full-grown—*i.e.* not merely somatically, but also physically full-grown—man be created? or can a human being become physically full-grown only by means of his own development? * There is no doubt that the real, actual *ego* (not the mere foundation of the *ego*) cannot be created, but must create itself. The same law holds true of God Himself.

*

Purely psychological (formal) freedom consists in

* Full-grown as applied to a personality means fully developed.

the power, as regards every separate act,* either to undertake or to decline it, to decide either *pro* or *contra*, to meet it with consent or with denial.

*

Self-determination most probably depends on the separation of the personal *ego* from the natural, although not necessarily material, organism. It is a determining (either formative or perceptive) of the organism by the personality or central point.

*

The pure *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ* is to be found only at the very summit of the development of a moral being. Below that point, freedom is always either freedom to do good, or freedom to do evil—although in both cases it becomes absolute only when development ceases,—not freedom alike to do good and to do evil. Even in our fallen condition, free as we are to do evil and unfree to do good, there yet exists in us a *liberum arbitrium*, because in every case a choice is left open, not indeed between the desire to do good and the desire to do evil, but between the desire to do evil and the desire not to do evil, between consenting to the commission of the wrong action and constantly struggling against this commission.

*

We may place in contrast to each other, on the one hand, necessity and chance, and on the other,

* More correctly, as regards every incitation to action, whether coming from without or from within.

coercion and freedom ; but necessity and freedom do not in themselves form a contrast. They do not therefore in any way exclude each other.

*

The personal individual is free, in the full sense of the word, when it is really *causa sui*. It cannot be this immediately and from the first; it must be developed by the moral process as a process of spiritualization. The individual who, by means of this process, has become purely spiritual, is *causa sui*, because it has posited itself as pure spirit. It is so also in another sense, because its personality is essentially the product of its own, that is, of its bodily nature. In this sense even the natural individual is *causa sui*.

*

A perfected personal organism is the condition of perfect freedom, which can therefore be attained only with the perfection of the spiritual body. The personality cannot will in a thoroughly efficacious manner, when in conjunction with an organism whose nature is heterogeneous or even hostile to it, or with one which, although spiritual, is as yet imperfect. The same is true as regards the reason.

*

A being is free, not when it determines itself according to its own *nature*, but when it determines itself according to its own conception.

*

In the consideration of human freedom we must

first of all inquire in relation to what other being this freedom is understood. It may be considered as man's power of self-determination in relation to God. It cannot of course be disputed that human self-determination in itself is entirely dependent on God; but none the less is it true that God, according to His own appointed way of entering into relation with the personal creature, exercises His unlimited power over man only in such a degree as shall not do away with his self-determination. But at the same time our freedom must be considered—and this is the main point in the whole question—as in relation to our material nature. The human personality, in proportion as it is true personality, has the power of self-determination as regards our material nature. This rests on the dualism which really exists in man—the separation of the sensual body and the personal soul. Neither of these are fully separated in the animal, the result being that in the animal the determining of the body is always at the same time a determining of the soul. With man it is otherwise. In him the personal soul, in its union with the material organism, is undoubtedly determined by that organism in its impulses and sensations. But this only on one side of its being; on the other the soul just as distinctly determines the material organism as a determining power of volition and understanding. Therefore man is not like the animal, identical with his impulses and sensations. He possesses, in his powers of volition and understanding,

the capacity, on the one hand, of rendering himself independent of these, and therefore of his material nature, entirely of his own accord, and without solicitation from the impulses and sensations; and on the other, of placing himself in direct antagonism towards them. The solicitation to action, which comes to him in impulse and sensation, must, in the case of man, before it can be reduced to action, first appear before the *Forum* of his personality, and only according to its decision can it finally result in action. Even when impulse and sensation result most completely in a corresponding action, this can happen only through the consent of the understanding and the will—of the personality as a whole; therefore only through man's self-determining power. On the second side, the doctrine of human freedom has meaning only on the assumption of two principles in man—principles which are dissimilar, both as regards their quality and their quantity. With the complete spiritualization of man they will therefore disappear.

*

The conception of freedom always presupposes more than one person, the free man being affected by the other. His freedom consists in the fact that, while being affected by another, he is not at the same time directly determined by that other. If he were in no way affected, then the question of freedom would be an idle one. The free being must always be a self, an *ego*, a subject, because such alone can place itself in opposition to another.

Moral freedom consists in the subject being master of his own motives, being able to form and modify them, even to produce a reaction against their influence (and also the contrary), if he is putting forth his best efforts. If he is too slothful or too impure for this, he has power even then to produce a reaction against this sloth and impurity by distinguishing *himself* from all his attributes, from all that forms a part of him. His weakness is always either sloth or impurity. The *ego* distinguishes itself from all that it is, and enters spontaneously into relations with it.

*

A personal creature, which is able to decide absolutely for God and the good as a whole, has no need of a test of freedom, any more than such a test is possible for him, because he cannot decide otherwise than for God and the good as a whole. Where this test is really needed, the decision must prove, to a certain extent, abnormal.

*

If the perfected freedom of the personal creature practically excludes the power of arbitrary self-determination, this does not involve any defect in him of the power of self-determination; because every abnormal self-determination is a partial want of true self-determination and the capacity for it, and in the abnormal exercise of self-determination the personal being determines itself in some degree in opposition to itself.

The error in Schopenhauer's denial of the freedom to the human will ("Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 176) is, that he does not admit that man has the power of changing his character, that his character may possibly be the object of a self-determining agency exercised by man himself. He does not admit that man may be the object of his own self-determination, because he fails to distinguish in him an *ego* and a nature.

*

Rationality is for man to attain unto, never—the case of One alone excepted—an already perfected fact in man's nature. The same is true of freedom.

*

If I have nothing to lose in life, then no hindrance shall deprive me of courage.

*

The *liberum arbitrium*, the actual power of self-determination, cannot be directly *given;* it must be acquired.

TEMPTATION.

Temptation consists in a hindrance of life, which is in danger of becoming a disturbance of life.

*

There is a difference between attacks of evil and temptation. In the former case the subject concerned has no desire to consent. Whether anything is to be a temptation, or only an attack of evil, depends on the moral nature of the person concerned.

SIN.

The development of man passes through stages of sin. Until the advent of the Redeemer it was, on the one hand, an ever completer development of the human personality, and on the other hand, in closest connexion therewith, a continual increase of human sin.

*

If sin is a necessary point of transition in human development, it is not on that account merely negative. The human individual may in his development permanently continue in sin. Evil is no less real than good.

*

The great solemnity and the immense practical importance of the doctrine of the devil is, that it shows us how the personal creature, in its transit through sin, may remain fixed in evil.

*

In proportion as the personality of the individual is developed, sin becomes more and more his own sin, for which he alone is accountable. In proportion as the power of self-determination exists in him, his sin is the work of that self-determination.

*

Evil in the course of development, or sin, is not in itself a condition of the development of the good; but it belongs to the idea of creation, as a creation out of nothing, that the created personality cannot

detach itself from material nature otherwise than by being first clothed upon with matter, and being in this way altered, rendered impure or sinful. This is the necessary commencement of the creation of man, but only its mere commencement, which comes to a close in the second Adam (1 Cor. xv. 45, etc.).

*

Before sin can be abolished through redemption, it must be recognised as enmity against God, which is by no means the case from the first.

*

The necessity of a transition through sin is not directly an ethical, but rather a physical, necessity. The apparent imperfection of the world, which requires this transition, belongs to, and is expressly demanded by, the conception of the world itself, and is therefore a positive perfection of the world.

*

Original sin, the sinful propensity, is a mere *accidens* of human nature, so far as it is a condition which, according to the principle of that nature, is to be expressly abolished.

*

The possibility that any personal creature, even after he has become aware of the impotence of sin as opposed to God, should yet determine to continue in sin, becomes explicable when we consider that the alternative placed before him is whether he will be converted, or, by slow self-consumption, finally *perish*, not live always in a lost condition. This must be

specially noted in reference to the devil. (Suicide is psychologically possible.)

*

Sin, or the sinful propensity, has a twofold origin: on the one hand, sensual; and on the other, selfish. Each of those forms of sin, again, appears as a distinct manifestation of evil; as the natural, in the form of grossness, and as the spiritual, in the form of malicious wickedness.

*

Even as regards sin, the Archimedean saying holds true, "Give me a point outside the world, and I will move the world from its poles." He who personally stood quite outside sin would possess in himself full capacity for overcoming sin in humanity, and for casting sin out of humanity.

*

No one will *now* become conscious of his need of redemption from a purely religious point of view, *i.e.* without being conscious of the moral worthlessness and unworthiness of his condition as estranged from God.

*

The principle of opposition to God, which belongs to the primary conception of the creature, can be really driven out only by the creature's own deed; but the creature cannot repudiate and cast it out without having experienced it as such in himself. To reject evil merely on account of a positive command (or prohibition) of God, is not to reject it

really, *i.e.* knowing what it is, and therefore with unbounded abhorrence. It is not necessary to this experience of evil as evil that the nature of evil should unfold itself in our own life, but only within the circle of our experience. On the other hand, this true rejection of evil equally presupposes the clear and lively knowledge of God.

*

The principle of opposition to God, which belongs to the original conception of the creature, can be abolished only by the creature itself, by its own self-determination, and therefore only by the personal creature. But in order to this the creature must be conscious of it as it really is, as evil. This consciousness can be primarily attained only by the experience of sin's workings. For from without, *i.e.* in this case through the teaching of God, the personal creature cannot understand the principle of opposition to God as it really is, because, at the commencement of its development, it is not yet capable of such a relation to God as would make this teaching possible.

*

The confusion in our conceptions as to the origin of human sin arises from the fact that we assume that the first human beings stood in an originally *actu* given relation to God, whereas this relation could have existed in their case only *potentia*. Man's development proceeds not from, but towards his communion with God.

Sin is not by any means originally a determining one's self in opposition to God.

*

Sin begins as the brutish, and ends as the devilish.

*

If the universal nature of sin were selfishness, then there would be no sin at all outside the relations between man and man.

*

It may very well happen that a man may feel so deeply the guilt connected with his sin, as to lose sight of the feeling of its unworthiness. And this latter feeling is not the true one.

*

He who is sincerely conscious of his own sinfulness needs no long and special preparation for repentance. He is naturally and at all times ready for repentance.

*

He who wishes to feel, to a certain extent, quiet and self-contented while persisting in sin, must go on ever narrowing his sphere of vision.

GOOD AND EVIL.

The ideas of right and wrong are transformed, within the department of morals, into those of good and evil, because the process of the creature, or rather the process of life considered as moral, and only as such, is a process of development of spirit, therefore of a being which is no longer in itself worthless.

Only the good, *i.e.* the real or perfect good, can have the power of overcoming evil. In proportion as impurity yet remains in the good, it will be powerless in the struggle against evil,—in direct contrast to the commonly accepted delusion of narrow-minded people, who consider that in this evil world we can never attack evil with good *alone* without a certain admixture of badness.

*

One of the greatest hindrances of good in the world is men's unchristian disbelief in its power.

*

One of the commonest causes of a morally bad disposition is stupidity.

*

The confusing point in the question as to the origin of evil is, that we generally take it for granted that God—who of course does not positively will the existence of evil—can yet create the personal creature in a state of perfect goodness. He cannot do this, because, if it is to be a creature, He must create it out of that which is not good, and also because the good as a whole is conceivable only as developed by itself. We must give up the attempt to establish a "perfect commencing point of the human race" (Schenkel: "Dogmatik," ii. i., p. 213).

*

The really evil thing in evil is the desire that the contradiction to the human ideal and the contra-

diction to the Divine, which at the beginning are inevitably present, should continue.

*

Everything, as I well know, depends for me on the fact that good shall be really good, and consequently evil really evil, and that even *dispendio mei.* An excuse for evil, above all in myself, I indignantly refuse.

*

The conception of the good is that of the right as something which is self-posited.

*

All good in this world, even in its noblest and most beautiful forms, like love, rests upon a "dark background," which it must painfully absorb and change into luminous spirit.

*

Imperfect or impure virtue has a bitter taste; only when it is perfectly sincere can its taste be sweet.

*

He who has once really tasted the good acquires a liking for it.

*

What hinders us most from recognising the good in others is that we do not see the evil in ourselves.

*

It is much more difficult to recognise good than evil, both in the individual and in the course of history.

*

The good, the absolutely real being, belongs to the

creature only as moral good; *i.e.* it is conceivable only as, on the one hand, posited by God, but, on the other, self-developed. For only a being which is *causa sui* is a truly real being; and a real being can have value in God's sight only when, in spite of its creation, it has become thus real entirely of itself. This strikes us even more forcibly when we remember that the good *in concreto* is spirit.

*

If evil is to be considered as "the indeterminate will raising itself to creaturely freedom," and the origin of evil to be, according to the idea of indeterminate will, incomprehensible (Jul. Müller: "Lehre von der Sünde," ii., p. 844); then this rising of the indeterminate will, the actualizing of its possibility, cannot be a transaction entirely without occasion, and an adequate reason can be found only in the predisposition to evil, therefore in something evil, which preceded actual evil.

*

The good = that which is right through self-determination.

SELFISHNESS.

Selfishness is naturally occasioned by the difficulty which, in a yet imperfect organization, the soul's life finds in perfecting itself as such, as the central point. The more difficult it is for the *ego* to comprehend and grasp the idea of itself, the more violent and immoderate is the repulsion which it exercises on outward objects. (*Cf.* Vorländer: "Psychol.," p. 382.)

In the animal nature the sensual tendency appears under the form of selfishness.

PLEASURE-SEEKING.

Pleasure-seeking is the tendency towards enjoyment (which includes appropriation) in and for itself and for its own sake, and not really with a view to appropriation.

PASSION.

Passion is partly sensual, partly selfish, according as the material principle, which holds the self-activity captive, is chiefly sensual as such, or egotistic. There is however neither a purely sensual, nor a purely egotistic passion; but each is always present along with an admixture of the other. The same is true of covetousness.

VANITY.

One would hardly believe it possible, and yet it is an oft-repeated fact, that there are people who would willingly see their vanity gratified, even at the cost of real detriment to themselves.

*

There is hardly any vice which makes us so wearisome to others as vanity.

*

The man of poor abilities has special temptations to vanity, in order that he may appear well.

COARSENESS.

Moral coarseness, properly so called, consists in limiting the social function to the necessary natural process of assimilation, and social intercourse to that of assimilation.

FOLLY.

Folly leads the way to prison quite as frequently as wickedness.

*

The dividing line between wisdom and folly is so extremely fine, that a prudent man will be very careful how he accuses any one but himself of being a fool.

*

Many a man endures a hard and life-long captivity who goes about free from any outward restraint, and perhaps even with a tolerably cheerful air.

*

Is there any connexion between the prevalent fondness for "business" life, sittings, meetings, statutes, protocols, etc., and the tendency to busy idleness, occupation without effort, and consequently without result?

JESUITISM.

It is indescribably humiliating when a man, in order to gain his own ends, instead of estimating his means according to the eternal laws of the moral world, estimates them according to the evil passions and weaknesses of men, and when his ends are of

such a nature that they can be attained by such means alone.

*

He who sets before himself or humanity other moral aims than those really appointed by God, even although he may consider and declare that his own aims are the aims of God, must yet come into conflict with the moral order of the world, and in the pursuance of his aims have recourse to unworthy means. (Jesuitism.)

ON CHRIST.

VI. ON CHRIST.

A.—CHRISTOLOGY.

BIBLICAL DEDUCTIONS.

IN Matthew v. 17, 18, the Redeemer expressly says that the complete realization of the moral development of man, of the moral kingdom in humanity, forms an essential part of His aim and work; and that the close of the present order of earthly things, which is the consequence of His second advent, cannot take place until this is fulfilled. It is noteworthy that in *v.* 18 νόμος (the law) alone is mentioned, without the addition of the "prophets" mentioned in *v.* 17. *Cf.* on this point John xiii. 34, 35. Such words as these in that last solemn hour! The saying of Jesus in Matthew v. 48 is deeply significant, less as a precept than as an assured evidence of the attainability of the moral goal in its unmeasured height; but, let us remember, only through Christ and in union with Him.

*

Whatever may have been the purport of the *true* eschatological predictions of Christ, they were cer-

tainly not *confused;* for in all His thoughts and sayings there was no confusion.

*

The Holy Ghost is considered as an ὄργανον of Christ, when He is entitled, as in Luke xi. 20, the δάκτυλος τοῦ Θεοῦ (*cf.* Matt. xii. 28); and when Christ is represented as ἔχων τὰ ἑπτὰ πνεύματα τοῦ Θεοῦ (Rev. iii. 1; v. 6).

*

The key to the saying of St. Paul, that Christ reconciles even "all things in heaven" (ἀποκαταλλάξαι, and indeed, διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ, Col. i. 20) lies simply in the Pauline conception of Christ as the πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως (Col. i. 15), *i.e.* of the unity of Jesus with the second Adams of all created spheres, of which each one has attained perfection only through a redemption by its second Adam. The statement in *v.* 20 is the natural result of this conception.

*

In Colossians i. 15 Christ appears to be called πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως as the Divine Logos, because in every (πάσης) particular sphere of personal creatures, He personally unites Himself with the first-born individual, the true or second Adam, not the merely first in time, and really dwells in him. With this idea *vv.* 16, 17, 19, 20 perfectly correspond.

*

If the Pauline idea of πίστις in reference to Christ

is in some degree mystical, the reason is not, that St. Paul connected any peculiar idea with the πίστις itself, but that Christ in His exaltation is to him the living One, who requites the believing trust yielded to Himself by His spiritual union with the believer.

*

In the second Adam, Christ, natural generation ceases. (*Cf.* 1 Cor. xv. 45; Rev. xiv. 4.)

*

Even the specific universal individuality of the Redeemer has for its condition His supernatural generation, and is otherwise inconceivable.

*

The ascension of Christ was the result of the absolute completion and spiritualization of His bodily nature, which necessarily implied its becoming invisible. His ascension has not placed Him far away from us, but only made Him invisible,—invisible to *us* who are not yet pure spirits (Matt. xxviii. 20). Because His absolute spiritualization was not completed till the ascension, therefore the outpouring of the Spirit succeeded His exaltation.

IDEA OF THE LOGOS.

God's world-development, according to its essential idea, is equivalent to His man-development. Here man is to be understood in the widest sense of the word, as indicating generally the personal creature.

*

The Logos of St. John comprehends in itself the

Divine nature, which is most frequently designated in the Old Testament as the Spirit of the Lord, but not in any sense the actually so-called Holy Spirit.

*

The Man Jesus must first be present, must be really and actually developed, before the Divine Logos can become the Man Jesus.

*

My nature, my animated body, is, on the one hand, that which by its process of life produces my personality, my *ego;* and on the other hand, and this in an even truer sense, that which my personality, by means of the material nature, whose product it is, has itself in a moral sense produced, and which is on that account a spiritual nature. If the personality of the Divine Logos formed for itself a human nature of the substance of Mary (*Ebrard*), then this is not really the proper nature of the Divine Logos, but only its garment, its armour, an artistic machine, etc. The relation thus remains entirely outward. The action of the Divine personality, which is in itself perfect and absolute, would thus be the mere appearance of action, *i.e.* action limited and controlled by its relation to its material human nature. The whole life of Christ as the Redeemer would be only a comedy.

*

If in the union of the Logos and man in Christ, the "human nature" assumed by the Logos does not also include the human personality, then it is absurd

to attribute *duæ voluntates* to Christ; for His human nature, if without a personality, can neither will nor have the power of willing.

*

The sinlessness of Jesus cannot be explained intelligibly, *i.e.* in a moral sense, if His human nature, of which alone sinlessness can be predicated, is merely the work of the Divine Logos itself, which has built for itself a human nature as the temple of its divinity. How can there be any question as to the possibility of a morally abnormal development? If the personality of a creature is not really self-developed, but, even in the case of the Divine personality itself, originally complete and perfect, then no skill or excellence whatever is shown in leading a holy life.

*

If the Divine Logos can "enter into the form of the *unconscious* soul" (Ebrard: "Dogmatik," ii., p. 8), then there is no reason why it should not "enter into" an animal, a plant, a stone, etc.

*

Can an absolutely Divine person "become a limited being" (Ebrard: "Dogmatik," ii., p. 104)? It is impossible that an absolute *ego* should place itself in the position of a finite *ego*, and act as such; for the main point here is not the nature of the outward conditions of existence, but the nature of the *ego* itself (existing in one way or another), which cannot lay aside its absolute *ego* without abolishing itself.

A Divine personality which has taken upon itself man's form of existence, *i.e.* the human personality, or human nature, is not a true *man*. A Divine personality and a human nature do not in their unity form a God-man. If the incarnation of the Logos is thus understood, as indeed it is by Ebrard, who represents the dogmatics of the reformed Church, then the Divine personality (*ego*) of the Divine Logos lays aside, in free self-sacrifice, its own Divine nature, and assumes instead, or forms for itself, the nature of man; and in that case the Logos does not become man at all. This can really happen only when the entire Divine Logos, the union of the Divine personality and the Divine nature, takes upon itself a true and perfect manhood, *i.e.* a union of the human personality and the human nature. There is no need of seriously undertaking to prove that the idea of a spiritual personality laying aside a spiritual nature is simply monstrous. Such a thing is *impossible*.

*

Looked at from the standpoint of the Lutheran doctrine as to the Person of Christ, the assumption, or retention, of an *ἀνυποστασία* of the *natura humana* of Christ is an inconsistency. (*Cf.* Ebrard: "Dogmatik," ii., p. 110, etc.)

*

If the Divine Logos wills to become real man, it can become so only by the assumption of manhood in the true development of its personality; because

the human personality, and that of the creature generally, is real only through its own development, only as the result of the process of its own life, therefore only through itself.

*

As far as it is possible for different personalities to exist absolutely in one another, this existence need not necessarily be limited to two, but may just as fittingly be considered as the absolute existence in one another of an infinite multiplicity of personalities. This is true of the relation of the Logos both to the multitude of special spheres and to the personalities in every special sphere.

*

The Divine nature, spirit as such, and the Divine Logos, personal spirit, are in their essential union the actualization of the hidden God. This actualization of the hidden God is itself an actual causality, and hands on its being to another outside itself.

CHURCH DOCTRINE.

If only our theologians could become clearly aware that all the Divine glory of the Saviour (see Thomasius: "Beiträge zur Kirchl. Christol.," p. 33) is nothing except in so far as it is moral, *i.e.* morally developed.

*

If a complete union of the Divine Logos with the Man Jesus was possible in a purely physical manner, and really happened at His conception, then there is no room left for a religiously moral development in

Christ; for the qualification of man for absolute unity with God is the absolute maximum of human perfection.

*

The maintenance of the *unio physico* of the two natures in Christ, has meaning only when God is considered as a sensual or corporeal being.

*

Whenever we assume a Divine hypostasis in Christ, as pre-existent to His human origin, we cannot consider the latter as more than a mere incarnation; and this is only another form of Docetism. This is also true, if the flesh assumed in this incarnation is considered as the mere garment, not as the proper nature, of him who has assumed it.

*

The idea that a personal, Divine hypostasis, as it is always represented, can become physically man, presented no difficulty so long, but only so long, as it was considered as merely the assuming of a human body.

*

The great error in the treatment of the doctrine of the atonement for sin by a Redeemer is, that our dogmatists consider that it is a matter quite self-evident that the atonement for sin is a satisfaction for sin through expiatory endurance of its punishment. (*Cf.* Gess. in the "Tahrbb. fur deutsche Theol.," iv. 3, p. 520.) The only possible way of affording help here is to lay down a correct definition of what the atonement for sin really means.

THE PERSONALITY OF CHRIST.

One special perfection of the Redeemer's personality is, that it developed itself in union with the whole human race. (A point specially noted by Conradi, "Selbstbew. und Off.," p. 149. *Cf.* p. 111, etc.)

*

We look upon Christianity too much as mere religion, while in reality it is an entirely new human life. The Redeemer was entirely man.

*

If ever a purely original man existed, it was Jesus.

*

Did the Redeemer possess individuality?[1] Answer: Not in Himself, but undoubtedly in His relation to others and by means of that relation. Not in Himself, for individuality has its origin in the circumscribing opposition of the natural or material element, to which the personality is conceived as united. This opposition consists more particularly in the autonomic activity with which the personality itself takes part in the process. In the supernatural conception of the Redeemer, the natural element, Mary's true conceptive power, was purely receptive, therefore purely passive, simply theonomically active; and since, as such, it could exercise no restraining influence upon the process, therefore the Divine conceptive principle moulded the personality purely as such.

[1] *Cf.* Conradi, "Christus in der Gegenwart," etc., pp. 261, 275.

It must nevertheless be observed that the very want of individuality on the part of the Redeemer was, on the other hand, the possession of individuality, inasmuch as He, standing alone in his non-individuality, forms thus a relative contrast to all others; His *ego* being thus, in spite of His universality, or rather in consequence of it, strikingly unique.[1] With such a nature the individual and identical determinations of His states [humiliation and exaltation] directly corresponded. On this rests too the specifically unique relation of the Divine Logos and the Redeemer. He is the universal Man, and yet, in an incomparable sense, the God-Man. But at the same time we must remember that He was a man, an Israelite.

*

The individuality of the Redeemer stands in the same relation to the individualities of the redeemed as the centre to all separate points of the periphery. In the centre all points are lost. In the Redeemer's individuality all the separate individualities of men are united to a perfect personality, and thus the personality, considered as human, really exists in a purely centralized totality of individuals. This is the concrete true personality. All individualities form an essential part of the individuality

[1] The Redeemer formed for Himself an individuality by an abnormal development. The individuality of Christ is the universal individuality, in which as such all forms of individuality are to be found.

of Christ; it appropriates them all. But Christ is a new being, and is rightly called absolutely the First.

*

The Redeemer is the second Adam as an individual. He is not only an individual of the race of man in its higher potency, but its truly *highest* individual. He is an individual, not because He is only a one-sided and defective realization of human nature, but because He is the realization of human nature in the perfect unity of all its many special sides. He does not indeed exhaust the conception of humanity, because He first is *implicite* its absolute realization; but He is the true, exhaustive causality of its absolute realization, because He possesses adequate power to realize the distinct unfolding of those varieties of human nature which in their simplicity are included in Him, in an organic totality of different individual human beings. And with the possession of the power there will naturally be the tendency to manifest those individual characteristics. But in this sense the Redeemer is the *highest* individuality, because His moral development was exclusively and with unlimited intensity directed to the *religious* side of His moral work; His whole life was in all its details a life in express relation to God, a moral life entirely under the potency of the religious life. For piety is merely morality in its original simplicity and unity, morality as it contains all in one, the central point of morality. The Re-

deemer's whole course of action was directed exclusively to this centre of the sphere of moral being, and it was thus directed owing to the individual moral task which had been expressly laid upon Him, therefore in an entirely normal manner. The whole moral vocation of the Redeemer was as such purely a religious vocation. (*Cf.* John xvii.; Luke xii. 14.) For this reason it was not sufficient that the Redeemer's morality should show itself simply in His own personal life, but it must also unfold and display itself as *per se* essential morality under the manifoldness of various types, in the totality of redeemed humanity. The Redeemer's individuality is thus the absolutely highest individuality, not as it was inborn (that of His material being), but as it was morally established by Himself (that of His *spiritual* being).

THE VOCATION OF JESUS.

From the Redeemer Himself we may see most clearly how the prosecution of one's own individual moral purpose coincides *in concreto* with that of the universal, and how he who makes himself virtuous exercises for that very reason the greatest influence on the community in the furtherance of its moral purpose. What did He accomplish during His life on earth? Very little as regards others, but infinitely much as regards Himself. He perfected Himself as the Redeemer, and what a vast work He thus accomplished for humanity became evident from the

day of Pentecost and onwards. (*Cf.* Tholuck: "Stunde Chr. Andacht," p. 51, etc.; also John xiv. 12, etc.)

*

If the vocation of Christ was exclusively a religious vocation, then this would explain in the most satisfactory manner why His life had such an early close. A vocation like His would not have filled up a life of the normal duration.

*

How strange it appears that Christ should be considered as the founder of a religion!

*

Can we say that Christ "founded," or wished to found, a religion?

*

When the image of Christ has truly arisen in our hearts, it must take in our spiritual life the place of the sun.

*

The work of the Redeemer's life was that of a specifically religious vocation, to make full communion with God possible for sinful man.

*

To unite humanity to God was the vast idea of the life of Christ. The task He set Himself was to make the pure idea of God shine in upon the world. If this succeeded, then in His judgment all the needs of men would be virtually satisfied. We who are born in the light of the idea which He brought into the world cannot sufficiently realize, either the great-

ness of the idea itself, or of the work by which it was brought to completion. (Matt. ii. 27. *Cf.* Schenkel: "Characterbild Jesu," pp. 168, 190.)

*

Jesus did not deliver a revealed doctrine, but His teaching, the communication of His ideas, forms an essential part of the revelation which *He Himself*, in His Person and work, really is.

*

That a man should feel that Christ is *great* to himself, and that he should consider Him as a *great Lord*—these are two things as wide apart as earth and heaven.

*

If to the consciousness that we can find our own personal salvation nowhere but in Christ is added this other consciousness, that the world's history apart from Him presents no way of safety whatever, then it is difficult to understand why—as many seem to suppose—the former consciousness should suffer.

PERSONAL CHARACTER OF JESUS.

It is not sufficient that we should be guided in all things by the *word* of Jesus; we must place ourselves at all times before His *image*. The former is not really possible without the latter, for His word can be truly understood only as an integral element of His Person.

*

The infinite moral greatness of Christ is admirably shown in the fact, that in the development of His

consciousness, and in all His practical course of doing and suffering, He kept with such clearness and consistency to the centre and substance of things. It becomes clearly evident too, in His strict avoidance of all connexion with the sects of His own historical circle; although some of these, especially the Essenes, seemed to present many more fruitful points of contact than orthodox Judaism. This was a brilliant proof of His truly historical insight.

*

Even as regards His freedom from prejudice, from the *ματαία ἀναστροφὴ πατροπαραδότος* (1 Pet. i. 18), the Redeemer stands alone as a perfect pattern for all times.

*

Jesus Christ was a true Greek, not less than a true Israelite.

*

It is a perfectly unique and very striking fact, that the views of Christ do not proceed from the concretely defined horizon of any age or any historical sphere, not even from His own. Mark the distinction in this respect between Christ and Socrates.

*

Christ did not adopt any of the elements of culture prevalent in His own age. (*Cf.* Bagge, "Das Princip des Mythus im Dienst der Christl. Position," p. 174.)

*

Our Saviour judged all sins mildly except lovelessness and hypocrisy.

The Redeemer freely granted Himself the full enjoyment of the sweet privilege of laying down no statutory regulations (though such are undoubtedly necessary as a transition point) for the community of those who believed in Him.

*

Christ is incomparably sublime in His never cherishing even the remotest idea of setting up a dogma of a religious nature.

*

It is noteworthy that the Redeemer would have nothing to do with dogmatising.

*

He who knows what an indescribably complicated task God had to undertake in creation, in order to attain His aim and object, will not be surprised that Christ had to build up His kingdom in ways that seem to us so slow and so strangely circuitous.

*

A significant point for Christology is the representation of the weakness of Christ in the days of His flesh.

*

There is no more absolute ideologist, according to the current acceptation of the word, than the Lord Jesus, and yet no one else ever achieved such vast results in history as He.

*

Christ's freedom from error rests mainly on the fact, that He did not extend the range of His desired

and attempted knowledge beyond the compass of His real powers of knowledge, and freely and unconditionally renounced in His unique *docta ignorantia* all pretension to knowledge which He Himself did not really possess.[1]

*

Do not let us seek the glory of Christ in matters which are of very small importance, and miss seeing it in those things which alone are important, merely because they are not extraordinary.

*

Even if we owed nothing to Christianity but the fact that the best and most perfect, and at the same time the most historically influential Man, was also the greatest and most consistent enthusiast, what a significance there would be even in this!

*

It was appointed by Divine decree that the Redeemer should die by the treason of one of His most intimate disciples, because, in order to His perfection, He had to experience the utmost human ingratitude. Even here Jesus showed Himself incomparably great, because He foreknew with perfect clearness that the utmost conceivable suffering was of necessity bound up in His destiny.

*

What is the work of Christ but simply His realiza-

[1] *Cf.* Thomasius: "Christol.," ii., p. 143, etc.; Schleiermacher: Glaubensl.," ii., p. 89; Martensen: "Dogm.," p. 314, etc.; Lutterbeck: "N. T. Lehrb.," i., p. 313; Matt. xi. 25.

tion of the idea for which, and according to which, God created man?

*

How surprising it seems that we find in Jesus no feeling of scorn for man!

*

Christ takes part in man's moral task only as in that of individual culture, its most primitive element. He is interested in the moral community only as far as it is the social community. His teaching of men, like that of Socrates, took the form of social intercourse.

*

It is not without significance that Jesus said "I am the Light of the world" (John viii. 12), not merely of one individual and another. He illuminates even the world's condition, and makes it bright.

GOD AND CHRIST.

If God is to be in a true sense loved by us, He must become one of our race, a human individual.

*

Before Christ, we had heard of God; in Christ, we have seen Him.

*

We must beware lest Christ should, in any way, conceal from us God, whom He wishes to reveal and declare.

B.—SOTERIOLOGY.

REVELATION.

If the Christian faith is to arise and endure, Christianity must, in a sure and certain way, be rendered objective.

*

In revelation an illumination or inspiration is possible without its degenerating into magic, because the direct influence of God on the self-consciousness of the inspired writer has a distinct modifying point of connexion in the objective fact of a Divine manifestation. Illumination or inspiration is impossible unless in some way connected with a manifestation.

*

Our older theology proceeds exclusively on the assumption, which it regards as self-evident, that man, even according to his original conception, and in his primary state,—notwithstanding his innate *sapientia maxima*—can know nothing of himself as to what is his divinely appointed destiny, and the corresponding norm prescribed for him by God, but only by a direct revelation from above.

*

It is customary for believers to seek in themselves those needs which revelation satisfies, it having first called their attention to them. This cannot be right, for it is to a certain extent artificial; the reverse would be the truer statement. Growing up in the sunlight which streams from revelation, those needs,

which are undoubtedly awakened by the influence of its light, should be already alive in us when revelation first comes before our minds with objective clearness.

*

Since revelation is essentially a revelation of God, the knowledge it communicates to us is exclusively the knowledge of God, not directly of any other object.

*

God reveals Himself by making the sun (His revelation) appear for humanity in the firmament, not by promulgating a calendar for it.

*

The sun of revelation shines in the sky. That is the main point. It illuminates all the world, even those that do not know that it is revelation at all.

*

We must not forget that the main point in revelation is, not that it shall produce an effect on the immediate sphere in which it is operative, but that the facts in which it consists shall be abidingly present for man in his intellectual horizon, as an essential *datum* in the complex of his perceptions and experiences. It seeks to introduce certain facts as elements of the human world, which this world could not have produced of itself.

THE BIBLE.

He who knows what difficulties and uncertainties are connected with the interpretation of Scripture (and none knows it better than he who has devoted

himself most earnestly to the task, especially to the interpretation of the Old Testament) will surely hesitate to rest the hopes of Christian piety in the last instance on Holy Scripture alone.

*

Divine Providence has so ruled the formation of the canon, that its correct interpretation is assured only as the result of human criticism in the exercise of its fullest powers. We are therefore under a moral obligation to engage upon such a criticism. This should be made clearly evident from the history of the apocryphal Scriptures. (*Cf.* e.g. Ebrard: "Dogmatik," i. p. 38, etc.

*

The Book of Daniel is the Apocalypse of the Old Testament; and *vice versâ*.

*

If the Bible is on principle a man's only source of knowledge—his whole world, outside of which he sees no legitimate object or means of knowledge,—then he cannot fail, and that indeed *optima fide*, to fall into an arbitrary and literal exegesis, and to consider this as the only *gnosis*. This was the case with the rabbis, and we see it repeated among our modern scripturists, such as Stier, Beck, Chr. Hofmann, Baumgarten, etc. The same cause has always the same effect. It is most unfortunate for the interpretation of the Bible that sermons must be preached upon it.

The Bible was not written to furnish texts for sermons.

*

Arbitrary interpretations of the Old Testament in the New Testament originate chiefly in the fact that, as many details of the Old Testament were from the first completely dark and unintelligible to those Jews who had believed in Christ, they had to seek in the Christian sphere of vision for means to solve these Old Testament enigmas. In the same way they were interested in proving the harmony of the two economies, and in confirming New Testament data by Old Testament prophecy.

*

God gives man nothing in a finished state. All His gifts are so bestowed that man shall have abundant work to do with them. This is especially true, not only of man himself, but also of the Bible.

*

It belongs to the nature of Protestantism not to confine itself, as regards Christian knowledge, to the Bible alone, but to look upon the whole world (nature and history alike) as a source of knowledge.

*

Let the Bible go forth into Christendom *as it is in itself*, as a book like other books, without allowing any dogmatic theory to assign to it a reserved position in the ranks of books; let it accomplish what it can of itself, entirely through its own character and

through that which each man can find in it for himself: and it will accomplish great things.

*

Everything spoken and written in the Bible undoubtedly presupposes expressly those parts of Divine revelation which had been previously delivered; but it does not equally presuppose the existence of those parts *of the Bible* which precede (whether nominally or really) the period of speaking or writing. This point has been much overlooked by Chr. Hofmann.

*

The demand that the interpreter of Scripture shall frankly place himself in a purely objective position towards the Bible, and allow it to speak for itself, sounds most ingenuous, and is in itself, *in thesi*, quite unimpeachable; but *in praxi* it leads to the very opposite of what it demands, because the interpreter, thanks to exegetical tradition, brings with him to his task certain definite and partially incorrect preconceptions as to the proper meaning of the Bible, whose authority this principle actually tends to perpetuate.

*

That is a fatal exegesis in which the expositor *tries* various keys, instead of knowing certainly that he possesses the right one.

*

The New Testament, at least in its original writings, is the photograph which the historical Christ mirrored directly (*i.e.* without the intervention of an elucidating human reflexion) on the consciousness of those who

surrounded Him. In other words, the New Testament is the original record of the manifestation of Christ. But at the same time the nature of the case implies that this formula can be accepted only in a relative sense. It is a renewed challenge to criticism.

*

One chief point in the peculiar religious influence of the Bible is that it leads us to contemplate the historical fact of Divine revelation, and truly represents it to our minds.

*

It would be well for the Bible if we could accustom ourselves to place its peculiarity and sacredness in what it actually is, not in qualities which dogmatists ascribe to it.

*

Where, except in the New Testament, can we find an entirely pure, naïve, and unaffected representation of Christian piety?

*

Is it so very difficult to be sure that our theology is in actual continuity with the New Testament theologumena, while, at the same time, we carry on our own independent method?

*

The Christian revelation can be transmitted only by the tradition of acts which concern it; *i.e.* of original records on the subject, and previous attempts to gather from these acts a correct and perfect knowledge. But these attempts must be transmitted by the Church in such a way that it takes its share in the

work of their continuation, and indeed does this with unlimited scientific freedom.

*

It is perfectly right that the incontestable importance of the Old Testament for the scientific comprehension of Christianity should be definitely emphasized; but the direct object of this emphasis must be, not the Old Testament writings, but the Old Testament economy or institutions.

*

It is a confusing distortion of the true position of the matter, that we have now-a-days for the most part merely "believers in the Bible," instead of "believers in revelation"; while those who call themselves believers in revelation understand nothing by the term except the Bible.

*

I find more and more that the Bible is made very little use of for its true purpose, but all the more for purposes which are quite foreign to it.

FAITH IN CHRIST.

Faith or belief belongs both to the religious feeling and the religious intelligence. On the latter side the truth, that an element of knowledge essentially belongs to it, is emphasized. Obedience is both conscientiousness and receptivity for the Divine co-activity.

*

As regards faith in Christ, there is a general

tendency to give special prominence to the fact that the object of this faith seems foolishness to the natural reason, and that in this way faith is unnatural to man; but we ought also to have a clear view of the other side of the question, on which Christ Himself lays special stress, and which becomes evident when we understand faith in Jesus in its original sense, as trust in His personal character.

*

There is a difference of meaning between these two expressions, "I believe that I am reconciled to God, because the Bible testifies it," and "I believe this, because Jesus Christ has said it."

*

If the Lord Jesus were once more to appear amongst us in the flesh, but quite *incognito*, without title or honour, this would be the surest method of discovering who are His. He who *then* felt the strongest attraction to Him, who bent before Him in deepest reverence, would belong to Him most closely, and would have the truest faith in Him.

*

It matters very little whether we are able to name the Lord Jesus with His true title; but it matters infinitely much that we should know His character, His heart and mind, with the most thoughtful correctness and accuracy. Not His official position and dignity, but His personal character, is the object of that unbounded and frankly-yielded trust which forms the essence of the *πίστις εἰς αὐτόν*.

If faith is comprehended as in its inmost essence true confidence in a person (as feeling the heart drawn out in trust towards a certain being), then it naturally follows that, in order to faith in Christ, a clear and lively historical image of His character is first of all required. A formula or articles of faith will be in this way quite excluded.

*

It is incomparably more important that we should know Christ in His personal character than in His position and office. To the man who knows Him in His character, Christ naturally becomes what in the gracious providence of God He was designed to be to humanity.

*

That the Lord Jesus did not wish that the faith which He so distinctly demanded for Himself should be understood in the sense of a dogmatic belief, becomes clearly evident from the care with which He avoided laying down dogmas or formulæ as to His person and His work.

*

Christianity knows nothing of a method, because it knows no other dietetics of piety than moral order in its full activity. It is of the greatest importance, as regards this point, that the gospel requires nothing more from man than simply faith in Christ. Cherish in your heart the living certainty of the historical fact Christ, and then, in the light of this certainty, pass through your human life on earth.

Faith can bring salvation only as faith in a *person*, not as faith in a *thing*.

*

As there is a form of unbelief as regards Christ, which thoughtlessly overleaps all opposing arguments and scruples in a summary fashion by a *salto mortale*, so there is a kind of faith in Christ which does precisely the same thing.

*

Faith and knowledge belong to different sides of our spiritual life. The latter rests on an act of our consciousness, our understanding in the widest sense of the word; the former, on an act of our volition, our self-activity. (?)

*

One reason why Jesus could help only those who had faith in Him was, that men might know that God can take delight in none but those who find their personal satisfaction in the being and character of Jesus. For this is the surest test of the human disposition.

*

True faith is, on the one hand, faith in facts; on the other, faith which is yielded to a person and springs from confidence in Him. Faith in mere doctrines, in scientific formulæ, is an inward contradiction.

*

Faith is at once the most personal and the most individual thing in man.

The doubt and the ἐποχή of the man who knows the difficulties connected with a question have far more religious weight than the unquestioning faith of those to whose minds these difficulties have never seriously been presented.

*

Now, as of old, faith cometh by hearing; but the sermon is not now delivered merely, or even chiefly, by the preacher and the Bible, but by the whole historical existence of Christianity, the entire objective condition of human existence in Christendom.

*

It is an abundant blessing to possess for ourselves with full certainty a holy and gracious God (such a God as we have in Christ); but it is a true blessing only if we possess this God in order to our work upon a distinctly objective, and not exclusively personal, task in the world.

*

Many of those who believe in God hold their belief merely as the heathen do, *i.e.* without knowing how they have come into possession of it.

*

He who is not consciously a Christian lacks the true central point in all his praiseworthy moral interests, and therefore the truly accurate and proportionate arrangement of these interests among themselves.

*

To be a Christian—indeed to believe in a God at

all,—and to be at the same time a pessimist, is an intolerable contradiction.

UNBELIEF.

Our worldly-minded unbelievers reject the Church's doctrines thoughtlessly and without examination; but our believers accept them, for the most part, in a precisely similar way.

*

The real nature of sin is disbelief in the good, *i.e.* God, arising out of scorn of the being of perfect goodness, *i.e.* of God. An absolutely good being and an absolute good exist only as God.

*

The naïvely confident scepticism of our men of culture, in its opposition to the positive in Christianity, supports itself as a rule on the foolhardy assumption that we can know nothing of those things which Divine revelation has brought to our knowledge,—the reason being that we are totally unable to understand them of ourselves.

RECONCILIATION.

The really fatal and reprehensible error in self-righteousness is, that it obscures the noblest feature in the character of God—His holy and merciful love.

*

Justice in the wider sense of "righteousness" may be understood as the essence of all the morally determined attributes of God.

It is not God's way to "take things amiss" with man.

*

The conception of the holiness of God (*cf.* Ehrenfeuchter, "Prakt. Theol.," i., p. 33) is, that what God wills or does not will, He does or does not will in no arbitrary way, but entirely by virtue of the actual nature of the object of His volition;—that therefore only what is good in itself as such can be willed by God. Because in the Old Testament there existed no landmark, by means of which the good in itself could be recognised, the good being known only as the good which was positively willed by God, because the idea of His moral goodness was not understood, therefore the idea of God's holiness is in the Old Testament somewhat obscure; and for this reason it falls into the background, even in the New Testament.

*

That God is holy does not mean merely, in a negative way, that He hates evil, but also, in a positive way, that He wills good. His justice, especially on its retributive side, must be considered in the light of this truth.

*

God's anger does not require to be propitiated; but, because it is a holy anger, it requires that atonement shall be made for sin.

*

It is quite correct to say that God, according to

His own nature, requires a satisfaction to be made for sin; but He can never find this satisfaction in punishment, in the ordinary sense of the word (*i.e.* in penal retribution), but only in the real abolition of sin itself. In the same way, it is quite true that the sinner himself desires to see satisfaction offered for his sin; but mere punishment, in the ordinary sense (mere penal retribution), could never, as he would gladly persuade himself, be such a satisfaction, because in it sin continues with even intensified force, but only a real abolition of sin. The same is true when the satisfaction is specially considered as due to the broken law.

*

It is an utter impossibility that a man should appropriate to himself the Divine pardon of his sins through grace, if he does not at the same time confidently believe that God will, because of this forgiveness, finally set him free from all his sin.

*

In the idea of atonement for sin, the willingness of God to pardon the sinner must be presupposed as already existing. God's character requires, not that this willingness shall be awakened by the atonement, but that the moral possibility shall be presented for putting it into effect.

*

It belongs to the nature of the anger of God, that it does not require to be mitigated or appeased. It is the anger of love, and requires only that the moral

possibility shall be presented for its being turned away.

*

By forgiveness of sins is meant the turning away of the hatred due to the sin committed by any person from that person himself; so that, while angry with the sin, God is not at the same time angry with the sinner, but loves him in spite of His hatred of the sin. The possibility of a separation between the person and his sin is therefore presupposed.

*

We can have no clear idea of the doctrine of forgiveness of sins, until we have a clear conception of the act of forgiveness itself. The common idea is merely, that when sin is forgiven the future consequences of sin for the sinner (after death, at the judgment, in eternity, etc.) are removed, nothing therefore happening *in the sinner himself.* But the true idea of forgiveness of sin is, that it is a present act of God in His relation to the sinner. It consists in God's testifying to the sinner, by actually entering into communion with him, that He has abolished the consequences of his sin, of which the most immediate is the cessation of the relation of friendship and communion with God, which is changed into a relation of anger. The act of forgiving consists in God's making the sinner conscious of His own gracious attitude towards Him by actually realizing it in his experience; the forgiveness of sins happens

when the sinner experiences, realizes, becomes conscious of it.[1]

*

To the truly honourable man the Divine forgiveness of his sin is the most pressing of all necessities, because it is the primary condition of real liberation from sin.

*

The forgiving mercy of God may be always understood to mean that God, while forgiving sin, places the sinner in a position to mortify in himself the sin which has been forgiven.

*

One great conviction which we owe to Christianity is, that mercy exists and rules as far as God's kingdom extends.

PREDESTINATION.

The apparent severity in the conception of Divine predestination appears in a much milder light, when we understand clearly, that election does not necessarily occur only in the *directly* religious form.

*

Absolute antisynergism (with all its consequences of absolute predestination, etc.) is a perfectly logical consequence, when the relation of man to *God* is considered as entirely religious, and not as being also *morally* mediated.

[1] *Cf.* Schwalb, "Luther," p. 33, etc.

SUBSTITUTION.

We may undoubtedly and in the fullest sense speak of a substitution of Christ for us; but yet in a different sense from that in which the Church's doctrine represents it.

*

By the idea of the merits of Christ we must not understand His merits in relation to God, but His merits in relation to the religious community. If the merits of Christ are understood in this latter sense, then we may also speak of their being imputed to men. They may thus be actually acquired and appropriated by others.

JUSTIFICATION.

Justification must come of itself, unsought. Faith also must come unsolicited, and with it justification is of itself assured. He who wished to believe in order to be justified would not possess true faith, and such a faith would not bring justification along with it.

SANCTIFICATION.

When sanctification is complete, the sinner who has been redeemed by grace is in himself really worthy of the glory which he attains (and this of immanent necessity) and really merits it in himself. Here therefore a true *justitia Dei remuneratrix* appears.

*

The ἔργα νεκρὰ of the Epistle to the Hebrews are

moral acts which do not result in real spirit, and therefore in vital, imperishable being, in the actor himself.

*

The whole question as to "good works" exists only in the sphere of abstract moral religiosity; in the sphere of religious morality the question is solely as to good effects (products) which the subject produces in himself and in his world. Not the formal point of view, but the material, here lays down the law.

REWARD.

Reward is the religious term for the moral conception of *fruit*. The importance of moral proportionateness is here emphasized, but that of moral interposition is not expressly touched upon.

*

That a merit should be rewarded is a self-contradictory idea. It belongs expressly to the conception of merit, that the man who deserves must (in his universal culture) acquire something. Every reward which falls to his share from others comes *post festum*. The question can be only of recognition.

*

Rewards are not wages. Even in human affairs the idea of reward excludes all claim of right.

*

To be worthy of anything and to deserve it are two different matters. Our undeservingness in God's

sight does not make us unworthy of Him, *i.e.* of His sacred mercy.

*

To acquire morally and to deserve (in relation to God) are not identical conceptions. On the contrary, the latter idea has arisen only because the former was not understood, and therefore all that man is, in relation to God, was understood as being entirely bestowed upon him by God, the question then being only as to the motive God had in giving.

*

In the affairs of salvation everything must be physical, not merely personal, but physical, not by direct establishment, but by moral production.

THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN.

VII. THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN.

GOOD, VIRTUE, DUTY.

THE complete separation of sin from man through the efficacy of the atonement, and the perfect accomplishment of the moral task, *i.e.* the complete realization of the highest good, entirely coincide, both as regards nature and time.

*

All that is truly a moral end, *i.e.* which corresponds to the conception of the moral or personal creature, is at the same time moral good.

*

Christian virtue is that moral disposition of the individual, by means of which he is specifically adapted for realizing the absolute restoration of sinful humanity, alike in himself and in the whole human race, from a state of sin into a state of complete salvation. This of course is absolutely true of it only in its full development.

*

The motive, as incitement or impulse, is the disposition in accordance with which I act, or determine

myself for or against the law. The true motive is merely the virtuous disposition. Special motives apart from the disposition do not exist.

*

The true motive of action must be the consciousness of man's moral task, and the will to accomplish it.

*

Design and execution belong to the side of skill; motive and aim to that of the disposition. What may be their nature in Christian virtue?

*

Moral virtue in itself and as practised for its own sake is the necessary foundation of public virtue. This is the real opinion of Schmid: "Chr. Sittenlehre," p. 514, etc.

*

The most important means of virtue (means of grace) is the moral community.

*

Duty always presupposes, not only the existence of imperfection, but the relative want of virtue and the relative existence of vice.

*

Every system of moral duty is in its very nature casuistic.

*

Duty can always be described only as a definite mode of action, never as a disposition. Thus, *e.g.* we speak of becoming virtuous, which implies the acquirement of possession knowledge, honour, etc.

Exclusive of our duties to ourselves (asceticism), duties can have reference only, on the one hand, to the entrance into special circles of the community, and, on the other, to the mode of action within these circles, so as to produce from the existing confusion a perfect universality and normality.

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL MORALITY.

If morality and religion are not to be purely identical conceptions, the notion of the former must originate directly in the idea of another relation of man than his relation to God.

*

Strict morality is attainable only along with an unconditional acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the moral principle as such, and hearty devotion to positive moral tasks.

*

The *honestum* means that which is worthy of man; that is, moral good.

*

Moral good signifies that which through its own self-determination corresponds to its original conception.

*

The real meaning of those who define the "conscience" as the principle of religion is, that the principle of piety lies in the moral constitution of man, whose qualities as a *moral* being necessarily include a relation to God. In other words, religion exists because there is a personal creature.

The Christian can look upon this present life as a possession of his own, only if he understands that by its means alone man can become truly spiritual.

*

We possess "eternal life," even on earth, exactly in proportion as we have this life in ourselves, in proportion as our individual personal life is really *causa sui.*

*

That which occurs morally occurs by virtue of its own self-determination. For this very reason we ought not to call it occurrence, but action. This occurrence, which, exclusive of every more special attribute, is found even in the animal, is *in concreto* consciousness and activity.

*

Those special features of the moral which must be understood in order to its scientific comprehension are, the results (products) to be produced by self-determination, the forces which constitute self-determination, and the modes of production (actions) which proceed from self-determination.

*

The moral signifies that which has originated in the self-determination of the creature. From the proper self-determination of the creature has arisen the very power of self-determination, besides virtue and the concrete mode of self-determination, or action in accordance with duty (which is such only because the subject has expressly determined itself to this

particular course of action). The moral therefore essentially includes both empirical-moral (*sittlich*) and religious elements.

*

The religious forms no contrast to the moral, for they are both comprehended in the same idea; but it does form a contrast to empirical or traditional morality.

*

The moral is not *in itself* exclusively identified either with empirical morality (*Sittlichkeit*) or with religion.

*

The great importance of the Kantian philosophy consists mainly in the fact that we owe to it the clear, scientific consciousness that the moral law holds good even apart from belief in God. (*Cf.* Thilo: "Die theologisirende Rechts und Staatslehre," p. 79.)

*

Why is man surrounded with material nature in all its vastness and riches, if in his moral endowment he has no special task in reference to it—if his moral task does not also involve certain social obligations (*sittlich*)?

*

The personal worth of man must be morally determined according to the nature and degree of his morality, not absolutely according to his general moral condition. The latter must rather be judged from the moral point of view, according to the nature

and degree of the self-determination by which it was originated.

*

A course of action which under certain social conditions (*sittlich*) is very wrong, may be, absolutely considered (*moralisch*), most commendable. The nature of the self-determination may be correct in the action, but it may be directed towards a mistaken object.

UNION OF GOD AND MAN.

These sayings—(1) God does not act upon man directly, *i.e.* not otherwise than through causal means; and (2) He does not act upon man without mediation, *i.e.* not magically, not without some point of contact in man himself and in his own activity, not without expressly addressing Himself to man's receptivity—are not by any means synonymous.

*

The definition of the workings of Divine grace as an *influxus Dei physicus* is very accurate. They are so, partly because the active causality in them is the Divine nature, or more exactly the nature of the Redeemer, the Holy Ghost; and its direct object in man is his nature, his organism or body, whether considered as material or as spiritual.

*

Every assumption of a physical, *i.e.* not morally mediated, union of God with the creature—of a union which is in its nature material, and which concerns

some other part of the creature than the spirit—is essentially heathenish.

*

That which on man's side constitutes and is the condition of unity between God and man is the quality of his moral condition and action, the conformity of his conduct to the moral norm or standard, not its quantity. The question here is not as to the relation between the finite and the infinite, which is a merely quantitative distinction, but as to the relation between the holy and the good. This must never be forgotten in the study of Christology.

*

The union of God with the personal creature can never be comprehended as a congruence of the being of both in a quantitative respect. In this case, but only in this, the canon in the theology of the Reformed Church is indisputably true: *Finitum non est capax infiniti.*

*

Every conception which admits that a communion between God and man can take place in a purely physical manner, *i.e.* otherwise than by means of a moral process, is mere Docetism.

*

In His work for man it is the constant fate of God to be misunderstood.

*

The direct indwelling of God in man never occurs as only physical, but always as morally mediated,

although it certainly rests on an action of God upon the nature of man.

*

The creature will become Divine, *i.e.* made essentially of the same nature as God; but it will not be deified, *i.e.* it will not be made identical with Him.

*

The only possibility of a creature becoming God is by perfectly uniting itself with God.

*

In order to possess God, a man must first be something which is capable of possessing Him, and also something which God can possess.

*

When God dwells in a creature, He can do so only as an active agency. And this is true of every spirit in its own degree.

UNION OF MAN AND GOD.

Love to God is, as regards its practical efficacy, something very different from mere love to the good in and for itself. In the former case we know that our doing and suffering cause joy or sorrow to the personal good One, and that is, in many cases, the only motive which can touch the heart.

*

He who has no consciousness, no feeling, no impression of the vastness which characterizes belief in God and Christ, should say nothing at all on the subject.

Man possesses no special organ for religion. He has a religion because he is man, *i.e.* because he possesses an *ego;* but he has in this *ego* such an organ, in order that in him God may find and possess a "thou." Because man can grasp the idea of himself, can become an object to himself, therefore objects in general can exist for him, and consequently God can exist for him as an object. He can understand God because he possesses the power of understanding.

*

In the normal human development, the earliest of all elementary ideas or guesses at the truth, and all knowledge (the original of both), is the elementary idea or foreshadowing (*Ahnung*) of the notion of God and knowledge of God.

*

He who believes in the good is for this very reason directly under subjection and responsibility to God, even although he himself may be quite unaware of the fact.

*

That which can alone adequately counterbalance our natural egotism is a lively faith in the holy God of love.

*

Is it possible to become free from ourselves without faith in the living God ?

*

In the case of many, we may be almost glad that they do not believe in God, because in this way their

habitual discontent with their situation does not appear as if directed against God.

*

Happiness, *i.e.* absolute satisfaction, can be secured to the personal individual only by communion with God, because this communion is a completion of the individual by the absolute being, the absolute fulness of being, and consequently an absolute fulfilment of life.

*

The true position of a man's heart towards God is not that to which he has given expression out of opposition to another who has been seeking in some way to force belief upon him.

*

Truly that man knows something of religion, who can only wonder, in all humility, how God is able to make of such a weak and (morally) fragile vessel a creature worthy of His grace.

*

Since God created a world from love, and in order to love His personal creature, therefore the only relation of the personal creature which corresponds to the true conception of his relation to God is that he shall love God and surrender himself to Him.

*

The personal creature leads a real, *i.e.* a wakeful, life, only when he is in correspondence with an outward environment. If the organs for this are wanting or fail him, God is yet able to place him in corre-

spondence with Himself, and thus he can really "live to God." (*Cf.* Luke xx. 37, 38.)

*

If man can serve God, then he can render Him real services (against Wuttke, "Sittenlehre," p. 445), for with God there is no mere court-service.

*

O how man prospers, when he is obedient to God!

PRAYER.

Prayer is an appropriation of the Divine nature (2 Pet. 1, 4), a direct appropriation of the Divine spirit.

*

Prayer, in the province of religion, resembles social intercourse, especially social conversation.

*

Prayer is the actualising of the religious impulse, the yearning after God, just as worship is the actualising of the religious emotion.

*

To the conception of appropriation belong two essentially separate moments. The individual who appropriates first assumes the natural object of appropriation, he takes it to himself or absorbs it, and afterwards incorporates it with his own nature by a process of inner assimilation, transubstantiation, or digestion. In religious appropriation these two moments are also distinct. In this case the receptive moment is asking, making request; the transubstantiating moment is thanksgiving. Without both

request and thanksgiving, prayer is incomplete. Between the two there lies, of course, as an intermediate point, the certainty of being heard, which therefore forms an essential part of every true prayer. (*Cf.* Matt. xxi. 21, 22; xi. 22–24; Jas. i. 5–8.)

*

He whom men have rendered unhappy must see to it that he maintains friendship with God, so that at all times he may cast himself with his sorrow upon His bosom, and there let his tears have vent.

*

Only He who created man can truly sympathise with and fully understand the peculiar idiosyncrasy of the human individual in his development through his unique course of life.

*

O if only a folio in calf could understand the feelings of a 16mo in paper cover! God alone can sympathise with the smallest as well as with the greatest.

*

How great is God, who can understand even the most embittered and soured disposition, to which no human being can find the key, and although it is no longer in relations of love to any one, can yet bring it into relations of love and confidence to Himself.

*

Every man has a circumscribed sphere of vision, whose eye does not reach as far as God.

To possess a God is, in every sense of the word, a precious thing; many think it costs too dear.

*

Intercourse with God is most natural to man as man; but if we disaccustom ourselves to this intercourse, then, indeed, it will appear a most unnatural thing.

*

Ah! how earnestly one longs to be a child again, to live once more in the immediate present!

*

He who carries in himself an unconquerable need for quiet, must suffer far more in this world than other men.

*

Possession is *in concreto* inspiration, in a religious sense enthusiasm (ἐν θεῷ οὐσιασμὸς).

BELIEF IN GOD'S PROVIDENCE.

As in life's morning we lie down, free from care and in deep content, in our mother's lap, so, when life's evening comes, do we lay ourselves down in the fatherly arms of God, only then with far clearer consciousness and with fuller and tenderer emotions.

*

It is a good sign when both joy and sorrow have a salutary influence in a man's moral training—specially good when their influence is exerted in equal proportion.

In the province of spiritual activity, God has so appointed that, as a rule, the individual is incapable of doing what he ought not to do.

*

Every yearning, every longing which arises from a true individual need, may be certain of one day finding full satisfaction (Matt. v. 3–6 ; John x. 10).

*

In the life of a human individual who has yielded himself to God, all discords must finally cease.

*

It is bitter, and yet precious and needful, that in all our learning we have to learn at last, how many of the objects of our eager study were not worthy of being learned at all.

*

If only any one could truly know how, from the first moment of its existence, God cares for the poor creature that is born of man, in all the weakness which it inherits from its parents!

*

God makes His sun to rise, not alone over the evil and the good, but also over the sorrowful and the glad.

*

How are we to find out in what way God would have us serve Him? God seeks to have every man's work just where he can most successfully develop and actualise his own peculiar gift. He is most

useful to God, just as he is most useful to himself and to the world.

*

It is well for us, that when our thoughts must cease, God's thoughts have not yet reached their end.

*

The life of most men is ordered for them in a way of which they themselves would never have dreamed.

*

The Christian looks upon the scenes of his past life, not as battle-plains and ruins, but as harvest-fields.

THE WORTH OF LIFE.

He to whom human life is to appear as vain, must possess in his consciousness the idea of a true life, and this idea itself will give to human life a real worth and value.

*

He who sincerely takes life in earnest finds it quite natural and a matter of course to do so, and does not, therefore, make any great noise about it.

*

Every possession certainly affords happiness, *i.e.* self-contentment, and is therefore an object of desire, because it is a means to our moral end.

*

The main point in human life, alike in that of the individual and the community, is not merely that it shall be correct, but also that it shall have real moral value.

The most abstract conception of life is the relation of the being to itself.

*

The contemplation of our earthly life as a "vale of tears" is a natural consequence of that life being considered exclusively as that of the individual, not as also that of the race. How can *love* obtain its rights if we look upon the matter thus?

*

Life and every vocation in life may be beautiful, if only lived in a manner worthy of man.

*

Man's life would not be worth living, if there were not treasures in it far higher than the sensual life of the individual.

*

Human life includes so much real gold, so many precious jewels, that he who knows these will not be tempted to set it off with gewgaws.

VOCATION IN LIFE.

The most pressing necessity for a Christian man, I mean for one who really believes in Christ, even simply in the salvation of his soul, is that he shall have some good work to do.

*

God does not require that each individual shall have capacity for everything.

*

One lesson which it costs us all much trouble to

learn, but which we all must learn, if we are to prosper and do good to others, is to desire to be nothing more and nothing different, in regard to our individual personality, from that which God has really given us the capacity to become.

WORK.

Effort and work must exist even in the strictly normal moral development. For every moral task which is set before the individual, the requisite measure of moral force is always present,—not *actu*, but only *potentia;* the individual himself must render it actual by an act of moral production, by a moral exertion. Hence every execution of a new task is a direct increase of moral force. On this the reality of the effort depends.

*

He who seeks to walk before the face of God must not place himself before the mirror and coquettishly examine himself, thinking, though it may be with ever so many expressions of humility, how handsomely he is decked out for Him; but he must go bravely and energetically to his own field of labour, and exert all his strength in the work, it may be the dirty work, which belongs to the province that has been assigned him.

*

To be able to work with a light heart must be too sweet for us to bear.

He who has work to do, a task to perform, needs no recreations.

*

Day and night exist just as far as there is an alternation of work and rest.

*

For the perfected spiritual creature there exists no longer action, but only influence.

*

Formative action is essentially efficacious. It has an outward product, because it always occasions a change in its object. We may reverse the idea, and say that perceptive action is an absorption of the object of perception by the subject which perceives. In this case, the former remains unchanged; the latter only is otherwise determined.

HUMILITY.

Only a good man can be truly modest and humble. But if he considered himself so, would he then be humble and modest? It belongs, therefore, to the conception of humility and modesty, that their possessor should be unconscious of their presence.

*

Humility presupposes courage, elasticity of self-determination.

*

No one will go far wrong who assumes that the average moral rank of his historical circle is much higher than that of his own individuality.

Well for him who knows and honestly admires something greater than himself and his own particular friends.

*

Modesty can and ought to be united to the consciousness of high personal gifts, because along with these there exist always and of necessity corresponding deficiencies in other respects. (In opposition to Schopenhauer, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," ii., p. 484, etc.)

*

The best proof of a man's sincerely thinking little of himself is, that it does not occur to his mind to use others as means to his personal ends.

*

How happy is the man who knows nothing of boastful self-consciousness!

*

To feel dissatisfaction with one's self is the surest method of rendering satisfaction to others.

*

A man must have a long neck, if he is to bend his head in true humility.

SELF-RESTRAINT.

If a person lacks capacity for any work, let him leave it alone.

*

We fail to realize the ideals which we had set before us for the pursuit of our later life, because the world around us is always changing.

As regards any subject which we do not profess to understand, we may, with perfect calmness, allow ourselves to be blamed for ignorance.

*

No one is more fortunate in his knowledge of human things than the man who makes a principle of avoiding all "private information," and keeping exclusively to the notorious. No man is more frequently deceived than he who with the aid of the secret chronicle hears the grass grow.

*

Is it really impossible to carry on a work with love, earnestness, and zeal (*e.g.* speculation), without over-estimating it?

*

It must be a most happy thing to have no private interests. In this respect, monastic life is to be envied.

*

It is a common but impure and dangerous motive to seek personal promotion through devotion to a good cause. It springs from a want of simplicity and unity of purpose.

INDEPENDENCE.

Independence of others is a dangerous position for our freedom. It is complete abandonment of all outward allies in order to a complete surrender to the tyranny of our own selfishness.

He only can know shame who makes himself ashamed of himself.

*

It is, perhaps, not so hard after all to be a slave, if only the work of a free man is not laid upon us.

*

Dependence on fashion is coarseness and barbarism.

*

It is quite natural and unavoidable that a man should feel the grief and pain of his individual life, and struggle to attain the mastery over them; but to enlarge upon his troubles to others, even to his nearest friends, to make them a subject of constant discussion, is, to say the least of it, unmanly.

*

We should learn from everybody; but N.B. for our own especial work.

*

The natural man is always disposed to bow before the arbitrary will, especially in religious matters.

*

All human individuals are not built an equal number of storeys high.

*

One serious evil is professional narrow-mindedness, that of the soldier, the clergyman, the courtier, etc.

*

Is it really impossible, even in Christendom, to have recourse successfully in our exertions for the good of the world, to men's pure and sincere desire

for good, without an admixture of incentives to selfishness.

*

Nothing is lofty which is not elevating.

*

The richly gifted person can sacrifice almost everything, but never his own spiritual or moral force. This may be applied to Christology.

*

It is a sad misfortune that, in order to carry on any work well in the world, we must have a profound conviction of its relative worthlessness. This makes life very hard for the thorough worker.

*

The maxim of the earnest worker is to think very highly of his task, but very little of his own performance.

*

As opposed to the man who does not hesitate to employ even the worst means for the attainment of his own ends, the only safe course is to renounce all means which are even ambiguous. The weakness of the good always consists in its impurity.

*

The man who has work to do in the world is indifferent to the charms with which others tickle his vanity.

*

He is a man who has convictions, and who stands up for them.

We may speak of self-love as a lawful thing only in the sense that we surrender our empirical personality to our ideal personality; which has been given us to realize, or which is, to a certain extent, already realized.

*

According to a man's own essential nature is his understanding of outward things. The reflection of these things corresponds to the quality of the mirror.

*

The self-consciousness of the individual is the sounding-board of the world around him.

DIGNITY.

True dignity consists in yielding obedience with inviolable faith and self-sacrifice to what we understand as right. The more truly we understand the right, the higher is the dignity and the nobler its nature.

*

Cheerfulness is inseparable from true earnestness.

*

The nobility of a scientific production determines itself according to the general moral character of the personality behind it.

*

The standpoint is of infinitely less importance than the man who occupies it.

*

It is well worth the trouble to awaken the sense of

honour, *i.e.* the sense of human or of Christian dignity. Nothing more effectually excludes ambition.

*

We look with indulgent eyes on the proud self-consciousness of the youthful spirit, because it carries in itself such a wealth of possibilities, which it hopes to realize in such a way that some good work shall result from them. But as for the man who can look back with lofty self-consciousness on the work he has accomplished—well, if he *can* do it, it is not worth while to prevent him!

*

The man who is satisfied with himself—whatever worse thing he may be besides—is at least a Philistine and pedant.

*

Can human pride go so far as that a man, because he feels, and perhaps feels wrongly, that he cannot be much to some other with whom he is closely connected, and who on his side yields him the warmest and most disinterested affection, must turn against that other in bitter enmity?

*

How many may there be, even among our men of culture, who sincerely consider that their own opinions are open to contradiction?

*

A man may be perfectly certain of his own conviction, and yet not consider himself on that account infallible.

HAPPINESS.

The happy man possesses this great means for the promotion of virtue, that he does not need to think much of himself.

*

He is a happy man who, when he lies down to rest, is glad to think of his awaking again in the morning.

*

He alone can be happy who has work appointed him in life, which he really possesses the ability to do.

*

The longing for happiness is not self-love.

SUFFERING.

What others term their "yoke," we Christians call by a nobler name, our "cross."

*

When God lays an obstacle in any man's way, it proves a hindrance only to his influence in and for the world, not to what he becomes in himself. On the contrary, it is a positive assistance to him in this respect. It is by no means easy for any man to bear the former patiently; but the purer his heart and the deeper his knowledge of God, the easier does it become to him.

*

There is no such thing as unbearable pain; when it becomes really unbearable, it breaks the heart,

either physically or morally. So long as it can be felt, it can be endured.

*

The brightest hours of the unhappy man are those in which he is overcome by the feeling of unspeakable misery. In the piercing sharpness of such grief lies a soothing, softening power. Why cannot we linger always on this bright and peaceful summit of pain, where the oppressed bosom can at last draw a breath of relief?

*

The omnipotence of God often appears to me most marvellously displayed in all that it permits a poor, weak child of man to suffer.

*

There are people who, after experiencing in their youth the happiness of joy, come in their old age to enjoy the happiness of suffering.

*

To take pleasure in the smallest things of life is the noble privilege, not only of childhood, but also of misfortune.

*

If a gloomy life is only enlightened here and there by one single gleam of bright sunshine, even that is sufficient, for it shows that the sun has risen and is shining in the sky. The full daylight will break upon our view when once we have reached the borders of the cloud of mist, for beyond it all is light.

Suffering, with all its pain and humiliation, would not be so hard to bear if it did not make us, while it lasts, so weary and so slothful.

*

Dei omnia laboribus et *doloribus* vendunt.

*

There are situations in which we can only resign ourselves to the will of God.

*

We have made a great step forward if we have got so far as to consider even our warmest wishes as of no importance, and have laid them quietly in the grave.

*

Many a man finds it a hard task to be satisfied with, and heartily grateful for, the gifts which God has given him.

*

The man who has learned resignation knows best the great tenacity of life, when he sees how new claims on life are always arising in his breast, even after his hopes have long been laid aside.

*

If a man has once for all renounced all earthly joys, then he is in a real and certain sense already dead. He lives only so far as life is work—a life without a Sabbath, which must often appear to him very long.

*

True piety and the comprehension of its nature can

be learned nowhere but in the school of suffering. Even Goethe was aware of this.

*

No one is ennobled without suffering.

*

He only is worthy of reverence who has been ennobled by suffering. God cannot show His own children a higher honour than by allowing them to suffer.

*

There is something indescribably touching in the thought that God receives the child whom He loves into the school of suffering, and chastens him there.

*

It is fortunate for the unhappy that their troubles seldom leave them time to think of their misery.

*

The school of action is most useful for the purifying and strengthening of one man's will; the school of suffering has the same effect upon another.

*

If we have no great sufferings to bear, we are apt to become so sensitive to small ones that our case is little better, and we lose only the salutary training influence which the former (but rarely the latter) usually exercise.

*

If a man is thoroughly unhappy, he gets over a thousand difficulties in life with the utmost ease.

There is no true human happiness without a deep-lying sorrow.

*

He whom experience has ripened looks for no untroubled joy on earth.

MATURITY.

The experienced master may be always distinguished from the childish apprentice by the fact that the former, while working no less earnestly, puts on nothing of the important air of office with which the latter performs the duties of his vocation.

*

Maturity, or ripeness, cannot be inborn, because it belongs to its very conception to be developed through the determining influence of man's personality upon his material nature considered as in process of organic development.

OLD AGE.

That which we have spent a whole life in laboriously burnishing may easily grow rusty during a long old age.

*

If life grows harder to us every day, still each day brings it nearer to its close.

*

In youth we dream of a thousand wanderings, dangers, and adventures, which we shall have to pass through in the life that lies before us; and

when in old age we look back upon our past career—yes, we find that we have passed through them all, but it has been inwardly, in our hearts.

*

It is sweet to look back on our own life, when we have done with it for ever, as a work of the wise and holy grace of God in the midst of the confusion of our own sin and folly.

*

One beautiful and pleasant thing in old age is, that it is able, quite naturally, and without any appearance of affectation, to retire into the hindmost rank, behind the generations of mature men and of youths.

*

One of the charms of old age is, that it is able without cowardice to retire into the hindmost rank.

*

As youth sings out before the world, so old age sings softly to itself.

*

How we rejoice, at the close of a long life, to think that we shall soon enter upon an entirely new career!

*

There are some men who have their youth in old age.

*

In old age all man's earthly possessions decay, and so do also his systems.

That which so easily causes a separation between youth and old age is the great difference in their appreciation of the value of things.

*

In extreme old age we gradually forget all that we have so laboriously learned, with the exception of the understanding of, and capacity for, good and evil. All the social side of morality gradually falls away; the moral alone remains indestructible, because spiritualized.

*

In the course of a long life the individual man becomes so indescribably small and insignificant in his own eyes that he thinks it full time for him to go to sleep.

*

God is gracious in letting us grow old, for there are many lessons which old age alone can teach.

DEATH.

The imperfect created spirit cannot continue to exist in our present sphere of existence after it has been divested of the body; it must, on account of its embryonic nature, be placed under the conditions of an embryonic existence. These are in their complex Hades or θάνατος. At the close of the earthly sphere, this Hades, which is a complex of media of a purely preservative agency of God, will be finally annihilated (Rev. xx. 14).

For the regenerate man there exists, after death, no temptation to new sin, for the outward source of fleshly as of selfish sin is now sealed up by the abolition of the material body, the primary principle of both.

*

Regeneration is not fully perfected until after death. The spiritual body must be complete before regeneration can be really perfected.

*

Death is not, as is commonly believed, the entire separation of soul and body, but only the separation of the soul from the *material* body.

*

How many a man will stand amazed and wondering, when he awakes from the sleep of death and beholds the possessions which he gathered up during this present life—with fear and horror!

*

When we close our eyes in death, we have forgotten all that we toiled on earth to learn; we know then only good and evil.

*

In death we may bid farewell to life with contentment and joy; to the saddest life no less than to the happiest.

*

How often does God, by causing a sudden, natural death, interfere with an "improper" miracle in the course of nature's laws.

If death destroyed all personal relations, it would be absurd to make it our desire and duty to love.

*

It is no self-deception on our part that death glorifies the departed in our memory; the reason is that we then grasp the whole character of the departed, not merely the separate local features of his image. A similar fact occurs as regards the absent, and for a precisely similar reason.

*

Life would not be a right thing without death.

*

During his maturer life the individual is obliged to live for the community to which he belongs; in death, as in his earliest childhood, he lives for some moments entirely to himself. The solemnity of death must have some connection with this idea.

*

The suicide always withdraws himself from definite, social duties, which are expressly laid upon him.

*

The whole material organism of the animal body will finally become a mere excrement.

CONTINUATION OF LIFE AFTER DEATH.

As the saved individual in the *regnum gloriæ* will always appropriate more completely to itself all other saved individuals through personal communion with them, so it will always appropriate to itself by means of perception and formation all (spiritual) natural

beings. In this way its own life will be constantly expanding, although the individual boundaries of its being, which have only ceased to be barriers, will remain undisturbed.

*

The physical torments of hell will not be merely sensual, but neither will they be entirely *unsensual*, because the bodies of the lost did not achieve a pure and true spirituality. That in them which approximated to spirit will be more and more resolved into matter, and they will thus become always more susceptible to material pain.

*

The functions of glorified, personal creatures are essentially the functions of the Divine Logos, which dwells within them, and which constantly exercises its functions through creatures, as its organs. They are therefore world-creating, world-preserving, and world-governing functions or activities.[1]

*

At the complete glorification of the earth, the locality of the kingdom of death, at least as a place of punishment, will be *eo ipso* abolished.

*

A curious preconception which we usually form, especially in the case of the Biblical writers, is that, if we assume that the existence of human individuals continues in the flesh after this life is over, we must, in consequence, maintain that it lasts on for ever.

[1] Hence, 1 Cor. vi. 23.

In the life to come, the great question will not be what we *know*, but what we *are;* and, in connexion with this, what we can *do*.

*

What a comforting thought it is for the man who suits no calling here on earth, that God will *there* have some little post ready, even for him, in which He will have work for him to do.

*

How I long for the monotony of heaven, where every one labours actively and in well-ordered routine at his own daily work, uninterrupted by the trifles of our so-called life.

*

In heaven we shall undoubtedly have to think and to will; therefore we shall require the capacity for both.

*

The saying, that every man will be saved who really does what he can, is founded, quite apart from every other idea, on the narrow-minded error that the salvation of man can consist only in the reflex of what he actually is in his own consciousness.

*

All that is here denied to any individual of the pure and full human happiness which is enjoyed in the relations of social intercourse, is laid up for him in heaven, not only in undiminished degree, but also in its purest form.

*

In this present life none of us are in our action

what we are in ourselves, or what we really wish to be,[1] on account of the hindrances which hem us in on every side, both in our inner and our outer world. This is why we find it so hard to love each other wholly and perfectly,—hardest of all in the case of those who stand in the closest relations to us. It will be otherwise in the perfect life to come.

*

Our organ of emotion is destined for eternity, no less than our organ of understanding.

*

He who believes in God must also believe in the continuance of man's life after death. Without this there could be no world which would be conceivable as a purpose of God.

*

He to whom this life does not appear high and honourable can have no true longing for the life to come.

*

The prospect of a continuation of life can have value in a man's eyes only in so far as it is the prospect of the continuance of life for the sake of one or several other persons.

[1] Not merely wish to *appear*.

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN.

VIII. THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN.

THE SOCIAL SPHERE.

THE four special modes of existence in a community —public life, science, art, and society—arise and are developed from the family; and, without being done away with as such, they again coalesce in the higher unity of the state. On its side, again, the state is only the full explication of the family, which has become merged in it, but whose existence is not thereby abolished.

*

Society, and therefore the sphere of action that embraces social duty, must erect itself like a pyramid from beneath, must rise from the most elementary social relations, those of the family and of municipal life, which furnishes the basis of all other associations in the state. Only in proportion as man fulfils his duties within that sphere of family and civil life can he extend his actions as concerned with social duties beyond that range.

*

Even Christian life in its historical development

began with the life of the family; and so human life, both in general and in each individual case, begins in exactly the same way.

*

Hospitality is an enlargement, or opening outwards, of the sphere of social fellowship.

*

A community of universal formation is possible by means of the *usefulness* of its product—works; a community of individual formation by means of the *agreeableness* of its product—possession; a community of universal perception by means of the *truth* of its product—knowledge; a community of individual perception by means of the *beauty* of its product—works of art.

*

All organization depends on the distinction and the perfect poising of a contrast, *i.e.* in such a way that both sides shall be evenly balanced. The contrast is that of unity and multiplicity, of the general and the particular. It is required that the latter shall exist as such without detriment from the former, and *vice versâ*. This demand is satisfied by centralization. In this case the unity, the pure universal, is placed in the centrality, but in such a way that no injury accrues to the being of the multiplicity, the particular. The many particular beings exist uninjured, but entirely under the potency of the unity, the universal. Unity and multiplicity exist thus in one another. In this consists the separation of the

contrast. Hence an actual society can be formed only in a multiplicity by means of its organization.

*

Organization is in general the normal condition of every community, because on it rests the absolute reciprocity of communication. This is possible in its perfection, only when by means of the absolute centralization of all points the universal exercise of the functions is secured ; so that, while every separate point in its function directly serves the whole, the whole itself exists directly for the service of every separate point (*i.e.* of all the other separate points in their functions).

*

The organization of the social community rests on the emphasizing of the contrast between the leaders and followers of fashion.

*

Spiritual light, of which our empirical aether is only a symbol, the δόξα of the New Testament, is the organic medium through which personal spirits act upon each other, through which, in the widest sense of the word, they manifest themselves to each other, etc. Therefore it is the true element of their life, but one which is inherent in their own spiritual nature, not one which exists outside them. It becomes outward only as proceeding from them in their mutual influence upon each other. It is therefore the true element of their social intercourse.

At the beginning of the development of moral society, its vitality and might lean predominantly toward the individual side (social life and art); but the farther it advances the more completely is this mode of relation reversed, and the more predominant for society becomes the significance of its universal side (public life and science). This development, however, proceeds in such a way, that the longer it continues the more thoroughly are the individual forms taken up into the universal.

*

The public festival is the widest circle of social intercourse.

*

In an abnormal development the military profession has to be added to the other classes of public life.

*

Community of action is achieved by the mutual communication of its products, but not also of its functions. This is produced in different modes in the various spheres of social intercourse. (1) In the community of formative action by the exchange of its products, especially (*a*) in its universal character by mutual transference, interchange of things (*b*) in its individual character by their mutual exhibition, interchange of property. (2) In the community of perceptive action by the representation of its products, namely (*a*) on the universal side by means of speech, representation of knowledge; (*b*) on the

individual side by means of the symbol, representation of ideas.

SOCIAL DUTIES.

We have general duties as men, as Christians, and we have the special duties of our profession. Both are duties towards others.

*

We must clearly distinguish between our duties to the state, and our duties as regards the four distinct spheres of action in the social community. The latter are related to the former as the special to the universal. To the former class belong the duties of our profession.

*

The tendency directed towards the community must not be pressed forward in such a way as to hinder the development of individualities.

INTERCOURSE.

If a person is unable to find the psychological key to the individual temperament of another with whom he is united by the ties of close relationship, he is certainly in a very difficult position.

*

The man who invented abbreviations within the sphere of man's social relations, belongs to the benefactors of his race.

*

Where I am forced to admire, I have neither the inclination nor the courage to criticise.

We should despise nothing in the world, but neither should we make a great outcry about anything.

*

A very good maxim for practical life is to prefer to wonder at some people on account of their inexplicable character rather than to treat them with contempt.

*

He who wishes to have authority must be modest, and willing frankly to confess himself in the wrong.

*

A certain degree of narrow-mindedness is the condition of enjoying direct social intercourse in a wide circle, no matter in what department.

*

It is a poor honour to be considered a remarkably pure character, because others are so much the reverse.

*

We ought, at least, to show respect to the man whose position we would gladly occupy ourselves.

*

Merry-making is better, but at the same time more difficult, than scolding.

*

Nothing is cheaper than scolding.

*

In your intercourse with your neighbour, beware of contracting love-debts of such a nature that you,

according to your individual character and situation, will not be able to repay them.

*

In claiming the services of others in our own interest, we should avoid doing so in matters for which they do not possess capacity.

*

No one can limit the claims of the world on himself by limiting his own claims on the world.

*

We should always take it for granted that each man possesses great weakness, but also a nobility of character which feels the bonds of his weakness.

*

The condition of every friendship, and indeed of every sort of good understanding, with the men among whom we live, is that we should make a two-fold assumption—the honesty of good intentions and the weakness of human nature.

*

In our moral judgment of men, their weakness—whether of the intellect or of the will—must be taken into account as a *positive* element.

*

True confidence always rests on a free act, not on a logical necessity.

*

Honour men by showing that you have confidence that they believe in the good (for he who believes

in it must necessarily *will* it), and you will see what wonders that accomplishes.

*

The suspicious person is most frequently deceived.

*

How does it happen that the worst hearts always see the most evil in their neighbours, and the best and purest always the most good? Which of the two will be likely to judge most correctly and least short-sightedly?

*

In the eyes of the good, the evil man appears much less evil than the good man himself in the eyes of the evil.

*

We deceive ourselves in men much more frequently through suspicion than through confidence.

SOCIABILITY.

There may be some individuals who are capable of no other social intercourse than that which can only be described as the mere dialogue. This is the minimum of social virtue, which must at least be assumed as in the possession of every one.

*

Those individuals to whom social intercourse is most evidently a necessity of their being, and who are the really dominant forces in society, feel this need chiefly as the necessity of securing an opportunity and occasion for the display of their own

personal qualities, not as the need of seeing the qualities of other people displayed for their own sake. It is the excitation of their own individual culture by the exhibition of the individual culture of others which makes them so desirous of the latter. Not the desire for communication, but the need of excitement generally makes them so sociable. They are commonly people of very strong self-consciousness.

*

As the essential forms of emotion are pleasure and displeasure, so the essential forms of criticism are applause and dissent.

*

The need of social enjoyment (when the enjoyment is reciprocal) is quite as it should be; but the need of having pleasure provided for us (therefore without reciprocity, unsociably) is entirely abnormal. Our public amusements must be judged according to this standard, which is of special importance in our judgment of the normal character of the stage.

*

One of the greatest charms of social life is that it is lived for the moment. It is play.

*

Men's views differ in nothing so widely as in their ideas of the wearisome.

*

Why does he who cannot make a joke count as a stupid man?

LOVE.

Not only in intercourse with God does man become "free and liberated from himself," but also in intercourse with his fellow-men; although, undoubtedly, looking at the matter in itself, full devotion to man can have a clear meaning only when entire self-devotion to God is considered as a moral duty.

*

Love is a virtue; it can never be a duty. It cannot, therefore, be commanded. (But *cf.* Matt. xxii. 35–40.*) Perfect love, as being perfect love, would render all mere duty superfluous. But *to love* is our duty.

*

We can understand clearly how a real existence of persons in one another may be achieved through love, when we see the heartrending grief which parting causes those who love. This, too, may be felt and shown merely on one side.

*

In our younger years we fancy that life means living for ourselves; but, as years go on, we learn from experience that it is not possible to live for ourselves; and we learn, too, that there is something better and more blessed than this, and that life means living for others.

*

If only we could all remember that, even with the poorest gifts and mental development, we may be of

* *Cf.* "Reinherd," ii. § 104.

infinite use to others, even to the most gifted and highly-cultured, through our love! He only is truly poor who has no love to bestow.

*

Ingratitude is disbelief in love. He who does not believe in love cannot possibly be grateful. But can the man who does not believe in love possibly possess it himself?

*

It is harder than he who has never made the effort might imagine, silently to return with love the hatred with which our love has been requited.

*

Feelings are originally egotistic; well then for him whose feelings have become, through moral culture, a perfect echo of the feelings of others,—through sympathy, the conductors of loving intercourse.

*

It belongs to the conception of love, that as far as it lies in its power to help, it really does help. Love is holy, because the good alone is its object; but we must also remember that this means the good in its widest compass.

*

It is no misfortune to be deceived, but only to deceive.

*

Before doing anything for our own pleasure, we must carefully consider the matter; especially we

must ask whether we will thus be a hindrance to others in the *work* they have to do in the world.

*

It can be no joy to any one when he sees the last glimmer of sunlight die out on the face of his neighbour.

*

Who can find words to express the heartrending pain which is suffered by those who have to give up all moral hope of another?

*

We shall not envy our neighbour any advantage, if we feel how much more becoming it is in him than it would have been in ourselves.

*

That is a strange conception of seeking after God and His kingdom that regards it as implying the renunciation of our attachment to beloved persons. (*Cf.* Beck: "Gedanken aus und nach der Schrift," p. 92.) Just as if God's kingdom did not actually consist in the definite relationship of persons to one another!

*

All individual culture must, as being appropriation, be at the same time a surrendering of ourselves to others,—a denying of self, a learning to love. Otherwise it is abnormal.

*

Mutual cares are an element of human happiness, because they are an element of love.

He who has something excellent to impart to others does not need to obtrude it upon their notice.

*

Love is mutual imitation. Can this be said of God's love?

*

If you can say of a human soul, it is mine, then you will touch it with the tenderest hand, that it may not be injured or spoiled. Would you not gladly *be something* to the soul that you know is yours?

*

If love is once fairly burning, it matters not though the flame die out which kindled it.

MAN AND WOMAN.

It belongs to a true marriage, that the woman shall be as a woman exactly what the man is as a man, and *vice versâ*.

*

Every unnatural gratification of sexual desire is immoral, because it is not essentially a gratification of love.

*

Personal unity subsists between various individuals, when their actions, alike of self-consciousness and self-activity, fully, but with inward necessity, coincide. By means of such personal unity, the several persons constitute one collective person, and if they are all individuals, then a personal collective individual.

But this is not that *unio personalis* of which Church Christology treats.

*

The relation between Christ and His people is represented as a marriage, because, like marriage, it rests on a mutual appropriation of individual persons. (See my "Theolog. Ethik," § 292.)

*

The authority of the man over the woman is grounded on the fact that he possesses a public calling. While the woman lives for the man, she also lives for the community. This is why she finds her satisfaction and pride in living for the man, just as he lives for his profession.

*

The woman possesses more feeling than the man, but less imagination. In this way she is less capable of artistic production,—immediate production being of course excepted. She finds it more easy to represent the strength of her feeling than its actual nature as definite pleasure or displeasure.

*

In marriage it no doubt frequently happens that the husband finds in his wife and appropriates to himself that part of his man's nature in which he was formerly deficient, and *vice versâ*.

*

Many marriages which appear most unhappy on earth will be proved in heaven to have been most fortunate.

Can the marriage-bond be broken in the life to come?

*

Every individual must have another who entirely and in a specific sense belongs exclusively to himself, and this can only be an individual of the opposite sex.

*

If there are manly professions which women cannot or will not share, or which, at least, certain individuals, who have undoubtedly a vocation for them, can fulfil only in an unwedded state, then, in this case, celibacy is justified and enjoined. (Matt. xix. 12.)

*

The soul-beauty of the two sexes is like a coin, of which we cannot say which is most beautiful, the obverse or the reverse.

*

In the eyes of the female sex, woman's coquetry is the most unpardonable of vices.

*

What a sad lot is that of the woman whose noble soul never finds its share of love, because it dwells in an unattractive body!

*

Right of inheritance rests on the natural connexion between parents and children,—generally speaking, on the natural connexion of all blood-relationships.

ON CHURCH HISTORY.

IX. ON CHURCH HISTORY.

THE APOSTOLIC AGE.

APOSTOLIC Christianity is by no means that form of Christianity which fully and perfectly corresponds to the idea of Christ, although it does undoubtedly fully and perfectly correspond to His idea of the earliest stages of the historical realization of His idea. We cannot sufficiently realize how high the consciousness of Christ rose above that of even His most enlightened apostles.

*

It is striking to notice how much the idea of the kingdom of God, which occupies so prominent a position amongst the ideas of Christ, falls into the background in the minds of the apostles.

*

The superior estimation of the doctrinal disquisitions of the apostles in the New Testament belongs to that over-rating of theology by which faith in Christ was so early placed in a distorted position.

*

We may well be afraid, when we see how in history every work which is suitable for its own time

(from the apostles' doctrines and onwards) becomes almost unavoidably a barrier and fetter to the spiritual freedom, in the purest sense of the word, of succeeding generations. Yet even this is an holy appointment of God.

*

We shall never be able to reconcile ourselves to the doctrines of the apostles, so long as we, clinging to the doctrine of inspiration, set out on the assumption that they were already in possession of clear, and to them satisfactory, knowledge as regarded the points concerned, and did not rather strive, with much toil and painful mental exertion, after the attainment of such knowledge.

ST. JOHN.

St. John was the first who clearly grasped the idea of Christianity as the essentially moral religion. *Cf.* 1 John iii. 4 and the entire polemics of this Epistle, especially chap. iv. 11–21 (in which note *vv.* 12, 16, 20, 21). The same is true of the Christology in his Gospel. From his historical position in his later years, this mode of consideration was naturally occasioned.

ST. PAUL.

It was an important turning-point in the history of Christian doctrine, when it came into the hands of an exponent like Paul, who had not been an immediate disciple of Christ, and had probably never even been personally acquainted with Him.

St. Paul was the first who made the specific Christian process of life in man the subject of special reflexion,—the first, indeed, who attempted to set up a special religious doctrine of Christianity.

*

A Christianity did not exist from the beginning, but only a Christ. It was necessary that He should be translated into a Christianity, and this was a prolonged and painful task, in the completion of which St. Paul was incomparably the most important agent. But this Christianity was not built up out of nothing, nor out of something earlier, such as Judaism, but out of a real Christ, a true historical individual, whose moral manifestation (God in Him—John i. 14) and whose life-development (His pressing forward through death to life) opened up an entirely new horizon for humanity, and presented to its understanding an entirely new problem, for the solution of which new data were indispensably necessary.

*

In Paul we first find scientific reflexion upon Christianity, on the one side, as an outward and an inward fact (the latter by means of the most careful observation of his own person), and on the other, in its relation to previous Divine revelation,—generally speaking, to all preceding history. This was very natural in the case of one whose faith in Christ was not, like that of the eleven, the result of the direct contemplation of Christ as a historical personality, but was grounded upon received information about

Him, and was therefore just as directly faith in Christianity as faith in Christ.

*

St. Paul was the first who, while preaching Christ, preached at the same time a Christian theology. This naturally excited surprise and hesitation in the minds of those believers in Christ, especially among the apostles themselves, who knew only a purely historical gospel, and who had learned, from direct intercourse with Christ, how foreign all dogmatizing was to Him.

*

Whenever we seek to make a special doctrine of Christianity, instead of contemplating the world, as far as it lies within our own range of vision, with minds enlightened by it, the danger arises of turning it into a school, and thus degrading it to the merely statutory. At the appearance of Paul the elder apostles must have felt this, though it may have been very dimly.

*

It is not difficult to understand why the other apostles hesitated when Paul began to set Christianity free from the Israelitish theocracy. That work of liberation, historical necessity as it was, meant nothing less than a setting free of Christian piety from every political form of organization (for it could not, of course, attach itself to heathenism) and placing it on a basis of its own ;—in one word, it was making Christian life purely religious, *i.e.* purely

ecclesiastical. The apostles must have had some idea how essentially foreign this was to the true nature of Christianity.

*

The idea of the Church develops itself only in the later writings of St. Paul, and is a natural consequence of the fact that the idea of the near approach of the second advent of Christ was falling into the background, and the idea of a necessary historical development of the kingdom of Christ was beginning to dawn upon his mind. (*Cf.* especially Eph. iv. 13, 14; also Schwegler: "Nachapost Zeitalter," ii., p. 377–379).

*

One reason why the early Christians had such difficulty in resolving to sever themselves from Judaism was, that they found it so hard to separate Christianity entirely from the political organization of the theocracy, and to base it upon the idea of a purely religious community—that of a church. Without doing so, they could not thus separate themselves. They must have had some idea, though perhaps a very dim one, of what the consequences of such a step would be.

*

We make a serious mistake in imagining that where Paul planted Christianity, the Pauline theology must also have taken root.

*

We cannot lay sufficient stress upon the advantage

which the elder apostles possessed over Paul, in their having been personally acquainted with Christ. To Paul, Christ was mainly a conception—the Redeemer. To the other apostles, He was always first and chiefly a concrete person, a distinct historical character. It was this which preserved them, even in spite of their "Judaism," from occupying a sectarian position.

*

Paulinism, in the true sense, seems to have attached itself almost exclusively to the person of Paul. Not until the period of the Reformation did it exercise its proper influence.

*

It is a precious, and for the theologian a most important thing, if he has not received his faith and his theology either from man or through man; if he, therefore, *mutatis mutandis*, occupies a similar position in the Christian world to that of St. Paul in his own day.

*

In the present day we would need above all things a new St. Paul, a new apostle of the Gentiles, who would convince unconscious Christians of their Christianity, and would, at the same time, show our Jewish Christians how unchristian is their legal, *i.e.* conventional Christianity.

JUDAISM.

Even in Israel we find clear proofs of the fact that piety in the ecclesiastical form must degenerate.

*

The theocracy of the Old Testament rests mainly on the presumption that there exists no law which is in itself moral, and no morally required constitution of the social relations of humanity; and that all legislation must be necessarily statutory, whether appointed by human judgment or Divine. It can thus know nothing of a distinction between "moral" and merely "ceremonial" laws.

*

In Old Testament times men knew that God was good (*cf. e.g.* Gen. l. 19), but they did not yet know that it belongs to the very conception of man himself to be good.

*

The great spiritual conception attained unto by Israel was that God is a moral being; that attained unto by the Greeks, that man is so also. Both lines of historical development run parallel with each other, and both are an essential preparation for Christianity.

HEATHENISM.

Plurality of religions. Other forms of heathenism are natural religions; the Hellenic is the *human* religion.

*

The incapacity of heathen (unrevealed) religions

for attaining unto the knowledge of God is felt not so much in regard to the physical as to the *moral* attributes in the idea of God.

*

The Chinese commonwealth forms a direct contrast to a theocracy.

MOHAMMEDANISM.

Mohammedanism was the first great historical interference on the part of Divine providence to prevent the absorption of Christianity into a Church.

*

Judaism and Mohammedanism have been placed in Christian world-history as a witness against Christianity, which, in its degeneration into a mere Church, had lost sight of its true position.

*

Because Christianity in the ecclesiastical form must degenerate, therefore, so long as it continues to retain the ecclesiastical form, Christ Himself permits other religions to exist alongside of it.

CATHOLICISM.

The undogmatic pious Christian may calmly put up with many dogmatic crudenesses and oddities, but never with a travesty of Christianity like Catholicism.

*

The maintenance of orthodoxy in the theology of the Roman Catholic Church is self-occasioned. The narrow minds among Roman Catholic theologians

are *bonâ fide* orthodox: the more highly gifted, who are unavoidably led back to fundamental heterodoxies, abandon the study of theology if they are in heart and spirit *bonâ fides;* but if, on the contrary, they are people *malæ fidei,* then they simulate orthodoxy. In this way theology never comes to a breach with the statutes of the Church.

*

In the eyes of the aristocratic classes Catholicism must recommend itself as a most useful religion.

*

Where Catholicism is a pure *res domestica,* quite free from all contact with Protestantism, Christianity shapes itself in a much more tolerant way than, from its principle, we might have been led to expect. It readily overlooks many things in its relation to moral Christianity, and this without inconsistency, but in strict accordance with its own adopted maxims.

*

It is a terrible thought that a cultivated man in our own day should be capable of considering Roman Catholic Christianity in all seriousness as the true Christianity.

*

Catholicism is indeed a thoroughly mistaken religion, and yet it has handed on the true idea of Christ.

*

If we seek another basis for the constitution of the Church than the law of the organization of

human society in and for itself,—if we seek for it some positive foundation,—we can find it nowhere else than in the Roman Catholic Church.

*

To persist in maintaining those Christian (ecclesiastical) traditions which were the natural outcome of their own time, but which can now exist only by artificial support,—this is essentially Catholicism.

CATHOLICISM AND PROTESTANTISM.

As long as we, like the Roman Catholics, lay the chief stress in our Christianity on the Church, so long they will very wisely hesitate to change their Church for ours. We shall never bring them over to our Evangelical Church, although we may bring them over to our Evangelical Christianity; but this can be done only in proportion as this Christianity is more and more set free from that statutory character which has dated from its organization as a Church. The Evangelical Church will never conquer the Catholic Church, but Evangelical Christianity will conquer Catholic Christianity in the Catholic Church, and in spite of it; and, indeed, it has already done so in no insignificant degree.

*

What justice demands of us Protestants as regards the Roman Catholics is the frank acknowledgment that Protestantism as a Church (not Protestant Christianity as a whole) is only a work of human weakness.

The more fanatical the behaviour of the Ultramontanes in the Catholic Church is, the more careful ought we Evangelicals to be, in practising the utmost fairness in our judgment of Catholicism, in order to maintain Christian communion with that large body of Catholic Christians who are not as yet fanatical in their opposition to us.

*

There is no doubt that a Protestantism of which the distinguishing characteristic consists in its maintaining the Protestantism of the Reformation period, has, in the present position of matters, very poor prospects as opposed to Catholicism. But it is only of such a Protestantism that this can be said.

*

He who has at heart the removal of the schism between Catholic and Evangelical Christians must desire above all that theological differences shall not be cultivated in the non-ecclesiastical walks of life. When this happens (as it so frequently does nowadays), it must be the greatest trial to such a unionist; for it forms no part of his object to make propaganda for the Evangelical Church.

*

Protestantism, as a moral power, has been victorious over that part of Christendom which has remained in the Roman Catholic Church.

*

If we find it difficult to understand how, at the time of the Reformation, even honest Catholic

Churchmen could utterly reject the reforming movement, we may find an explanation in the obstinacy with which, in the present day, our honest Evangelical Churchmen tenaciously maintain the ecclesiastical character of evangelical Christianity.

CATHOLICISM AND THE STATE.

The relation of States to the Catholic hierarchy will not be properly regulated until the national will has become their determining power, *i.e.* not until they are democratically constituted.

*

The most thorough-going curialistic policy is the natural policy of consistent pessimism, of unconditional disbelief in the power of the good, even within the range of Christian humanity. From this point of view Church and State are alike under police regulations.

*

The State, while granting its Roman Catholic subjects freedom of religion, can do so only within certain limits, as otherwise it would abolish its own conception as the State.

*

If the Roman Catholic of the present day does not place those Christian interests to which the Christian State devotes itself higher than the presumably Christian interests of his own Church, then he cannot be a good citizen. If the Catholic Church, in whose nature it lies to accommodate itself to existing cir-

cumstances, is wise, it will, although thus acting in opposition to its essential principle, act in this direction upon its members.

*

If the Catholic Church, after having passed through most striking and continuous transformations during the first five hundred years of its existence, cannot alter its form any further in the course of all-changing history, then it must endure the natural and necessary consequences.

THE REFORMATION.

Must not the Lord Jesus Christ, who carried out the Reformation, have had farther-reaching, more comprehensive ideas than Luther and Zwingli, who were His instruments in carrying it out?

*

The Reformers wished to return to the original form of Christianity, therefore to what had already existed in the past; the historical reforming movement, on the contrary, seeks to introduce an entirely new form of Christianity.

*

The Reformation was so entirely the personal deed of Germany, that its people shed their blood in its cause during many years.

*

The Reformers, while placing the subjective side of religious belief in the light of corrective criticism, never thought of doing the same with its object—

the traditional image of Christ. They confined themselves to bringing that object more prominently to the front.

PROTESTANTISM.

The conception of Protestantism and of Protestant Christianity, as distinguished from that of the Protestant Church, is that it is the essentially moral (morally determined and realized) form of Christian piety.

*

Very many people who stand in very loose relations to the Protestant Church have yet a firm hold on Protestantism.

*

The Evangelical doctrine of the universal priesthood of Christians undoubtedly has for its consequence (*e.g.* when it is applied to the interpretation of Scripture) the abolition of ecclesiastical authority; but it follows from this only that Evangelical Christianity, according to its principle, knows nothing of ecclesiastical form.

*

The Evangelical principle of "the universal priesthood" is that it is not a necessary condition of communion with Christ in the case of every individual in Christendom that he shall possess some special, *i.e.* ecclesiastical, mediation, which is not already included in his relation to the moral and religious community. Its idea is that there is salvation

to be found in Christendom *extra ecclesiam*, and, indeed, that such is *salus Christiana*.

*

It belongs to the nature of the Reformation that the Church which proceeded from it at the time of the reorganization of the Church cannot continue its development beyond that period. Protestantism must therefore retain its ecclesiastical institutions just as they were originally formed.

*

The Protestant Church is the slavish form of Protestant Christianity.

*

Why is the most important point in Evangelical Christianity the inward and spiritual, the relation of the heart towards God? Because it neither knows nor requires a special outward form, but possesses in the natural relations of men the outward form which best corresponds to it in the moral or social community.

*

Protestant Christianity is still in its earliest childhood. No wonder, then, that it is still labouring over its alphabet, and very ignorant.

*

It is unfair to blame imperfect forms of human society, on account of the troubles which arise out of them. These troubles are the very sign of their vitality and relative perfection, because they are progressive influences which proceed from themselves.

THE REFORMATION AND THE CHURCH.

The way in which the Reformation determined the conception of the Church is perfectly natural, if we proceed on the assumption that the Church exists for no other purpose than to be the historical bearer and transmitter of the message of Christ, this being the essential condition of its efficacy in the world. The idea that the Church is the community of those who belong to Christ is thus tacitly relinquished; that room for a community so conceived must be sought elsewhere is just as tacitly assumed, and this in perfect accordance with the nature of the case. Or rather let us say, that the need of a Christian community upon earth was not at that time clearly recognised. The question as to whether, according to the nature of the case, any other than a really Christian community could be the propagator of the genuine and correctly understood evangelical message, was never brought forward in those days.

*

The real essence of the Reformers' conception of the Church is that it is the divinely appointed instrument or institution by means of which Christ exercises His redeeming influence upon individuals, —an influence whose outward means are the word and the sacraments. (See "Confession of Augsburg," v.) This understanding of the idea of the Church was truly in accordance with the times. As, according to their views, the redeeming influence of Christ

upon the individual seeks only to secure for him a share in heavenly blessedness, and not also to qualify him for a community of the redeemed on earth, it is a perfectly natural consequence of their conception of the Church that Lutheranism, in its doctrine of the Church, should lay the chief stress on purity of doctrine. For all those to whom the need of the Church is chiefly the need of a religious society, the Evangelical Church, especially the Lutheran, must be, to a certain extent, unsatisfactory.

*

In order to understand the Reformers' idea of the Church, we must not forget, as Schenkel constantly does, that to their minds the two Churches, the invisible and the visible, are Churches in an entirely different sense. They are not related to each other as the "ideal" and the "real" Church, but the former is a community, the latter an institution. The invisible Church does not seek to realize and represent itself in the visible, nor has it even the remotest tendency in this direction, for only in heaven can it be represented and realized; but the visible Church is the necessary training-school in which those members of Christ which it requires to its perfection are produced and educated. The invisible Church has no tendency towards the visible, but the reverse. Briefly stated, the visible Church is not a Church at all in the primary sense of the word, but a school of Christianity,—while the invisible Church is the *ecclesia triumphans*, its roots only being grounded in

this present existence. From this point of view a Christian community on earth does not seem to belong to the appointment of God, neither is it to be striven after. Confusion of thought arises only because the earlier conception of the Church, that of the *congregatio sanctorum*, was often unconsciously recurring to the minds of the Reformers even as regarded the visible Church.

*

That which Schenkel calls the "ideal universal Church," and on which he lays such emphasis, was to the Reformers almost an unknown conception.

*

In proportion as the idea of the Church as the community of saints gave place in Luther's mind, during his later years, to that of the institution for the transmission of the means of grace, the appointment of the clergyman by the congregation, and the share of the congregation in Church government generally, must have fallen into the background of his ideas.

*

The first stage in the historical position of the Evangelical Church which proceeded from the Reformation was, that wherever it established itself as a great whole, it became the Church of the State. The second, and naturally resultant, stage is that the State sets itself free from the Church, which then becomes a private affair. Whenever the State is divided in matters of religion, it cannot long endure a con-

nexion with the Church, which becomes a source of continual complications and annoyance.

*

If the Reformation of the 16th century had been universally accepted, the ecclesiastical form of Christianity would have been perpetuated, and a schism of the Christian Church, which was the great event of that epoch, would have been avoided.

THE LUTHERAN AND THE REFORMED CHURCHES.

The Reformed Church has a much less pronounced and rigidly defined, and therefore a more plastic and many-sided individuality, than the Lutheran; the reason being that the Lutheran Church, which has to be traced back to one individual founder, and he a man of an overwhelming personality, has appropriated the individuality of its founder to itself.

*

In the Swiss Reformation there was from the first, along with the real reforming interest, which sought to restore Christian piety in its original purity, an admixture of the scientific or theological interest, which concerned itself with the solution of questions on which theological systems depended. In the Lutheran Reformation this was not the case. Even this fact contributed to the formation of the diverging characteristics of the two Evangelical Churches.

*

The idea of Protestantism itself, as distinguished from the idea of the Protestant Church, occupies a

perfectly indifferent position as regards the various characteristics of the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches.

*

Very truly does Schenkel maintain that "an ecclesiastical separation of the two Evangelical Churches was not the necessary result of the confessions of either, but was possible only in a period which took the scientific expositions of the Protestant principle for the principle itself, and which limited Protestantism to a narrow circle of elaborately formulated doctrines, just as if its aim had been to introduce a new and very human theological school, and not rather a new life of communion between God and man, a Church of regenerate humanity." ("Das Princip des Protestantismus," p. 65, etc.) But he ought not to overlook the fact that Protestantism could clearly never have founded a Church at all if it had not itself been implicated in this confounding of theological doctrine with Christianity. Only on the assumption that Christianity is originally and essentially dogma do we arrive at the idea of a Church.

*

That part of the progress of the Reformation which belongs to secular history, which lies beyond the religious side as such, was comprised more directly in the Reformed Church than in the Lutheran; while the historically effective appearance and founding of the Reformation, the Reforming movement, belongs mainly to the Lutheran Church.

The fundamental convictions of the Reformers proceeded, in the case of Luther, from a purely personal need; in that of Zwingli, from a feeling of the need of the Church. But only through the incomparably deeper subjective value which the Reforming impulse thus received from Luther could he strike in upon history like a flash of lightning, which kindled his contemporaries, and which no power on earth could avail to extinguish.

*

The Lutheran Reformation, with all its weaknesses, has this great strength, that it was peculiarly a German Reformation. Luther was a true and thorough German. For this reason the German Protestant world has always felt an instinctive drawing towards Lutheranism; and in spite of the evident advantages possessed by reformed Protestantism, it has yet remained foreign to the people of Germany, its western extremities alone excepted.

*

Luther proceeds invariably from a purely religious point of view, and directs his influence toward the purely religious side of Christianity. It is otherwise with Zwingli and Calvin.

*

The Swiss Reformation is the natural historical result of the previous development of Christianity; the Lutheran is a new revelation of Christ in the midst of the natural course of Christian history.

It was very providential that the humanist Melanchthon was placed by the side of Luther. Luther had a deep and hearty respect for this great representative of humanistic Christianity, although he himself belonged mainly to its religious and mystical side.

*

That which, from a moral point of view, is the idea of the universal moral purpose, the universal (objective) highest good, is, from a religious standpoint, the idea of the glory of God. This may be illustrated by referring to the first petition of the Lord's Prayer, and considering the relation of the second petition to the first. The fact that Lutheranism does not emphasize this idea, while reformed Protestantism accentuates it most strongly, affords a fresh proof of how the latter has at heart the *objective* interest of Christianity, the former only the subjective interest of the salvation of the individual.

*

If we seek an explanation for the fact that the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches have remained permanently separate, we must take this into account, that the existence of both Churches belongs to the essentially non-ecclesiastical stage of the historical development of Christianity, in which the real movement of Christian life has no ecclesiastical tendency, and does not therefore seek for itself a Christian community of the nature of a Church.

Luther was a prophet, which Zwingli and Calvin certainly were not. In saying this, however, we detract nothing from the dignity and importance of either of these great men. In Luther, Christian history decidedly takes its course once again as Church history in a new epoch. The Swiss Reformation was soon drawn in the same direction, most decidedly through the work of Calvin.

*

An error which we not unfrequently meet with, is that when a person is filled with admiration for some great man, such as Luther, who discovered one great and splendid truth, he is apt to become so dazzled by it, that he considers that *one* as the whole and perfect truth.

UNION.

My interest is ultimately concerned with the concord and unity of Christians, not with the union of Churches; or, at furthest, with the latter only in so far as it can be made a means to the former. It may, however, become, on the contrary, a hindrance to the former, and as matters now stand, only too easily. I could, therefore, have wished that we had never suggested the idea of a union of the two Evangelical Churches, which now live peaceably alongside of each other.

*

The severance of the Reformation into two hostile Churches was undeniably a grave sin against the

principle of the Reformation; but it was an equally serious offence against this principle, arising from a misunderstanding of its real nature, that led men, after this error had been recognised in both Evangelical Churches, to seek to expiate it by blending the two Churches into one, instead of concluding a perpetual peace between them, without any interference with their separate condition.

PIETISM.

Pietism is purely religious Christianity, such as Protestantism brings along with it, considered as set free from the ecclesiastical form, but at the same time necessarily bound down to much more individual forms.

*

Not inappropriately does Feuerlein[1] call Pietism,—"The evil conscience of the Lutheran world."

*

Those Christian agencies of love in which Pietism excels other evangelical schools are precisely the same as those in which Catholicism is superior to Protestantism as a whole. This is a characteristic fact.

*

What Socialism is nowadays in the world, home missions are in the Church. The two movements

[1] "Die Sittenlehre des Christenthums in ihren geschichtlichen Hauptformen," p. 149.

correspond to each other, and arise from the same historical impulse.

*

You Pietists have set before yourselves no work of world-wide importance to accomplish for Christ! Does it not startle you to hear it?

*

Do not stand among other people with your Lord Jesus Christ in your hand, looking as awkward and confused as if you had no idea what work you could do in the world of to-day.

*

Whenever we cease to consider the conventional forms of Pietism as the essential characteristics of Christianity itself, our confidence in its exclusive, or even pre-eminent, Christianity begins to totter.

*

An association under its religious aspect takes the form of the conventicle. It is an association for religious edification, for peculiarly individual religious culture. Such an association is as real a necessity in the religious sphere as a moral community is in that of the moral. Its perfection naturally consists in the perfect congruence and consistency of these two societies, the moral and the religious. The distinction between clergy and laity disappears in the religious society, just in proportion as that of authorities and subjects does in the moral. When we have understood the conventicle in this way as religious, perhaps not just absolutely Christian, social

intercourse, we cannot fall into the error of ranking it above the regular ordinance of public worship.

MYSTICISM AND THEOSOPHY.

Mysticism and theosophy are both of an essentially religious nature, but it is characteristic as regards their distinction and their relation to each other, that to the former, only the subjective self, to the latter, the whole objective world, is an object of knowledge in God, proceeding from the idea of God.

*

Gnosticism is a form of theosophy.

*

It is perfectly natural that current theosophy should derive all things ultimately from the idea of God; but one of its fundamental errors is that it fails to discover the relation of man to God through the relations of man to himself and to the world outside him, *i.e.* through his moral constitution, but, on the contrary, seeks to ascertain the latter by the former. It does not explain the religious self-determination of man by his moral self-determination, but the reverse; and this even on the threshold of human development. (*Cf. e.g.* Hofmann: "Schriftbeweis," i., p. 357, 363.)

FANATICISM.

The opposite of moral religion is magic religion; the opposite of practical, every-day religion is a fanciful, fantastic, empty, idle, abstract religion.

Fanaticism is abstract moral elevation without the practical tendency or practical value.

*

Most people imagine that there can be no real enthusiasm and love without extravagance.

*

Fantastic, unpractical, abstract piety must always become magical, non-moral; because, without a real object on which to direct itself, religious self-determination must always become empty and worthless. The idea of merit naturally attaches itself to this; for to do anything which does not include in itself any objective necessity for being done, is an *opus supererogatorium.*

*

To have an "inward grasp" of religion has a clear meaning only when understood in the sense of moral comprehension. Otherwise it leads to mysticism and quietism.

RATIONALISM.

Rationalism is a bad theology, but by no means such a bad religion. It is the popular comprehension of religious moral Christianity, and is actually much older than the employment of the name in theology. Even at the time of the undisputed sovereignty of theological orthodoxy in the Church, it was always in the evangelical party the real Christianity of the great mass of those who were not indifferent or actually profligate. Pietism, which runs parallel

with it, even from a historical point of view, can never, from its very nature, be the Christianity of large sections of the community.

*

The narrow-mindedness of rationalism becomes specially evident in the fact that, although it renounces dogma, it yet thoughtlessly retains the old views of the relations of Christianity to the Church.

*

Pelagianism and its offshoots consist mainly in the fact that the Divine act of redemption, even on its subjective side, is not considered as creation.

*

Rationalism results from the need felt by a mind at variance with the dogmas of the Church, to hold fast by the ideas of Christianity.

*

It is indeed a fact of priceless importance that man should hope to receive from God a mercy which would make no alteration in His holiness. If, however, we must maintain, on the one hand, that God's mercy is not bestowed upon the rationalist in the way in which he trusts in the pardoning grace of God, we must in fairness, on the other hand, acknowledge that it is not bestowed upon the ordinary dogmatic orthodox believer in the way in which *he* considers that the pardoning grace of God finds its motive through the satisfaction of Christ.

*

Reason is undoubtedly a noble and incomparable thing, if only any one possessed it!

I recognise no antithesis between rationalism and supernaturalism.

*

So far as rationalism forms a contrast to supernaturalism, I am a decided anti-rationalist; so far as it only means what its name directly implies, I am just as decidedly a rationalist.

*

As a theologian I am a supernaturalistic rationalist, not a rational supernaturalist.

SUPERNATURALISM.

Supernaturalism cannot be too highly exalted; the relation of communion between the uncreated and the created cannot be considered as too close and intimate; but even in the smallest point this connexion should never be otherwise regarded than as a morally mediated one.

*

Our duty nowadays in theology is to establish the authority of the *supernatural* in Christianity, in the strictest sense of the word, but with the unconditional exclusion of the magical.

*

The absolute person may very well refrain from the use of his powers, but he cannot hinder himself from possessing these powers. To attain them first in a moral, an ethical sense, first to become something as regards his virtues, is for the absolute being an utter impossibility. He cannot lay aside his essential qualities, even if we were to grant that he can put off

at will his peculiar conditions of existence, neither can he ever forget who and what he actually is.

*

While God constitutes the "laws of nature" in matter, He cannot confine His own activity within them; He cannot will to make them a barrier to His own activity. The only possible barrier to the activity of God would be the self-contradictory, unreasonable, and therefore unholy.

*

The miracle is not a breaking through of the laws of nature on the part of God, but an activity on the part of God without the interposition of these laws of nature. Nothing detrimental to these laws occurs in the miracle. In it God either works absolutely, *i.e.* entirely without means, or by employing such cosmic, created means as do not belong to the material, earthly world.

*

Not wonder, but admiration, is the true position o our minds in presence of the works of God, especially in His revelation of Himself in these. Ecclesiastical piety, indeed, delights itself in paradoxes; not so the piety which is ripe and manly.

*

A created world, which was in itself so perfectly organized that the entrance of the direct agency of God could not be admitted without producing a disturbance in it, would be a barrier for God, and consequently, as a creature, most imperfect.

The miracle appeals to the imaginative side of man's nature, that of direct presentation, exactly as prophecy does to the purely intellectual. The specific characteristic of both is that the process of mediation is entirely wanting.

*

All that does not belong to the process of the self-development of the world is not *natura*, and is therefore supernatural—a miracle, which may thus be unmistakably recognised by its evident want of a process of mediation, which because it exists in the world always within the limits of space and time, is always distinctly observable.

*

This material world is indeed an organic whole, but not of such a nature as to leave no room for the miracle, or to be disturbed in its process of life by the direct entrance of the Divine causality. The organic life of the world, especially that of material nature, is, as even our most every-day experience teaches, by no means in itself perfect, but is in a thousand ways impeded and disturbed, and must struggle on through innumerable diseases and dangers. And this quite naturally and unavoidably, because the very conception of matter excludes the idea of its perfect organizability. There are therefore opportunities enough for assisting from without the course of organic life in material nature. But it follows, of course, that the direct entrance of the Divine causality into material nature will exercise no disturbing

influence on the course of its organic life, but will rather remove hindrances and disturbances with the aid of its healing and helping power. Very many superstitious ideas are abroad as to the perfect organic life of material nature.

*

The distinction between the *contra* and the *supra rationem* is made by the supernaturalist with good reason and very appropriately, because we actually possess reason only in an imperfect and relative state, and therefore any revealed fact may very well be *supra rationem empiricam*, i.e. *relitivam*, without being *supra rationem effectivam*, i.e. *absolutam* (which is indeed inconceivable).

*

To those who object to miracles we will simply say: "Friends, we have no wish to force upon you a belief in miracles. If you cannot reconcile yourselves to them, set them aside, and see then how you will manage without them, and where you will find a pragmatic explanation of those actually existing results to which we possess the key in accepting miracles."

*

I believe in miracles because, as regards certain facts, I cannot do without them as historical explanations—in order to bridge over the gulfs in history.

*

We ought to oppose most energetically that thoughtless belief in miracles which supposes that the

acceptance of a miracle raises it beyond the reach of accurate investigation into those facts in its concrete particulars which profess themselves miraculous.

*

I have no objection that my belief in miracles, and my supernaturalism in general, should be apologised for as a childlike naïveté.

*

As regards miracles, the supernaturalist is from the first in a very different position from the anti-supernaturalist, because to him a marvellous occurrence is in and for itself by no means improbable, but, on the contrary, very probable.

*

To us modern people as a whole, the ancient Christian notions of angels and devils, heaven, hell, purgatory, etc., have all been lost; and in losing the old ideas, most of us have lost the things they concerned. This is not the case with myself.

*

What to our minds is incomprehensible is not necessarily a miracle; on the contrary, the miracle is decidedly comprehensible, but directly comprehensible only as the immediate agency of the Divine causality.

*

As it was perfectly natural in earlier ages to believe in a supernatural efficacy of God in the world, so we nowadays find the contrary more natural. But both alike rest upon a preconception.

According to the opponents of miracles, God dare not move. He is imprisoned in the laws of nature. But who then has imprisoned Him there? Surely not Himself.

SCHLEIERMACHER.

One point in which Schleiermacher seems to me especially great is, that we find no trace of vanity in his nature.

*

What I cannot understand in Schleiermacher is his taste for "interesting" people.

ON POLITICS.

X. ON POLITICS.

CHURCH AND STATE.

FROM the standpoint of our present historical position, a future "perfectly organized Christian State" appears much less a Utopia than a Protestant "true Church of regenerate humanity," which would be "under the headship of Christ alone."[1] For under the historical circumstances of the present, the State is evidently on the increase; but the Church (not to be confounded with living Christianity) is just as evidently on the decrease.

*

He who wishes to learn what and what kind of community the Redeemer really wished to found on earth, whether it was a Church or something different, should read John xiii. 34, 35. The order of things there required has not only been nowhere realized, but by no Christian community (only by individuals as such) has it been comprehended as a task which ought to be realized. Our own time is beginning to have some dawning idea of the truth. The peculiarly Christian political problem places itself before us

[1] Schenkel: "Das Princip des Protestantismus," p. 66, etc.; *cf.* p. 90.

here. Sooner or later it must find a solution, and its Columbus, with his firm faith and confidence, will not for ever be waited for in vain.

*

If, in the case of our evangelical laity, it should ever come to a conflict between their duties as Christian citizens and their duties as Churchmen, on which side would the decision be likely to fall?

*

I could wish the State to occupy an entirely neutral position towards Christian confessions, to have nothing whatever to do with them; not because I would have it indifferent to Christianity, but because I wish it to cherish exclusively, and with all its might, that Christianity which it is its duty to cultivate, religious moral Christianity, which is the divinely appointed heir of ecclesiastical Christianity in all its forms.

*

The State may indeed grant perfect independence to the Church (whichever Church it may be), but only on condition that it does not in so doing surrender to it any of its own privileges.

*

That which we so often hear deplored as want of religion in the State, is in reality only the want of a Church; and this does not in the very least imply an absence of religion.

*

I do not for a moment doubt that the Lord Jesus

Christ has a far deeper interest nowadays in the development of our political condition than in our so-called Church movements and questions of the day. He knows well which has the more important issues behind it.

*

If we examine the historical influences which have proceeded from Christ, do we not find the moral and social (political) reformation of the Christian world incomparably more important than the dogmatic system of religious doctrine?

*

The family is the most immediate provision of God for the mortification of the natural selfishness of the individual; the wider, and the only adequate, provision is the commonwealth, considered as national humanity.

*

The "universal best" is a very imperfect way of expressing the "universal moral purpose."

*

When Christianity within the Church had thoroughly deteriorated and no longer remained true to its pure original, a simultaneous reassertion and restoration of its own proper character was made in the secular sphere, under stimulus supplied by the Church.

*

Who would believe it possible that even nowadays, whenever the State is mentioned, most people

should, in a truly Philistine way, think merely of the government and its administrative organs (machines)? But unfortunately it is so.

*

If the State has become truly and consciously Christian, then undoubtedly there is no further need of a means for the transmission of Christian revelation (or the gospel), which office the Church has, from the earliest days, fulfilled; and the Church can then organize itself entirely according to its original conception, *i.e.* as a purely religious Christian community. That we have not as yet progressed thus far, no one will, however, be likely to dispute.

*

The Christian State has nothing to do for Christian piety as such; as long as the latter needs to be cared for, there is still need of a Christian Church along with the Christian State, and to it this duty belongs.

*

The consciousness that the merely legal state does not correspond to the true idea of the State, which recognises in it an essentially moral community, has already been awakened amongst us. (*Cf.* Thilo, "Die Theologisirende Rechts-und Staatslehre," pp. 330–332, 338, etc.)

*

Man flourishes only in a community. If therefore the Christian cannot live for the ecclesiastical community, he must live for the political, if he is to prosper.

In which province does Christianity show itself most productive at the present day, in the ecclesiastical or in the secular?

*

Those people whose ruling interest is the *Church*, are nowadays in deed and truth, *i.e.* apart from outward appearance, not a whit more Christian than those whose ruling interest is the State; on the contrary, the reverse is more frequently the case.

*

The State cannot do religion a better service and a higher honour than by "not troubling itself about it," *i.e.* by acting on the conviction that nothing can be more advantageous for religion than having the proper regulation of the relations of the human community determined exclusively by the standard which its own idea supplies.

*

The atmosphere of the State is purer and more salubrious nowadays, even from a Christian point of view, than the atmosphere of the Church.

*

In Christianity only two tendencies are possible, the ecclesiastical and the political. Therefore it must be, either—or—. What lies between the two is mere empty nothingness.

PRINCE AND PEOPLE.

Even the community requires a conscience; for, in a thousand cases, conscience alone can give the final decision as regards its questions. The prince is this conscience of the State, and to him therefore must belong the power of unconditional veto and the personal irresponsibility which characterize the conscience. But as the conscience in the individual can never entangle itself in unseemly conflict with the reason, without risking the loss of its own sovereignty, so the prince must avoid coming into conflict with the reason of the nation.

*

If the prince were important only as being the means for rendering it possible that the people should come to be of one mind as to their affairs, and that the national reason should, in all security, carry on the government, would not this be a very high importance indeed? Could you possibly assign him a position that would bring higher dignity?

*

No one is fit to govern, as distinguished from dominating, who is disposed to be headstrong, who is contented if he himself does right, and to whom it is not an equally warm and pressing desire, not only that right shall be done, but that it shall be the personal deed of those whom he governs.

*

It must be ruinous to a State, when, instead of

strife between the parties in the nation, which is unavoidable, a strife is set on foot between the people and the prince.

*

It cannot but be fatal to royalty to identify its interests with those of the privileged classes.

*

The people cannot identify itself with the prince, as the whole cannot identify itself with the part; but the prince can identify himself with his people, and in this, moreover, his highest glory consists.

*

It is much more natural and easy that the prince should yield to the publicly expressed conviction of the people, than that the reverse should take place.

*

The prince must govern for this reason, that he is in the position to understand most correctly the national reason, and the nation's rational desire.

*

The reason why governing is such a difficult and vexatious task is that the ruler cannot attain his objects by commanding, but only by the proper decision of the wills of the governed; he must therefore entirely renounce the idea of proceeding according to his own mind in the attainment of those objective ends which are the common property of all.

*

The strongest regal power is possible only where

the monarch's position rests on the personal choice of the people,—therefore only in the monarchical republic.

*

Where the prince really governs according to the constitution, as in England, a refusal of taxes cannot occur. All decisions of the constitutional government naturally presuppose that not only the nation, but also the sovereign, is constitutionally minded.

*

Nothing is more dangerous for the throne than a corrupt or cowardly representation of the people.

*

At no other period is hereditary sovereignty of such incalculable value as at the time when nations *begin* to rule themselves. At this period the mission of royalty reaches its meridian height.

*

Princes must learn to understand their people, not the reverse; for moral development takes place in the people, not in the prince.

*

The senseless talk about the "inseparability of the welfare of the crown and the kingdom," has a correct meaning only when we reverse the order of crown and kingdom, *i.e.* when the crown identifies itself with the country, not when it narrow-mindedly requires that the country shall identify itself with it. There is no middle course between the two.

Only those authorities are really powers which are involuntarily authorities,—the *auctoritates naturales.* We must beware only of making them *positivas*, in the opinion that their influence will thus be strengthened.

*

There is no doubt that if the prince does not realize the *majestas populi* (which does not of course mean that of individuals, or even of masses), he will not be able to govern according to the constitution.

*

The idea of constitutional monarchy is certainly not that the prince shall govern according to his own ideas, but that the people, through the prince, shall be able to govern themselves. (That is, really *govern*, in contrast to anarchy.)

*

If a representative government is appointed, if therefore an organ is established expressly for the purpose of allowing the public reason of the nation to find an utterance, then it is a contradiction in terms and morally wrong, if the prince refuses obedience to the expression of this organ. He cannot surely consider himself as wiser than his people as a whole.

*

If princes are unwilling to descend—as it foolishly seems to themselves—to that position which, in the present moral condition of the nations, alone remains possible for them, then they make their own existence impossible.

A common misfortune in governing is that people suppose themselves able to alter the nature of things by their own cleverness.

*

A prince is in a good position nowadays only if he joyfully renounces all idea of holding an exceptional position, because he possesses the clear conviction that thus alone he will exalt himself to a truly lofty position.

*

A high-minded prince will make it a point of honour not to wish to be wiser than the intelligence of his people. It will appear to him a shame and disgrace to rely in his government on the non-intelligence of the population.

AUTHORITY.

To the conception of authority belong these two things:—(1) That it shall proceed from the community, and (2) that, having proceeded from it, it shall possess authority over individuals in the community. This is the very purpose for which the community chooses for itself a head, that it may yield obedience to it, and through it to its own idea.

*

In what proportion a community may be democratically organized must be determined entirely according to the degree in which the whole community is animated by a common spirit.

No one can govern who is not disposed to grant to every one of his subjects perfect independence as regards himself.

*

In order to govern along with a constitution, one must first of all govern according to it.

*

To govern according to one's individual caprice (a very different thing from governing according to one's individual conviction) really means, not to govern, but to domineer.

*

To govern, as distinguished from domineering, means, to realize one's ends by independent instruments.

*

If, in a representative government, more than one chamber is really necessary, that the different chambers may mutually examine each other's decisions (as Trendelenburg, "Naturrecht," p. 384, etc., 454, 455, maintains), then the second chamber can properly be only a real senate, an assemblage of the notoriously highest intellects of the nation,[1] and its position would only be that of a court of appeal.

*

He who understands by governing arranging matters according to his own mind may have a vocation for everything else, but has certainly none for ruling.

[1] But who would choose them? and who could do it with undisputed authority?

Autocratically-minded (*i.e.* in plain English, wilful) people are useless nowadays in public life.

*

A man may find much that is praiseworthy, even necessary, in public and political life, and yet not feel himself called upon to take any direct share in it.

*

We should never expect great things from authority, of whatsoever kind it may be. All authority is merely provisional.

*

It is strange that so few can reconcile themselves to the idea of a real government, *i.e.* a certain attainment of reasonable objects by means of freely acting factors. The higher the art of the government, the more unlimited is the freedom. This is the case alike with the divine government of the world and with political science among men.

*

To rule the people according to the highest intellectual and moral convictions prevailing among them is the only worthy maxim in government, and soon it will be the only possible one. The nation provides itself with a government for the purpose of being ruled by itself, and being enabled to govern itself.

*

If the government persistently ignores the liberal tendencies in the nation, the result cannot fail to be

that the people, unnaturally pressed downwards to the lower strata, soil themselves with all kinds of impurity. The government ought to raise them out of the dust and ennoble them!

*

A high-minded system of government cannot prosper when executed by mean-minded officials.

*

Personal confidence is nowadays what authority was in the past.

*

The moral law, as distinguished from the moral norm, is always a positive, a concrete, formula.

*

The measure, and especially the duration, of punishment ought to be determined according as it will be most likely to attain its object, the actual abolition of evil.

*

Even in the human community the conception of punishment is that of expiation (*i.e.* making pardonable) of evil that has been committed. Only in this case it is the human community, not God, for whom the wrong must be expiated (made pardonable). But does not this conception of punishment exclude the punishment of *death*, in which the subject, whose sin the community is to forgive, is annihilated?

RANKS OF THE COMMUNITY.

From a moral point of view, we must certainly desire, that those ranks which occupy at present the very lowest position in the social scale, should gradually cease to exist; but from the same point of view, we must necessarily form the same judgment as to the very highest ranks in our present society.

*

There is no more efficacious means of spiritually (religiously and morally) elevating the "common man" than a spiritually elevated community.

*

The more backward human society is in its history, the more does it confine itself to establishing moral order in the sphere of a few individuals, who are then the privileged classes, at the expense of the worthy development of larger masses.

*

Of one kind of human nature and life it is true, more than of any other, that it was not created by God, and that is *court-life*.

*

It is a sign alike of ignorance and narrow-mindedness, when the more highly-educated classes despise the instinctive tendencies of the masses. He who can look farther sees in them auguries, for the true interpretation of which a haruspex might well be required.

He who really stands high does not raise himself on tip-toe to look over the heads of others, but bends down that he may hold communion with them. He finds no gratification to vanity in his superior height, but a painful narrowness of room.

*

The moral Proletariat (in which the individual lives without self-consciousness in the mass) is as great an evil as the "social" Proletariat, and is a fruitful source of the latter.

*

The tendencies of the masses can never, indeed, be predominant forces in public life, but in one respect the masses,—as being such parts of the whole, which are relatively mere material nature,—have an advantage over the educated classes, viz., that they are driven as by an instinct in the direction of future history. But it follows, of course, that all such instinct must first pass the censorship of reason.

POLITICAL FREEDOM.

The increase of political freedom must unavoidably result in a loss of personal freedom to the individual. For this reason he who is jealous of his personal freedom becomes readily a friend of absolute government. As a compensation, therefore, a relaxation of conventional etiquette, especially of the conventional social Gène (constraint), must keep even pace with the advance of political freedom.

As long as Christianity refuses frankly to acknowledge political freedom as its legitimate sister, it will fail to acquire the confidence of the men of these days to any great extent.

*

If a man is not allowed to set before himself any political aims, at least any positive aims, but only private aims, he is being practically educated in egotism. And can this be good for the State?

*

The universal longing for freedom is the necessary consequence of the fact, that self-determination is the distinctive characteristic of human action.

*

In our ecclesiastical disputes we may easily see what a bad thing it is for a man nowadays to have no clear and certain political convictions, as is the case with by far the larger number of our clergy.

*

He who turns away from historical progress because it sometimes gets into dirty hands, must take himself out of God's creation altogether.

*

Formerly a man's political opinions were considered as having no necessary connexion with the condition of his individual morality; nowadays this is no longer possible.

*

It is still a widespread misconception, that every agitation originates in impure motives. This was

a consequence of our having so inconsiderately accustomed ourselves to absolutism.

*

In all departments of life this blessing accompanies freedom, that law and order are held dear by those who possess it. (*Cf.* Lange: "Dogmatik," ii., p. 1178. "Within Christianity order ceases to be order the moment it oppresses freedom.")

FORMATION OF PARTIES.

All parties in the state have a relative right,* (none can have more,) and each must be able thoroughly to assert its own.

*

In public life we must follow the stream of history, quite regardless of the appearance presented by its more immediate organs: for we do not follow these, but the history whose organs they are, and this often without rightly understanding it ourselves.

*

Public life is impossible without parties (combinations formed of those who are striving after a common end, with the same means, and according to one united method,) and the organizations and agitations connected with them.

*

Every movement which asserts itself in conscious conjunction with others, necessarily becomes a party.

* Naturally in very different degrees.

In this there is nothing wrong. Only the party must be for a cause, not for a person. It is actually a sign of progress that we have parties nowadays in all departments of public life, and, as a consequence, fewer cliques.

*

There will be no thorough reformation in our politics, until the word "conservative" has become completely antiquated. It means nothing more than simply "desirous of privileges."

*

Our "well-disposed" people are for the most part either without disposition at all, or actually very ill-disposed.

POPULAR REPRESENTATION.

Whenever the idea of the *State* has dawned upon the consciousness of a people, especially of its more intelligent classes, there is felt simultaneously the need of a representative government.

*

The representation of the people must be also a real representation of the State;—representation, not only of individuals as such, (so that each one as a particular individual may have his share in the guidance of the community,) but also of the idea of the whole of the community as such. These two, however, are thoroughly intermixed and interdependent. It is not the government alone, which represents the State as such.

ABSOLUTISM.

The sovereignty of the masses (not that of the people, which, rightly understood, is quite as it should be,) rests upon one and the same principle as absolutism,—the final authorization, not of that which is morally and constitutionally right, but of that which accords with the particular will of the individual.

*

In absolute monarchies the taste for the true and simple degenerates to a melancholy degree.

*

A *limited* autocracy, *i.e.* arbitrary government, is the most senseless of all political constitutions.

*

As long as the idea of the State is not yet alive in the general consciousness of the people, so long, but not a moment longer, the autocratic element is perfectly justifiable. This, however, let us remember, is true only if we assume that the autocratic government directs its constant efforts towards the awaking of that idea in the people's consciousness.

REPUBLICS.

He who wishes to educate a nation into ripeness for a republic, can do so in no other way than by training it to virtue, and especially to inviolable respect for every legal institution, disagreeable as it may be. The most dangerous people for dynastic monarchies are men who work in this direction.

It is utterly vain, and leads only to confusion and obstruction, to seek to realize one's ideas in politics before they have penetrated the masses. The unideal nature of republican politics is, therefore, by no means a misfortune, but salutary wisdom.

*

A hereditary aristocracy in a free state, is one of the most odious of political deformities.

*

The Republic is the only form of government in which the avoidance of revolution is absolutely assured, from which therefore the revolution is absolutely excluded.

REVOLUTION.

There occur in history times of judgment,—periods in which, in the consciousness of the age, an irrevocable sentence of death is pronounced upon historical powers, although some space of existence may still be left them. The year 1848 was a time like this.

GERMANY.

As matters stand with us at present in Germany, our only political task seems to be that of judiciously training up the people, even those belonging to the lowest strata, to such a moral (*i.e.*, as should always be understood, religious and moral) excellence, that the aristocratic, or more exactly, the privileged, classes will have to be ashamed in its presence.

We Germans present a melancholy spectacle in the fact that so many who were in their youth spiritually stirred degenerate so soon into Philistinism. It is a sign that our political affairs are out of order. The reason is that our civil life is not really public life. Are matters in the same state in England?

*

Because we Germans do not consider the separate state to which we each more immediately belong as our actual fatherland, but only Germany as a whole, which is represented by no dynastic monarchical government, we live in a certain sense as citizens of a free state, and for this reason we wish to think of ourselves in the first place as Germans, not as Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, etc. And thus, in perfect accordance with the nature of German ideology, we live in the midst of our dynastic states the ideal life of a republican nation.

*

Why do we demand the political unity of Germany? Because we Germans are one people, and nothing separates us but nominal dynastic rights, whose moral importance we are no longer able to recognise.

NORTH AND SOUTH GERMANY.

The South German has unquestionably this characteristic advantage over the North German, that the individual feels himself more directly and vividly a member of the whole, of the people in general, though in the first place only of his particular race.

The North German in his proud self-satisfaction despises himself for his own jokes, the South German laughs at things and people with the air of a foolish person, who does not consider himself as wiser or better than the object of his merriment, but as a child, to whom in his simplicity persons and things appear droll and farcical.

*

Prussians are the worst provincialists among the Germans; in their happy self-consciousness they naïvely consider their own Prussian affairs as those of Germany as a whole, or at least as their highest point.

*

My sympathies are by no means with the Prussians as such, but only with the Prusso-Germans.

*

If a purely German state like Prussia, (it is quite another case with Austria), wishes to be something more than this, wishes to become one of the great powers of Europe, instead of looking upon Germany alone, itself included, as a great European power, this is, and must ever be regarded as, an un-German disposition.

*

When the South German puts on airs of consequence, we indulge him in it patiently, because it always appears a little ridiculous.

*

I do not, generally speaking, consider it a specially

favourable sign, when a South German, who has been transplanted to North Germany, feels himself particularly comfortable. I would not say this, however, in the case of a North German transplanted to South Germany.

EUROPE.

In our Europe, England alone excepted, there are in consequence of its historical development, everywhere unnatural and apparently insurmountable hindrances opposed to the natural development of moral life.

*

My fear is that our continental European states will all finally return to absolutism. For our dynasties will never decide in favour of a really and sincerely constitutional (therefore of a democratic) government, and our populations, owing to their historical antecedents, appear to be incapable of a republican constitution, on account of the yet unextinguished dynastic parties in their midst. The age of European culture is undoubtedly verging upon its close; but, on the other hand, the dawn of a Transatlantic culture is just as unmistakably beginning to break.

*

In our old Europe we shall never realize a rational arrangement of ecclesiastical, and even of political matters; in the new Transatlantic world men have found themselves from the first on the simple, right,

and natural road, because they have established perfect freedom of the churches in relation to the State.

*

The circumstance that our present political relations present to so many a relative impossibility of honestly yielding obedience to their sincere convictions,—especially in religious and theological matters,—must bring deep demoralisation in its train.

*

Must it not enrage a nation to see its interests in the hands of smooth drawing-room gentlemen, in whose artificial and conventional sphere of life every full and deep human emotion has been extinguished?

*

Will nations never come to understand the simple truth, that the interests of all are entirely reciprocal?


FRANCE.

The worst political evil is when a nation fears, and is obliged to fear, itself. This is the present condition of the French nation.

RUSSIA.

Russia is that frightful empire of the knout, by whose example our continental European princes possess the physical power of ruling their people absolutely, even against the universal national will.

QUESTIONS OF CULTURE.



XI. QUESTIONS OF CULTURE.

HISTORY.

THE historian must be able to distinguish between life and death, even in their most deceptive masks.

*

To the eye of the historian events appear quite otherwise than to the ordinary eye, and for this reason the true historian must submit to be reproached as an idealist and visionary. Reading between the lines, he sees an event which quite escapes the ordinary observer; and in the event which, because it is directly tangible, is alone perceptible to the latter, he sees no real event at all, but only the cloud of dust which history raises in its course through the world, and by which it is enwrapped and concealed. For this reason the true historian must not be destitute of speculative capacity.

*

History is no longer history when we place it outside of time. If time in history has no reality for God, then history cannot exist for Him at all.

*

The reason why the course of God's works appears

so slow to man, is that, within the compass of his own existence, he has accustomed himself to such small dimensions.

*

He who wishes to work thoroughly, must work very slowly. This is true even of God.

*

Who, in looking upon history, especially upon that of Christianity, could refrain from wondering—even, for a moment, from doubtful—astonishment at the excessive slowness with which God carries on His work in the world, allowing it to take its course through a thousand apparently retrogressive windings! The Divine world-government frequently appears even as a retarding force. Why does He do this but just because the work must be, not His alone, but also ours,—because His work in the world is to develop it from itself, a process carried on with no sudden bound. And people actually look surprised at our theory as to the origin of evil!

*

God retards the progress of His kingdom, so that even the weak may follow after. (Predestination.) *Cf.* 2 Pet. iii. 9.

*

When the Redeemer speaks of a "shortening" of the great tribulation in the last times, He expressly takes for granted that the history of humanity, especially of Christian humanity, proceeds according to a law of inward development, which God un-

doubtedly holds in His own power, as He holds all laws of the creature's life.

*

The greater a historical principle is, the more slowly and through more numerous stages of development does it unfold its import; but for this very reason it endures all the longer in its ceaseless modifications. This is true in the highest degree of Christianity.

*

The result of the life-experience of the thoughtful man is not that all things in this world are vain; but rather, that in it the noble, imperishable metal of the real must be wrought out with pain and toil from vast dross-heaps of the vain and worthless.

*

We hear indeed the melody of the world's history; but who can catch the sound of that wondrous harmony which accompanies it, as that melody re-echoes in the millions of human hearts which it touches!

*

Well for him who sees in history, especially in that of his own day, the real facts themselves, and not merely, as so many do, the dark shadow which they cast.

*

History proceeds calmly on her way through the midst of parties.

*

Historically dominant spiritual forces exercise an

incalculably important moral influence, even upon those who are quite unconscious of their existence. They are the spiritual imponderables.

*

Changing times oblige most people to be always looking at matters with different eyes.

*

All beginnings present a crude and uncouth appearance, even those in history.

*

Moral forces, even according to the principle of their own nature, become in the course of time physical forces; and the further history progresses, with all the greater celerity. Only we must not imagine for a moment that moral powers can be really, and therefore permanently, extinguished by physical force.

*

As the earth in the course of its formation passed through very varied cosmic conditions, so has humanity in its moral history.

*

Why do men, in the movements of history, follow dark impulses only? In order that the guiding power may remain in the hand of God.

CULTURE.

The correct measurement of great and small is a fairly trustworthy criterion of culture.

The narrower a man's sphere of vision, the more naïvely does he trust in it.

*

One leading characteristic of the cultured man is that he has an impression of the power of prejudice.

*

It forms a part of true culture to be able to distinguish between greatness *in quanto*, and greatness *in quali*.

*

The idea is the action and reaction upon one another of the products of individual and universal knowledge, the reciprocal action of apprehension (and therefore of intuition) and conception (and along with it representation), namely as directed towards one and the same object of knowledge. Hence the peculiar vitality and power of the idea, and for this reason also, it is the characteristic of the highest theoretic (or intellectual) culture to possess ideas. It is the meeting-point of artistic and scientific knowledge, and hence also the specific bond which unites art and science. The highest task for the understanding is therefore to comprehend everything in the mode of ideas, to possess all its knowledge in the form of ideas. The product of individual and universal culture, when acting or reacting upon one another, is virtuosity, the reciprocal action of possession (and therefore self-satisfaction), and an object of possession (*i.e.* acquirement, or property). To be a virtuoso is therefore the characteristic of the highest

practical culture. It is the meeting-point of public and social life; and the highest task for man's formative action is therefore that everything shall be fashioned with virtuosity.[1]

*

We do not really understand a truth, until we have perfectly contemplated the various applications of which, on its many sides, it is capable.

*

What we best understand with the understanding, we are often least capable of doing.

*

I usually understand best the very things that I can do least.

*

It matters little in Divine things *that* we should know, if we are not clearly aware *what* we know.

*

Every author writes for those who understand him, not for those who cannot or will not understand him. Hence the mistaken nature of all polemics.

*

We see things more truly in proportion as we see them in wider connexions.

*

In order to the correct understanding of the world, those men are necessary who are accustomed to con-

[1] *Cf.* George: "Metaphysik," p. 397, etc.

sider matters, not merely from the outside, but also from the inside.

*

Because truth is always so thoroughly simple, we are very apt to imagine that it must always be knowable, if not indeed already known.

SCIENCE.

Among the rubbish of our scientific literature lie many scattered grains of fruitful knowledge; but, unfortunately, the only men who could discover them have no time to search among the sweepings.

*

The beginning of all science is to be able to trust our five senses.

*

It belongs to the very idea of sense that it is also the faculty of observation—that it reflects upon the consciousness of the subject the actual image of the object, by whatever artificial machinery this may be brought about in the sensible and somatic nature of the observer. It is the true nature of objects which we apprehend with our senses, although indeed only *by means* of the sensations which these objects produce on our organs of sense, not merely the sensations themselves which these objects have produced. Trust in our five senses is the commencement of all science.

*

He who has not sufficient respect for science, that in occupying himself with it he forgets his own personality, need have nothing whatever to do with it.

We have far more need of reproductive than of productive intellects.

*

It belongs to the character of the scholar, in the higher sense of the word, that he has no expectation of success for his work during his own lifetime.

*

It is unfortunate when a man, in the course of a long life spent in constant occupation with science, has never learned to control his own ideas. In what an excessive confusion must this result!

*

Why do I consider it a calamity, when professors (scholars) do work which does not properly belong to their profession? Because, in this way, the work which does belong to their profession, and which none but themselves can perform, must remain, partially at least, neglected.

*

Every one ought to strive after freedom from error by being content to know nothing, except what he, according to objective and subjective conditions, really *can* know, and by strictly distinguishing, within the range of his ideas, between what he really knows, and what he has only learned from tradition. He who wishes to be free from error, must renounce the idea of knowing *much*.

*

The scholar is never more comfortable than when nothing "happens" in his individual sphere of life,

when every one leaves him entirely unmolested. But in this very fact lies for him a great temptation.

*

Unconscious ignorance is not error.

ART.

Artistic (or æsthetic) beauty is that attribute of the representation of the individually determined self-consciousness, by means of which the objective or identical image of the object (of the individually determined self-consciousness represented) presents itself in a peculiarly pure and energetic manner in some individual form. The beauty of a work of art always presupposes that the individually determined self-consciousness of the artist possesses the peculiar power of penetrating with his understanding, therefore with his powers of sense-perception, (or emotions,) into objective nature, into the actual being of his object;[1] and on the other hand, that the artist possesses the capacity of representing, and thus transmitting to others, this his individual knowledge, *i.e.* his individual perception or feeling of the object, in a peculiarly pure and energetic manner, by means of the symbol. Both these powers in their union constitute the true artist, who thus requires, in order to his perfection, a culture which must carry on its work chiefly on the reproductive side. Thus we see the reason why so many erroneously consider themselves as artists. They possess one element of the

[1] *Cf.* Hegel: "Propädeutik," § 187.

artist, but only one, most commonly they possess the perceptive alone.

*

True artists must feel things before, and with poorer means of knowledge than other men, in order that others may learn to feel them rightly.

*

Beauty, in general, is the attribute of the outward or material object, and is clearly meant to reflect (to allow an appearance or shining through of) the idea, using the word in a strict metaphysical sense, according to which idea is regarded as equivalent to spirit. It must be a representative symbol of the idea, whether it be the idea of one particular object, (supposing that an idea of that object can exist; as *e.g.* of man,) or of some other idea or totality of ideas (as the world in its totality is the reflection of such an idea). This beauty may be either a natural product, like the beauty of nature, or an artistic product, as *e.g.* the beauty of a melody; or both together, as the beauty of the human body,[1] and as far as we can speak of such a thing,[2] the beauty of the soul.[3]

[1] The ideal, through whose reflex upon itself the body is beautiful, is the human personality. That human body is beautiful which is for the spectator a representation of the human body in its truth and its perfection: Ecce Homo! The Apollo Belvedere.

[2] We may, indeed, speak of soul beauty, so far as the soul as natural is a material thing, therefore not in itself an idea, which it becomes on its spiritualization—when therefore the idea, as something outside of it, can reflect itself upon the soul.

[3] It is a misuse of the word to speak of beauty in the perfectly

Metre is essentially necessary to poetry, because the tone is one side of the primitive individually determined means of representation. Metrical speech is eloquence under the potency of the tone.

*

Even social intercourse requires art as an object of social enjoyment, as art, on the other hand, requires, in order to its perfect development, the theatre of social intercourse.

*

The ideal is that being which, according to its own conception, is purely ideal; but this it is impossible ever to attain.

*

There is a difference between the mere sign and the image.

*

Architecture is the art which relates specifically to particular personal property. For this reason it is not exclusively a fine art (as the others are) but is, at the same time, a trade, as having in view necessity. (*Cf.* on this point Schelling: Werke, i. 5, p. 574, etc.) For this reason it is the earliest of the plastic arts.

*

The wonderful thing in music is that it, while

realized spirit. It is too poor a description of it. The spirit, in which idea and existence are absolutely one, is above the mere appearance of the idea in existence, therefore above all beauty. Even man lays aside his beauty the more he realizes himself as spirit; for ripe old age is no longer beautiful in the actual sense of the word.

appealing entirely to the emotions, does so on one side entirely through the understanding, namely, through the strictest mathematics of tones.

*

Like emotion and impulse, fancy and taste need to be rendered moral, to have their sensual character laid aside; the wildness of the former (which deforms even sensual organic life), and the crudity of the latter.

*

Emotion and impulse, when united by means of fancy, are, in the moral process of human life, a plastic force, a moral plastic power.

LITERATURE.

Speech or discourse falls into two families, the epic and the dramatic. The former seeks only to do justice to the object by representing it to the auditor, and thus to do justice to the auditor as regards the object; the latter seeks to produce the object as a real power, as an active influence over the spectator, and it thus directly draws the spectator into the action represented by the object.

*

Speech, purely as such, (as word-speech,) always wavers in the current contrast of the universal and the particular; it expresses only the former, and can never produce perfectly particular things, never a perfect image of concrete objects. Speech can do

this only by means of poetry. (*Cf.* Schleiermacher: "Æsthetik," p. 638–644.)

*

He who possesses ideas of his own, must begin by reforming our common mode of speech.

*

The literary world ought to see that the language of a people does not become obstinate.

*

The charm of ancient classical literature consists mainly in the fact that in it we hear the affairs of men discussed by people who, in comparison with ourselves, must have looked upon them with *fresh* eyes.

*

The best test of the "classical" is that even a higher degree of intellectual culture never makes it appear trivial.

*

He who is a poet only in his childhood, is for that very reason a poor and childish poet.

*

It belongs to the nature of the didactic poem, that it can have only a short existence. With the progress of scientific knowledge men lose their liking for it.

CRITICISM.

It is not only much more pleasant and satisfactory, but also much more instructive, to search out and keep in view the good and great qualities in others

than the mean and worthless. This is specially true of literary criticism.

*

Many authors appear to imagine that books are written in order that scholars may criticise them, while they really exist in order that scholars may *use* them.

*

If, in criticising the ideas of others, we reprehend them for logical errors into which they have fallen, we ought always to remember in doing so that we ourselves are only too apt to stumble in the same way.

*

Doctrinarianism consists, not so much in the setting up of an exact doctrine, as in the tendency to apply some special doctrine in its scientific purity, and consequent abstractness, immediately to any given concrete case.

PEDAGOGY.

To excite piety by cherishing morality (not the reverse) is the true canon of instruction within Protestant Christianity. Its consequence is, that the guidance of education can never, in Protestant Christianity, become a mere affair of the Church.

*

Those schoolmasters who have usually produced deep and lasting religious impressions upon the youth of learned scholars, are not the professors of religion,

pious and full of unction as these may be, but the hard-headed mathematicians and philologists, who are inwardly full of reverence for Christianity, without discoursing of it *ex professo.*

*

If I find myself under the moral training influence of any one, the true knowledge of his moral character is incomparably more important for the attainment of this purpose than that of his social position and dignity.

*

In the training of our young men for their profession, it would be a good thing for us to set out on the principle of assuring ourselves, not that they *have learned* something, which can never be done with any degree of certainty, and in regard to which the true insight almost always comes too late, but rather that they *do learn* something.

*

The academic professor should be to his audience a means of learning, not an object of learning.



CHRISTIANITY AND THE CHURCH.

XII. CHRISTIANITY AND THE CHURCH.

THE CHURCH.

HE who wishes to have a Church must support himself entirely upon those to whom piety *as such* is the main point in Christianity. But if we are to have a real Church, in some sense a national ecclesiastical community, not merely a small body of separatists, it must be so organized that those whose main concern is religious morality, indeed morality in general, shall be able to exert themselves within it, without spiritual compulsion or constraint of conscience. Even in a Church constituted thus the former party will remain its life and soul.

*

The reason why natural religions can produce no Church is that the Church rests essentially on the assumption of a distinction between piety and natural or universally human life. (*Cf.* Romang: "System der Natürlichen Religion," § 28.)

*

What the Church actually is, determines itself according to the prevalent conception of it.

If the social life of a community is, on the one hand, so perfectly developed in all things, and especially in itself, and on the other hand, so penetrated by religion, that within its circle an approximately universal and perfect religious moral community exists, then the universal community ceases to have its locality and its organ in the Church. The latter then becomes the organ of the religious community of those who recognise the religious as really religious only in its separation from the moral. But as these, according to the nature of their standpoint, necessarily determine the religious to a certain extent arbitrarily, their piety will have, in some measure, an idiosyncrasy in it, and their ecclesiastical life will thus expend itself in a multitude of little individual idiosyncratic ecclesiastical schemes and arrangements. Two opposing currents run parallel in the province of the Church: the one aims at attaining the most comprehensive, but at the same time the least strictly ecclesiastical community; the other seeks to secure the most strictly ecclesiastical, but at the same time the most narrow and exclusive ecclesiastical community. The tendency to a State (or rather to a national) Church is inherent in the former; the aversion to such a Church is equally inherent in the latter.

*

As regards the Church, we must direct our efforts to provide that those only shall belong to it who, because of their ecclesiastical interest—their interest, that is, in the special Church concerned—are its volun-

tary adherents. This will date from the period when Christianity in the people is secured even independently of the Church.

*

My own principle is the same as that which floats before the minds of those who place their whole interest in the "invisible Church." But because I think the matter clearly and distinctly out, and consequently must protest against their meaningless description of an invisible Church, I call forth their loudest opposition.

*

The final word of the advocates of the Church is that some institution is indispensable as a means for transmitting the Gospel to humanity. But in the present position of Christianity is there really need of such a special institution? What *can* the Church do in this direction which the State does not also do entirely of its own accord? Is it that the Church transmits along with the Gospel its own interpretation of it—its dogma? But matters have now come to such a stand that the only part of dogma which has or can have the slightest authority is that which Christian sentiment and Christian science have learned quite independently of it. What does the Church of the present know of Christ and Christianity (as a historical fact) more than the Christian world?

*

It is sad if matters have been reduced so low in the Church that, in order to its continuous existence, the

multitude of sensible and honest men must allow themselves to be guided by a handful of fanatics.

*

As long as Christians as Christians had a share in no other community except the Church, so long, but not a moment longer, Christianity and the Church were really identical.

*

When a man proceeds on the candid assumption, that it is the Church round which everything finally revolves in the history of the salvation of our race; then, reasonable as he may otherwise be, his considerations of human things become utterly confused.

*

If in the present position of Biblical and dogmatic criticism, Christianity in its ecclesiastical form can no longer exist, then we may very well let it go.

*

One of the most significant symptoms of the present condition of the Church in Protestant Christendom is the great cooling of interest in historical studies, apart from those directly connected with disputed ecclesiastical questions, among the rising generation of theologians.

*

Our "Church-people" are *optima fide* reactionaries against the world-government of Christ.

*

The only salutary policy for the Church is constantly to maintain vital contact and sincere friend-

ship with all the currents of Christianity in other departments of life.

*

One of the chief tasks of our present evangelical church-government must be to extinguish every spark of clerical pride.

*

The less Christian piety accentuates the Church, the greater need does it feel to belong to a great, comprehensive ecclesiastical community, the more intolerable does it find a sectarian position.

*

Our churchmen and clergy act in all naïveté, as if Christianity existed for the sake of the Church and the clerical profession, while the true state of matters is exactly the reverse.

*

Many misconceptions of our preachers nowadays are not attributable to themselves, but to the present historical position of the Church.

*

It cannot be our duty to maintain the Church at the risk of breaking up Christianity.

*

The oft-repeated demand that "all outward authority" shall fall to the ground in matters of the Christian religion, means *in concreto* nothing less than that the Church as a whole must fall.

*

He who believes that all religion, or at least all

revealed religion, is worthless, is easily goaded on to theological fanaticism.

*

It is narrow-minded to imagine that the justification of the chequered subjectivism of men will be conducive to freedom in the Church.

*

The confusion which exists as regards the idea of the Church has for its ultimate cause the fact, that while maintaining quite correctly that "The company of believers, which is in its inward essence a communion with and in Christ, ought to represent and realize itself in the world as such," [1] we at the same time take for granted that this must happen in some other way than in human society itself, our reason being that the latter community actually existed before Christ and independently of Him.

*

It is confusing and pernicious in its effects, to demand such things from the Church as ought indeed without doubt to be demanded from Christianity, but which, according to its fundamental principle, can never be accomplished by a Church.

*

We seriously misunderstand the nature of the Church, if we seek to put an end to the "want of sympathy" of our evangelical "congregations," by awakening their interest in the political life, without

[1] Jul. Köstlin: "Der Glaube," p. 403.

having first aroused their interest in the religious life of the Church.

*

The Church is important only to the man to whom piety itself is important, to whom it is the highest and holiest of all things. The most worthy Christianity, if it is not at the same time religiosity, counts for nothing in the Church.

*

Ought congregations to be twice represented in the Church, first by their legitimate delegates to the Synod, and then also personally, and indeed in a majority of their numbers? Ought the latter to be entrusted with the decision as to what the "needs" of the "congregations" are? If congregations wish to be represented, the first condition is that they shall respect the decisions of their representatives. To seek first to deliberate upon these decisions, means nothing less than a dissolution of the ecclesiastical community.

*

The primary necessity for a Christian community is that it shall frankly acknowledge that the Gospel occupies an objective position, as a norm, which is perfectly independent of its own estimation and resolutions.

*

If, on the one hand, full ecclesiastical freedom is allowed, and if, on the other hand, every Church is bound by necessity to support itself financially entirely by the contributions of its adherents, then

a true and actual church-community is the natural and direct result. Where one or other of these two conditions is absent, or where both are wanting, an attempt must be made to establish a true and actual ecclesiastical community by artificial means, but in this way the end is never really attained.

*

Government presupposes reasonableness on the part of the governed; when this is wanting, as in the case of our church-members, no one can be expected to take an interest in the government.

*

Because the historical existence of the Kingdom of Christ originally required a special community (the Church), we cannot get rid of the idea that it must always remain so.

*

The simple and only effectual means against separatism is unlimited ecclesiastical freedom.

*

The Christian Church does not exist merely for its own sake, but also for the sake of Christian revelation, as a means for its transmission; and since as Christian it can be an ecclesiastical (*i.e.* purely religious) community only in proportion as it is a community founded upon the Christian revelation, the connexion of these two points in its vocation is an inward necessity. We may expect to find them both existing in equal proportion, and the chief task in the organization of the Church is that it shall

really be so. It must strive after its object of being a purely religious community in such a way that in so doing, its other object, to be a means for the transmission of Christian revelation, remains uncompromised, and is, as far as possible, promoted.

*

The common presupposition, that in the same people the Church is more Christian than the State, can be accurate only on condition that the Church is a perfectly free association, and adherence or non-adherence to it a matter of perfectly free individual choice.

*

From the fact that the company (flock) of Christ's people originally constituted itself as a Church, it does not necessarily follow that the flock of Christ is to be identified with the Church.

*

The idea of a Church exists in and for itself quite independently of Christianity, although to Christianity it undoubtedly owes its historical existence.

*

It is really alarming to see to what degree of insipidity Christianity may be reduced in the hands of ecclesiastical, and especially of orthodox, people.

*

According as we consider the conception of the Christian Church either as that of the transmitter of the historical efficacy of Christ, or as that of a purely religious community, we shall shape our ideas of wor-

ship from different points of view. In the former case, we shall direct our chief efforts towards organizing it as a transmitter of Christian tradition; in the latter, we shall construct it upon such a foundation as shall be most in accordance with the views of all its members.

*

A national Church exists wherever a nation carries on its national moral task, supported by the consciousness of common piety as the basis of united activity.

*

The Church ought to train men for heaven; but if it imagines that it can and ought to do this *immediately*, otherwise than by helping to train them to live noble lives on earth, it has fallen into an idle dream. For heaven can be built up only upon earth.

*

The point of controversy in our Churches nowadays is whether we are to have a historical Christianity or a Christianity of sects.

*

Those who, in order to assist the Church, direct their influence not upon those who are spiritually at the summit of the mountain, but upon those who are spiritually walking at its foot, ought not to expect much success for their cause.

*

There is, thank God, not merely a Christian Church,

but also a Christendom, which cannot be divided and separated by confessions and creeds.

*

To seek to help on the Church, at the expense of life outside the Church, is pernicious and wrong.

PIETY.

There are many, even among the best of people, to whom piety would mean nothing, if they were once persuaded that it is not anything peculiar, nothing but the healthy, bracing and refreshing atmosphere which we inhale at every breath. It is very difficult to come to an understanding with people like these.

*

A serious and fundamental error of our dogmas and dogmatists is that the latter, like genuine theologians, define ideas always from the purely religious point of view, *i.e.* they always take up a position as if man determined his actions directly and from the first in relation to God, and not rather in relation to himself and to the world outside him, *i.e.* absolutely according to his moral relations. This is especially the case in the doctrine of sin, etc. But it is an assumption which is entirely contrary to experience, and as such it is contrary to common sense.

*

In the contrast which our earlier theology used to draw between *res spirituales* and *res civiles* it becomes remarkably evident how the essentially moral

character of Christianity has remained hidden from the minds of theologians, even among Protestants, and how the moral as such has as yet no essentially positive relation to Christian piety and to Christianity as a whole.

*

Unconditional surrender of himself to God is undoubtedly the essence of all requirements which can be made of man; but, let it be remembered, it must be self-surrender along with a morally useful life. Otherwise he has nothing to surrender to God, and the apparent implicitness of the surrender is merely its emptiness, while the pompous talk upon the subject is really a presumptuous mockery of God.

*

To make everything depend on piety, and to be at the same time without interest or taste for the comprehension of the works of God, even in the details of their nature and teleological connexion, is an inward contradiction which we not unfrequently encounter.

*

In characterizing the moral well-being of man, the Church's doctrine gives prominence only to its formal, *i.e.* its religious side, but never to its material, *i.e.* its moral side. It emphasizes only the fact that the course of action which is becoming on the part of man is obedience in humble confidence and grateful love to God; but never that this course of action ought to be in itself the production of an essential good, the accomplishment of a task on earth which

the Creator has laid upon man by the position assigned to him in the world. The fact that the requirements of God from man concern precisely these worldly tasks does not seem to Church doctrine a sufficient statement of the case.

*

The merely religious standpoint always brings along with it the serious danger of self-deception.

*

The *opus operatum* is the necessary consequence, and therefore the characteristic mark, of all forms of religion and piety that are not simply moral.

*

It is noteworthy, as regards the fundamental view of the nature of piety taken by our older theology, that it possesses only one word for the two ideas, which it expresses by the term "world." The world is its "world."

*

As long as there exists only a *materialiter* moral, which is only *formaliter* religious, the impulse to work for the attainment of objective moral possessions cannot be aroused. The only interest known is the interest in the soul's salvation.

*

The cardinal idea through which the *ecclesiastical* conception of religion is sharply marked off from the *moral or secular* is that of the "spiritual" as distinguished from the immaterial or higher part of man's being,—although the Scriptures are unaware of any

further expression than πνευματικός,—*i.e.* the spiritual without the mediation of the moral. Is not this idea a relapse from specific Christianity?

*

There is a close connexion between the mistaken ideas as to the relation of piety to morality, and the custom of representing heavenly blessedness as a condition of rest, of keeping holiday. Do we find this idea anywhere expressed by Christ?

*

Why do you, who are so indignant at the predominance of material interests in our own times, regarding it as a symptom of deep degeneracy, not rather lead those who pursue them to a consciousness of the inward connexion between these material interests and the highest ends of humanity?

*

The more Christianity is considered exclusively as piety, the more will the mind of the Christian be subject to doubts as to his being in a state of grace; for in the same proportion his relation to God is without the mediation of the moral, and the want of this element will specially affect his understanding. The demon world will consequently be all the more likely to interfere.

*

As regards the processes of spiritual, and especially of religious, life, that which is morally mediated is often represented from the first as magical.

If any end whatever, which, though perhaps most worthy, is only one particular end, *e.g.* the religious as such, is made our exclusive end, then we put into effect the principle that the end sanctifies the means. We need only refer to Pietism.

*

The tendency of Christian piety towards the external is not in itself erroneous; it is erroneous only as far as it tends towards a false externality, *i.e.* where it does not seek its outward expression in the moral, but in an idle because for practical life unimportant, and therefore morally worthless, externality, inasmuch as it seeks to give itself expression in a purely religious manner.

*

Like all noblest things, piety and religion may be most easily spoiled.

*

Piety, as understood by some, reaches beyond the compass of morality, and that alone is regarded as true and genuine piety which lies beyond these limits. By others, again, a morality is conceived of which can stand in no positive relation to piety, and cannot, therefore, suffer by the want of this relation.

*

Our training in piety ought to educate us to a piety which has few words (in possession, I mean, not merely in use).

*

Because Christians nowadays can make no

progress in the ecclesiastical department (understanding this of the conception of the Church), they imagine that the Christian of to-day should not occupy himself with doing, but should wait quietly till the Lord Himself—*i.e.* without human intervention—provide satisfactory conditions for His people.

*

It is not a sign of specially good Christianity, (being not merely narrow-minded, but also very far from modest and humble,) if we have an eye only for the evils of our time, and can see nothing of its peculiar good.

*

To be discontented with our times, out of humour with the course of history, is within the period of redemption nothing less than impious, no matter how the impiety may seek to disguise itself.

*

Piety is always a relation to a person, whom alone we can trust, obey, and love; in whom alone we can hope. This is why Christ is so peculiarly suitable as an object of piety.

*

How often we find people considering as their characteristic insignia of heavenly honour what are really only the crutches for their weakness!

*

Ordinary pious people cannot conceive man's subjection to God otherwise than as his subjection to arbitrary or statutory ordinances of God.

He who knows the Christian, or indeed the moral life as a whole, only as a religious life, and who then (as cannot fail to be the case) cherishes false ideas about religion, cannot flourish as a man.

*

On the standpoint of exclusively religious morality, the moral subject is indeed necessarily engaged in the exercise of practical moral functions, especially that of individual culture; but it does not consider them as morally commanded (because from the abstract religious point of view they do not appear to be thus required), but solely as a tribute exacted of him by the necessity of nature, and for this reason he treats them with disrespect.

*

Exclusively religious morality is in danger of treating with laxity even formal morality itself. Since it knows nothing of moral mediation in religious matters, it is apt to lose sight of the necessity of mediation in general.

*

If piety considers any moral action as pleasing to God and as desired by Him, which is not really a requirement of the divine world-purpose, which is, therefore, other than a moral purpose, it is, *eo ipso*, transformed into the magical, and thus moral piety comes to suffer in its reputation: for a means of communion with God which has no reality corresponding to it, which it actually, *i.e.* by a causal

connexion, mediates, can be nothing else than a magical means.

*

If, from the fact that religion occupies the central position in the moral being of man, we conclude that his moral development should, and therefore can, begin directly from the religious side, we have drawn our conclusion too hastily. Religious development necessarily presupposes that the beginning, at least, of moral development is already present.

*

The specific danger for piety is idleness, (busy idleness being expressly included,) the *infructuositas vitæ*. Abstract piety is in its very conception slothful.

*

Even piety has special need to bear in mind continually that idleness is the beginning of every vice.

*

An exclusively religious contemplation of matters always produces mental confusion.

*

One characteristic defect, which has from the very first been found in our ecclesiastical piety, is that it does not understand with perfect clearness, that no one will receive everlasting salvation from God except in so far as he actually receives eternal life in himself, and this he can receive only on the path of morality.

*

Piety is not the foundation, but the soul of human

life, alike on its individual and its universal side. Its foundation is material nature.

*

Piety exists in order to harden, not to soften us; the tenderness which it imparts to the character is something very different from the weak-hearted effeminacy of those people who are always occupied with their precious personality and its so-called necessities.

*

A man may be an excellent Christian, and yet not possess the very smallest historical insight.

*

I do not draw any very great distinction between those who are Christians only because they have learned nothing different, and those who, for the very same reason, are *not* Christians. Even the Christianity of those who are Christians *par dépit* is much of the same description.

*

That is no true piety which imagines that the world exists solely for the sake of religion.

THE CLERGY.

Many a man who overflows with assurances of the indispensability of faith in Christ, has a clear understanding of what he says only so far as he is firmly persuaded that without this belief there would be no ministers.

*

Where does office in the Church originate? with

God, or with the congregation? Like all authority it originates in the very nature of the community.

*

Church parties as such exclude themselves from taking any share in church-government.

*

The minister's gown must fall off, and the pulpit be lowered to a level with the congregation.

*

A man may be a true pastor, who is to a certain extent "touchy" (of course, *only* to a certain extent).

*

What kind of people do we need nowadays for pastors? *Men;* but men who are clearly conscious that their manhood comes from Christ alone.

*

He is a worthless parson who makes a trade of religion; but is not the man who chooses it as his profession strongly exposed to the danger of making his profession his trade?

*

He who enters the service of Christ is not clothed in His livery; for Christ has no livery.

*

The interests of Christianity cannot regulate themselves according to the interests of the clerical profession.

*

There is a tendency to arrange Christianity for the most convenient possible use of the clergy.

The chief interest in the Church nowadays lies in the fact, that without it there would be no clergy, and for this reason it is they who chiefly represent it.

*

You must either assign to the synods real ecclesiastical duties, (and in that case they must be performed by men competent to deal with Church matters, *i.e.* by theologians,) or you must assign to them duties which men unacquainted with Church matters can perform as well, and in that case they are not really ecclesiastical duties.

WORSHIP.

Worship is the primitive, absolutely universal communion, which as primitive must necessarily be religious. It is therefore a communion of good works, of prayer (answering to sacrifice), of the word of God, and of worship (answering to adoration). In worship therefore the formative and perceptive faculty on the one hand, and the identical and the individual character on the other, must mutually penetrate each other. The communication of religious knowledge (of the word of God) must be also a direct communication of religious apprehension and intuition (worship), *i.e.* a religious discourse carefully expressed in suitable forms. The communion of religious appropriation (prayer) must be also a communion of religious apprehension and intuition, etc.

*

As moral and religious action and moral and re-

ligious communion develop themselves first of all in the individual form, so also does worship. It occurs in the first place as a communion of prayer (including sacrifice) and devotion (including adoration). A communion of good works and religious knowledge appears in a decidedly pronounced manner only in Christianity. At the same time, the universal religious communities supply the sure foundation on which the individual can be raised. The functions which represent the former must therefore precede in worship the functions which represent the latter.

*

Knowledge in the religious form (the representation in words of religious knowledge), is the word of God.

*

Sacrifice, because of its connexion with religious appropriation, is in its essence grateful surrender of religious possessions to God. For this reason the *body* itself comes within the scope of its objects.

*

Worship is the root from which the Church must spring. It is, of course, the primitive law of an absolutely universal community, which must proceed from the religious side of human nature.

*

The character of the "festive" in worship, is the overpowering of reflection under the immediate impression produced by the religious object.

At the culminating point of their development, self-activity and self-consciousness exist entirely in one another, both in their universal and their individual character,—on the one hand, therefore, making and thinking, and on the other, appropriation and apprehension. This is of special importance as regards worship. The more it culminates along with the culmination of religious life, the more will religious action, *i.e.* sanctification and religious thought, *i.e.* theosophy, on the one hand, and religious appropriation, *i.e.* prayer (sacrifice) and religious apprehension, *i.e.* adoration, on the other, exist in absolute union with one another (the two former in the sermon, the two latter in the Lord's Supper).

*

If the hearer is to follow the sermon with pleasure, what he hears must both surprise him by its novelty, and compel assent by its convincing nature for the *sensus communis.* (Chrysostom.)

*

We want no challenging sermons!

*

Theology, which is from beginning to end theoretical, can have a share of practical work only when ecclesiastical practice is an essential part of its object.

*

The holy day must be a day of joy (of pleasure), in order that man may rejoice in his God. Joyful worship is the purest worship.

Homilists generally reach the text by way of their own ideas, whereas the real point is to understand the ideas of the text and make our own correspond with them.

*

In liturgicis, and in general *in ecclesiasticis*, this principle holds true:—Better classical Latin than barbarous German, where classical German is impossible.

*

If we wish to pray in unison with our Christian forefathers, we must use the same words that they did; for they cannot understand our peculiar mode of speech, while we are very well able to understand theirs.

*

If unorthodox people (like myself, for instance) wish to join in the service of God, they must go to their orthodox neighbours in the Church; for of themselves they can produce no form of public worship, and for this reason they ought to make no objection if others do not regulate their service according to their own ideas. It would be a fine thing, indeed, if in Church matters those who neither belong to nor believe in a Church (good Christians as they may otherwise be), were to lay down the law for those who believe in the Church (even granting that they are worse Christians than themselves). Their self-confidence, perhaps otherwise justifiable, would be here decidedly out of place.

The sermon must continue to hold the principal place in our public worship: because, as our worshipping congregations are at present constituted, they cannot, in their communion of Christian piety as such, rise much above the communion of universal knowledge; they are not morally capable of a real sacrifice of prayer. The reason is found in the actual condition of affairs amongst us. Christian worship as such attains its true perfection only in those periods of Christianity in which this same Christendom is unreservedly regarded as in its essence a Church, and as the only Church.

THE SACRAMENTS.

If a mystery or sacrament is not instituted by Christ Himself, or by some person authorized by Him, it ceases to be a mystery; because, in this case, it lacks the power which is to the believing mind the witness and guarantee of the inward and invisible fact symbolised in the outward ceremony of its administration.

*

If anything speaks against infant baptism, it is, that in this case the specific rite of immersion (*βαπτίζειν*) cannot be administered.

*

Not infant baptism itself, but the conception of baptism which is in direct contradiction to it, should be abolished as reprehensible.

Continuance in baptismal grace is a moral development analogous to the personal development of the Redeemer Himself. But it certainly reaches only a remote approximation to His development. In man's case, the development of sin is a constantly victorious and progressive combat against it.

*

There is no more powerful expression for the essential unity (not identity) of piety and morality than the mystery of the Holy Communion in its original sense.

*

The means of nourishment (bread and wine) were elevated by the Redeemer into means of grace.

*

If we realize the supreme importance which the Redeemer attaches to the loving communion of His people (John xiii. 34, 35; xvii. 21–23), we can understand clearly why He wished to have the mystery of the partaking of bread and wine celebrated at a common meal.

*

In the love-feasts, which were one of the earliest Christian institutions, we see how the Christian community constituted itself in the earliest times as social life.

DOGMA.

It is noteworthy that the Redeemer would have nothing to do with dogmas.

*

Dogma—that is, doctrine authorized by ecclesiastical sanction—has value only on the assumption that it is not a definite and universally acknowledged conclusion of the reason. If it is so, then the ecclesiastical sanction is aimless, and consequently has no meaning. It comes *post festum.*

*

The theologians have taken Christ out of the living reality of history, and changed Him into a fantastically adorned puppet; and now they complain that the world cannot reconcile itself to Him!

*

The chief cause of the rejection of Christ is now, as in the days of His flesh, men's false conceptions about Him:—then, the false conception concerned the Christ, His office; now, it concerns Jesus, the Person.

*

We cannot praise Christ too highly; but as to Christian dogmatics (no matter of what particular Church), we will make no great outcry about that.

*

How many people there are whose heart clings to Christ's atonement for sin, without clinging to Himself.

Dissension is unavoidable, as soon as we begin to lay down dogmas.

*

By the way in which the different ages interpret and understand the Divine revelation in Christ, they all display, although in different degrees, the narrow-mindedness of their own character. (Think, for example, of Lessing.) This is the true test of the spiritual consciousness of humanity in the different stages of its development.

*

The whole expression, "Christian truth," is greatly wanting in clearness. What is "*Christian*" truth? Knowledge in the light of the historical fact "Christ," —a light which is to be conceived of as in continual growth.

*

To have perfect truth ready on the spot (instead of being in possession of the conditions and means for working out the truth for ourselves) is an all too charming thing. Not merely the theologian, but even the Christian, finds it far from easy to withstand this temptation.

*

There are people enough, who in all good faith consider the dogmatic system which the Church has put together from the facts of Divine revelation, as Christianity itself, or as the only Christianity.

*

Dogmatic Christianity is with perfect consistency

also legalistic Christianity. The authority which the conventional possesses in the theoretic department, it naturally retains in the practical.

*

From want of reflection as to the objects of our faith, some people swallow the Church's dogmas whole, while others, for precisely the same reason, quietly leave them alone. Is not the real worth of both very much the same?

*

Can we suppose that Christ should find satisfaction in our swallowing down what is indigestible to us in Christian tradition (in the widest sense of the word) —can we suppose that to belong to what He calls "believing"?

THEOLOGICAL AND SECULAR SCIENCE.

Our contemporaries look for the solution of those questions and difficulties which concern Christianity, no longer, as formerly, from theology or ecclesiastical science, but from secular science. Our theologians and clergy should take note of this indisputable fact.

*

Many complaints are made as to the ignorance of our contemporaries, especially the more cultured among them, as regards Christianity; but it would be much more correct to complain of the great ignorance characterizing our theology, which is, however, quite in accorda[illegible]rance of Christianit[illegible]nly

chargeable upon the unscientific character of our theology.

*

As matters now stand, it is of the greatest importance in the interests of Christianity that its debit shall pass out of the hands of the theologians into those of the laity. The manipulation of it on the part of professional theologians, at least before the present generation, unavoidably carries with it a suspicion of the shopkeeper.

*

One of our most pressing necessities is that secular science should set before itself the task of reaching by its own methods the ends aimed at by theology. Only thus can there be for our educated people, most of whom find it impossible to conduct scientific researches for themselves, another authority, through which they will be able to yield confident assent to all real facts (in the widest sense of the word) in Christianity. For they are, and that not capriciously or without sufficient reason, profoundly suspicious as to the trustworthiness of theological science.

*

The ecclesiastical indifference of people in our days means in many cases nothing more than that, in their opinion, the theologians do not really understand much more about religious questions and problems than they do themselves. Is this such a heavy crime?

*

Whenever the clergyman knows no more of Chris-

tianity than the well-instructed layman, the ecclesiastical office of preacher ceases of itself to exist. It is singular, that the clergy are not allowed to preach the very things which, owing to their theological studies, they really do know better than the laity.

*

It is unfortunate when a weak head gets into the profession of theology. The man's conscience urges him on to search after truth, and his incapacity for such research leaves him fixed in inextricable confusion.

*

In the present position of matters, it happens almost unavoidably, that every earnest young spirit must take up an artificial position in theology, and let his left hand know what his right hand does. In other departments, a man learns his business straight off, without imagining that anything peculiar is connected with it.

*

Among the many confusing definitions, with which so much jugglery is carried on in our present theology, there is none more remarkable than the "foundation of life."

*

At a period when all government is becoming more and more self-government of the people, the laity naturally demand as a condition of their sympathy with ecclesiastical life, that they shall have a

share in the government of the Church, and that this shall not rest entirely in the hands of theologians.

*

No "privileged" truth exists any longer amongst us. Truth can claim authority only in so far as it can actually obtain for itself authority in the conviction of men.

*

Theologians are still very much inclined, when they have a problem to explain, to refer to God, avoiding thus, by a convenient hypothesis, the explanation which it costs them too much trouble to make.

*

All ecclesiastical reforms, which do not proceed from the belief that our laity know better than the clergy what the Church requires, can lead to nothing.

*

I am firmly convinced that the invention of steam-engines and railroads has had a much more important positive influence in furthering the kingdom of Christ than the elaboration of the dogmas of Nicea and Chalcedon.

*

The fact that the Redeemer limited His life-work exclusively to religion as such has made it possible that His work, Christianity, shall continue unalterable through all phases of historical development as a dominant religious force, while it can still remain in harmony with every new development of secular

knowledge, and indeed in such a way that the further that knowledge progresses, Christianity itself is placed by its means in an ever clearer light, and is brought to an ever more perfect comprehension.

CHRISTIANITY OUTSIDE THE CHURCH.

There are, I am aware, innumerable people in our day, who in all sincerity consider Christianity as the sanctuary of men, and who would not at any cost allow themselves to be robbed of their right to call themselves Christians, and who are yet so at variance with ecclesiastical dogma and its practical consequences, that they, *bona fide*, can have no share in maintaining its creeds.

*

A serious man may very well have other things to do in life, than to rack his brains about dogmas and theological controversies. Many a one is very orthodox, simply that he may be able to leave theological quibbles alone.

*

As regards belief in Christ, there will be no radical improvement amongst us, till the ends aimed at by theology are taken in hand by non-theological science.

*

The current assumption in theology always is that the degree of a man's adherence to the Church is the best test of his Christianity. But will a supposition so utterly opposed to all experience ever again be able to secure general acceptance?

How seriously we deceive ourselves in imagining that the proclamation of Christ has attached itself solely to the preaching of the Church, or even that its chief means are found in that! How can it escape our notice that it has long ago sought and found for itself far other, more secular ways, and that its highest success consists in its having transmitted itself, without the aid of any peculiar institution, as a permanent ingredient of the prevalent religious and moral atmosphere!

*

Universal priesthood of Christians as such; not merely of Church members!

*

So long as Christianity and the Church are identical, Independentism is indeed unchristian (*cf.* Schleiermacher: "Prakt. Theol." p. 526, etc.); but the case differs when a Christian community exists even independently of the Church.

*

When theological science has perfected its dogmas, it falls to the lot of secular science to erect a system of theosophy. But the latter does not, like the former, possess an authority by means of which it can give to its work a statutory character.

*

A great deal of that which we consider as a contradiction of Christian faith is only a contradiction of the ecclesiastical formulating and manipulation of it.

Within the compass of Christendom there can be no absolutely pure "natural" man. All men develop themselves from the first under the influence of the principle of redemption which has to some degree become historical in every sphere of life. This is true even of those within its pale who do not acknowledge Christianity, and who have, perhaps, a creed in opposition to it (always, of course, *optima fide*).

*

Within Christendom, especially at the present point of its development, the Gospel is by no means exclusively proclaimed by the Church's preaching and teaching on the subject, and by the use of Holy Scripture. On the contrary, it happens most frequently by indirect methods.

*

One of the chief efforts of believers in the present day, must be to help to set Christ free from the Church.

*

If the Lord Jesus were once more to walk in our midst, would He be able to decide upon any other attire than the costume of the laity?

*

Under no circumstances whatever do I consider any special cut of coat as the suitable costume for Christianity. Only in the dress of the laity does Christianity really feel like itself.

*

Those who take their stand upon a Church are

exposed to sudden and violent fluctuations, owing to the many changes of outward circumstances: those who take their stand on Christianity hold on their steadfast course.

*

How many really pious Christians, especially among our more cultured people, get any real help for their piety from the dogmas of the Church?

*

It is quite without foundation to say that what dogmatism terms "the law," performs the same offices for us at present, which in the *locus de lege et evangelio* were originally laid upon the *lex*. These offices are performed by quite another law, the present law of Christian morality.

*

Christianity proves itself to be an absolute religion, in its not seeking to be a religion *as such*, a religion *à part*. He who seeks to make it so, destroys its character of absoluteness.

*

Whenever we consider evangelical dogma as untenable, we can lay no great stress upon the difference of Churches in Christianity.

*

Christ is "the Lord" in the secular province no less than in the ecclesiastical.

*

It is folly to miss seeing the sovereignty of Christ, which lies visibly before our eyes in the world's

history, in order to await from the future a fantastic sovereignty which, we dream, will arrive in some magical way.

*

In the history of Christianity the blossoms of Christian piety are but separate and transient appearances; the course of historical development is not found in these. Real historical progress lies in the constantly progressive work of the spirit of Christian history directed toward the ever more perfect upbuilding and spread of the Christian moral community.

*

If to the consciousness that we can find our personal salvation nowhere but in Christ, is added this other consciousness, that even the world's history apart from Him presents no way of safety whatever, it is difficult to understand why, as so many seem to imagine, the former consciousness should suffer.

*

In proportion as our religious relations are looked upon as morally conditioned, the idea of national, and in general of natural and material, conditions of sharing in salvation, in the kingdom of God, etc. must fall away.

*

As regards all which is merely ecclesiastical in our Christianity, I have perfect freedom of conscience for my own convictions.

*

That a Christian people would present a poor

appearance with a piety set free from dogma, if its political conditions were otherwise well ordered and sound, cannot be admitted for a moment. Only the Church as an institution, and consequently the clerical profession, would suffer in such a nation. *Hinc illæ lacrymæ !*

*

I do not want Christianity preserved in vinegar and sugar ; I want it fresh from the tree. I want this season's fruit, just as it grows in this year 1800 and so much, on the living tree of universal Christian history.

*

The main point nowadays is to be pious in the open air.

*

Only in our maturer years do we begin to realize what a wealth of meaning lies in the so-called elementary truths of religion ; and what an indescribably great thing it is to be really persuaded of them ! Then, too, we can understand how persons of outstanding piety have been satisfied with these truths alone.

*

He who can pray the Lord's Prayer in sincerity must surely be a Christian.

*

Our aim at the present day should be, not to improve our dogmas or Church doctrines, especially in the treatment of dogmatic subjects ; but to liberate

the general religious consciousness from its previous servitude to the forms of belief contained in dogmas or Church doctrines.

*

Strange misconception that dogmatism must be at any price the highest thing in theology!

*

If the Church can be maintained in existence only by a reserved and secret course of action on the part of its theology and its teachers, only by a restriction laid upon its frankness and sincerity, then we may without regret allow it to fall. Christianity will not fall with it, as it would in the case of dishonest procedure. Let the Church remain where it will, if only truth and honesty come to no harm.

*

He who, like myself, has already passed through religious experiences before becoming more intimately acquainted with the dogmas which have been founded upon them, will be very much disposed to take up a perfectly independent position towards dogmas in general.

*

My disposition is utterly averse to the cultivation of religion *purely as such.*

*

If the more highly cultured people in the Church occupy a free position towards dogma and historical tradition, as compared with the less highly cultured, this difference is to a large extent equalized by the

act that the latter are not *precise* in their acceptation of dogma and tradition, and are indeed quite incapable of being so.

*

Our anti-dogmatic and non-ecclesiastical Christians think thus: Let us wait patiently in the meanwhile, till the theologians, in the course of their special science, have so far purified Christianity from its statutory character that we shall be able once more to reconcile ourselves to it.

*

Why will the State not allow the man to count as a Christian, who expressly acknowledges himself as such, without adhering to any special Christian Church? This is the actual position of numberless people in our own day.

*

To the pious Christian mind the spiteful and jealous rivalry which exists among all Churches without exception, although in very diverse degrees, must render all Churches objectionable.

*

No one who trusts in God's forgiveness will place his confidence in anything but His holy and merciful love; but it may very well happen that our dogmatic formulæ upon the subject, and our whole dogmatic treatment of it, may be decidedly opposed to his peculiar disposition.

*

I grant to no one the right to excommunicate me

from Protestant *Christendom.* In the Protestant *Church* I claim only indulgent tolerance, and even that is not a claim of right.

*

Even the man who holds a most sceptical position towards Churches, dogmas, and the historical in Christianity, may yet, if he is a sensible man, easily perceive that the peculiar religious and moral character of Christianity is indisputably historical, and may thus in all sincerity believe in Christ.

*

Our "moral (practically moral) Christians" and our "believers," who will not admit that the former are "Christians" at all, are alike in this, that they are equally unable to see that the former have received whatever moral worth they possess from Christ and only from Him.

*

In the present age the fate of Christianity is no longer bound up with the fate of confessions and Churches.

*

He who imagines that the fortunes of Christianity are being defended nowadays by dogmatism, or indeed by theology as a whole, has fallen into a serious error.

*

Even in religion (piety) man doth not live on home-baked bread of prose or dogmatics.

Christianity is essentially anti-mythological; but not in its ecclesiastical character.

*

All our ecclesiastical opponents, irreligious as they may personally be, are so far right in their accusations, because their indisputable rights of not being forced to live in a Church to which they cannot in sincerity belong, are always denied them by us. One of the chief moral rights of the individual is to be allowed to be honest and truthful. As matters now stand, cannot we with perfect freedom say to the man who stands outside the Church: Have nothing to say on ecclesiastical matters; for in the position you have taken up respecting them they are no concern of yours.

*

You first dress up Christianity in a coat which turns it into a caricature, and then you wonder indignantly why people turn their backs and scoff at it.

*

If you have such a scorn for the Christianity of so-called free-thinking people, what *better* thing have you to oppose to them?

*

As regards my demands from the Church of the present, I do not take up my position in *Church* history (the Reformation), but in universal *Christian* history.

*

If the course which Christianity, that of the Lord

Jesus Christ, takes in the history of the world, goes contrary to the ideas of our clergy, they will have to alter their ideas to suit it, since the reverse is never likely to happen.

*

The Saviour did not promise the continual influence of the Holy Ghost, in the company of His people, as an influence exclusively in the Church.

*

The question which the Church must perforce ask itself at the present day is whether the history of the world, within the bounds of Christendom, is a Christian history or not.

*

Has that man any less firm foundation for his belief in Christ, who founds it upon the historical influence of the Redeemer, and upon his own personal experience, than he who founds it upon "God's word," *i.e.* upon Holy Scripture?

*

As long as those who profess to represent exclusively the cause of the Redeemer make use of the weapon of scorn against you, as a supposed opponent, you need have no fear that you may possibly be fighting against God.

*

In its own historical surroundings, Biblical Christianity presents a most majestic appearance; but the case is very different when we transport it bodily into a sphere so utterly foreign to it as that of our present

historical position. As regards Christian morals, this is almost universally acknowledged; why not also as regards Christian doctrine?

*

The Lord Jesus Christ and His Christianity can well bear to be contemplated again and again with fresh eyes; indeed they demand it, especially of every new age.

*

We have, thank God! progressed thus far, that our cultivated people who have fallen out with the Church are able, partially at least, to distinguish Christianity from the Church, and do not any longer occupy a position of indifference towards Christianity itself. They have however, at the same time, become certain that the understanding of Christianity is not an affair of learned and technical study, and that it is, consequently, not a privilege of theologians, but that they themselves know something of its nature, and may thus fairly demand that in the treatment of ecclesiastical matters they themselves shall have a hand in the business, not the theologians alone.

*

One chief objection which, in the ordinary treatment of Christianity, many people make to the demand for faith in Christ is, that they cannot understand what practical and life-filling task this faith, in its own peculiar character, sets before humanity.

It is the lesser evil that too little should be spoken of religion rather than too much.

*

Even as regards religious questions, deeds are worth more than words.

*

There must be examples of the fact that a person may be a believing Christian and at the same time a thorough man.

*

What is good for the man, is always good for the Christian.

*

Let no one hide his manhood behind his Christianity! On the contrary, our duty is to let the latter shine through the former.

*

Our duty is to set aside the so-called "Christian religion," and to replace in its stead the Lord Jesus Christ Himself.

*

There are very few who can relish the pure, unadulterated water of life of Christian piety. For most people it is not piquant enough.

*

Oh if we could only help to secure for Christ that historical position in the consciousness of Christendom in which alone His glory is comprehensible!

*

Christianity has actually ruled the world for

eighteen centuries, and is ruling it still; who ever heard of a philosophy that could rule the world?

*

We live in a Christian world, *i.e.* in a world in which the good conquers solely by its own power.

*

I protest against every one who seeks to make Christ a monopoly and Christians a privileged class in society.

*

It forms a part of true Christianity to make no great ceremony about our being Christians.

*

Christ stands, without any assistance from man, as the sun in the sky of history. From Him comes the light that lightens Christendom; only in a very inferior degree from the lanterns lighted by the Church.

*

Many see the light which illuminates the world without seeing the sun from which it flows. Well for him who sees the sun; but even the others have a priceless possession in the light.

*

What a strange delusion it is that we dare not bring Christ to the light! Certainly not, if we have only a dogmatic effigy of Him!


*

Indestructibility of Christ, and consequently of Christianity.

The special glory of Christianity consists in its marvellous variability.

*

The distinction between the Pharisaical (which does not mean anything specially bad) and Christian believers, is the old distinction between the Pharisees and the Lord Jesus Christ,—that the latter sympathises with sinful men, while the former scold and upbraid them.



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